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Abstract 
NASA’s Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) Project conducted research aimed at 
eliminating visibility-induced errors and low visibility conditions as causal factors in civil 
aircraft accidents while enabling the operational benefits of clear day flight operations 
regardless of actual outside visibility.  SVS takes advantage of many enabling 
technologies to achieve this capability including, for example, the Global Positioning 
System (GPS), data links, radar, imaging sensors, geospatial databases, advanced display 
media and three dimensional video graphics processors.  Integration of these technologies 
to achieve the SVS concept provides pilots with high-integrity information that improves 
situational awareness with respect to terrain, obstacles, traffic, and flight path.  This paper 
attempts to emphasize the system aspects of SVS - true systems, rather than just terrain 
on a flight display - and to document from an historical viewpoint many of the best 
practices that evolved during the SVS Project from the perspective of some of the NASA 
researchers most heavily involved in its execution.  The Integrated SVS Concepts are 
envisagements of what production-grade Synthetic Vision systems might, or perhaps 
should be in order to provide the desired functional capabilities that eliminate low 
visibility as a causal factor to accidents and enable clear-day operational benefits 
regardless of visibility conditions. 
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Executive Summary 
Within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety 
Program (AvSP), the Synthetic Vision Systems Project has developed aircraft cockpit 
display system concepts to improve pilot awareness of the external environment by 
providing a perspective computer-generated view of the outside world.  This synthetic 
view of the external environment is created by the use of on-board geospatial databases 
and precise aircraft attitude and positioning information computed by a Global 
Positioning System-based navigation system.  This work was aimed at eliminating 
visibility-induced errors and low visibility conditions as causal factors in civil aircraft 
accidents while enabling the operational benefits of clear day flight operations regardless 
of the actual outside visibility condition.  To meet all of these goals, Synthetic Vision 
(SV) must provide more than just a display of terrain information.  In that regard, a 
Synthetic Vision System (SVS) takes advantage of many enabling technologies that, 
together, create an operational avionics system, including the display of the external 
environment, with independent, redundant information sources to enable substantially 
improved performance and enhanced operational capabilities.  The independent 
informational elements form the basis for monitoring the dynamic flight environment and 
thereby supplement the synthetic world with real-time, direct measurement of the 
surrounding terrain, air / ground traffic and structures / obstacles / objects that are not 
within the databases.  Integration of these enabling technologies into the SVS concept (a 
true system, rather than just terrain depiction on a Primary Flight Display) provides pilots 
with high-integrity real-time geo-referenced information that improves situational 
awareness with respect to terrain, obstacles, traffic, and flight path, both in the air and on 
the ground. 
Numerous research and development activities have been conducted to evaluate, 
investigate, and assess technologies that can lead to operational and certified SV systems.  
From these works and through the cooperative efforts of industry, academia and the 
FAA, certified SVS display concepts could be operational in the very near future (some 
are already operational in the general aviation arena), providing quantifiable operational 
and safety benefits.  This paper attempts to emphasize the system aspects of SVS - the 
fact that an SVS must be a true system, rather than just terrain on a flight display, in order 
to enable the full suite of potential safety and operational benefits envisioned.  An 
additional emphasis is placed on the operational context for the utilization of SVS 
systems, and particularly on the specific intended functions of the SVS systems for 
individual flight applications.  The primary thrust of the paper, however, is to document 
from an historical viewpoint many of the best practices, lessons-learned, and 
considerations that evolved during the SVS Project from the perspective of some of the 
NASA researchers most heavily involved in its execution.  It does not purport to reflect 
the views of either industry or university participants, nor even those of all NASA 
researchers.  In most instances, “best practices” is meant to be synonymous with 
“Recommended Practices” in the context of the vernacular of the Society of Automotive 
Engineers Aerospace Recommended Practice and International Civil Aviation 
Organization documents.  However, there are a few exceptions, all of which are indicated 
as such, in which the Project selected an option or made a decision based on 
programmatic reasons rather than solely on research results.  Many of the symbologies 
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used in the NASA SVS Project were never really evaluated for better alternatives, at least 
by the Project.  For example, the flight path marker symbol varied from straight winged 
to gull winged rather routinely.  Unless things obviously needed improvement, the 
Project invested its resources in other issues.  The NASA Integrated Synthetic Vision 
System Concepts to be discussed in relation to those best practices do not exist as other 
than concepts.  They illustrate what production-grade synthetic vision systems might, or 
perhaps should, be in order to achieve their potential to provide the safety of flight and 
operational efficiency of clear daylight operations, regardless of visibility conditions. 
1. Introduction 
According to the definition advanced by the FAA in AC 120-29A, a Synthetic 
Vision System (SVS) is “a system used to create a synthetic image (e.g., typically a 
computer generated picture) representing the environment external to the airplane” (FAA, 
2002b).  NASA provides more detail in that a Synthetic Vision System is a display 
system (see fig. 1) in which the view of the external environment is provided by melding 
computer-generated external topography scenes from on-board databases with flight 
display symbologies and other information obtained from on-board sensors, data links, 
and navigation systems (Parrish, Baize & Lewis, 2000).  These systems are characterized 
by their ability to represent, in an intuitive manner, the visual information and cues that a 
flight crew would have in daylight -- Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).  The  
 
 
Figure 1.  Synthetic Vision System. 
 
visual information and cues are depicted based on precise attitude and positioning 
information relative to onboard databases of static features such as terrain, airport 
features, obstacles, and relevant cultural features.  Dynamic features may also be 
depicted. For example, traffic information may be presented from surveillance sources 
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such as Traffic Alerting and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Airport Surface 
Detection Equipment (ASDE), Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), 
Traffic Information Services - Broadcast (TIS-B), and / or an Airport surface Target 
Identification System (ATIDS).  Information derived from a weather-penetrating sensor 
by runway edge detection or object detection algorithms or with actual imagery from 
such a sensor, and other hazard information (such as wind shear) may be presented as 
well. 
The SVS Project (1999-2005) was chartered to develop and support the 
implementation of SV systems for commercial transport, business jet, rotorcraft, and 
general aviation aircraft that would greatly improve aviation safety and efficiency of 
operations.  The Project was to emphasize the cost-effective use of synthetic vision 
display concepts (both tactical and strategic), worldwide navigation, terrain, obstacle and 
airport feature databases, integrity monitoring and forward looking sensors as required, 
and Global Positioning System-derived navigation to eliminate visibility-induced 
accident precursors.  To ensure wide-spread incorporation of SV technologies into the 
National Airspace System (NAS) fleet in order to achieve the envisioned safety benefits, 
operational credits for SVS equipage were to also be accentuated by developing and 
demonstrating enhanced operations. 
A large majority of avionics systems introduced since the early days of flight 
(attitude indicators, radio navigation, instrument landing systems, etc.) have sought to 
overcome the issues resulting from limited visibility.  Limited visibility is the single most 
critical factor affecting both the safety and capacity of aviation operations.  In 
commercial aviation, over 30-percent of all fatal accidents worldwide are categorized as 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) - accidents in which a functioning aircraft impacts 
terrain or obstacles that the flight crew could not see (Boeing, 1998).  In general aviation, 
the largest fatal accident category is also CFIT (FAA, 1997), although a further analysis 
of retractable gear single engine aircraft accident data by Lowell Foster of the FAA’s 
Small Aircraft Directorate (Foster, 1998) concluded that ‘loss of horizon for any reason – 
night, IMC, haze or low visibility’ was the top cause for accidents.  Such a category 
would include ‘Continued Flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)’, in 
which low experience pilots continue to fly into deteriorating weather and visibility 
conditions and either collide with unexpected terrain or lose control of the vehicle 
because of the lack of familiar external cues.  Of significant concern in Part 91, 135, and 
121 operations is the problem of runway incursion incidents, which usually involve the 
same causal factors of restricted visibility and compromised situation awareness.  In the 
U.S., runway incursions (a runway incursion is defined as any time a plane, vehicle, 
person or object on the ground creates a collision hazard with an airplane that is taking 
off or landing at an airport under the supervision of air traffic controllers) have increased 
substantially over the last decade.  Although the number of reported occurrences, at an 
all-time high in Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 of 407 occurrences, have decreased (339 in FY 
2002, 324 in FY 2003, 327 in FY 2004, and 324 in FY 2005), runway incursions are still 
a significant threat to aviation safety and operational efficiency (FAA, 2003; FAA, 2004; 
FAA, 2005a). 
Finally, the single largest factor causing airport flight delays is the limited runway 
capacity, increased air traffic separation distances, and degraded airport surface 
operations efficiencies resulting when visibility conditions fall below those allowed for 
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visual flight rule (VFR) operations.  SVS technology may provide a mitigation to this 
visibility problem with a visibility solution, providing the benefits of day-VMC operations 
during flights in IMC and / or night. 
Initial attempts to solve the visibility problem with a visibility solution have utilized 
imaging sensors to enhance the pilot’s view of the outside world.  Such a system is 
termed an “Enhanced Vision System (EVS)”, which, according to FAA (2002b), is “an 
electronic means to provide the flight crew with a sensor derived or enhanced image of 
the external scene (e.g., Millimeter wave radar, FLIR)”.  EVS typically uses advanced 
sensors to penetrate weather phenomena such as darkness, fog, haze, rain, and / or snow, 
and the resulting enhanced scene is presented on a head-up display (HUD), through 
which the features of the external environment may become visible or at least more 
distinguishable by the pilot (Larimer et al., 1992).  The sensor technologies involved 
include either active or passive radar or infrared systems of varying wavelengths.  These 
systems have been the subject of experimentation for over three decades, and the military 
has successfully deployed various implementations.  However, few sensor-based 
applications have seen commercial transport aircraft success for a variety of reasons, 
including cost, complexity, and technical performance in all-weather conditions.  
Although technology advances are making radar and infrared sensors more affordable, 
they still suffer from deficiencies for commercial applications, particularly when 
combined with the pragmatic difficulties of obtaining operational credit for equipage.  
High frequency radars (e.g., 94 GHz) and infrared sensors have degraded range 
performance in heavy rain and certain fog types.  Low frequency (e.g., 9.6 GHz) and 
mid-frequency (e.g., 35 GHz) radars have improved range, but poor resolution.  Active 
radar sensors also suffer from mutual interference issues with multiple users in close 
proximity.  All such sensors also yield only monochromic information with potentially 
misleading visual artifacts in certain temperature or radar reflective environments. 
By definition, SVS displays (see fig. 2) are unlimited in range, are unaffected by 
atmospheric conditions, and can provide a level of service constrained only by the  
accuracy of the on-board database, ownship positioning and attitude information, the 
fidelity of the display media, and the capabilities of the computer memory and processing 
resources.  The rapid emergence of reliable Global Positioning System (GPS) position 
information and precise digital terrain models, including data from the Feb., 2000 Space 
Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM; Rabus et al., 2003), make this approach 
potentially capable of true all-weather performance as well as extremely low cost, low 
maintenance operations, although SVS too faces significant difficulties in obtaining 
operational credit for equipage.  Applied to its fullest potential, SVS technologies should 
provide a revolutionary improvement in aviation safety and utility. 
The SVS Project was to develop technologies with practical applications.  
Specifically, SVS research was intended to demonstrate substantially increased pilot 
situational awareness through the reduction of accident precursors associated with the 
loss of vertical and lateral spatial awareness, loss of terrain and traffic awareness on 
approach, unclear escape or go-around path, loss of attitude awareness, loss of situation 
awareness relating to the runway environment, and unclear path guidance on the surface 
that may otherwise lead to a runway incursion.  In addition, SVS research was to show 
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Figure 2.  Example of SVS primary flight display and navigation display. 
 
how an increase in the efficiency of the NAS could be realized by allowing precision 
IMC operations to many more runways than the current ground infrastructure permits. 
The SVS Project (Baize & Allen, 2001) began officially on October 1, 1999 
(although initial activities such as planning workshops and preliminary technology 
assessment studies began in 1997), and concluded on September 30, 2005.  Participation 
by a multitude of government, industry, and university researchers was broad, either 
under Cooperative Research Agreements (CRA) involving partner investments, or under 
other contractual and grant mechanisms.  There were originally eight CRA teams, which 
included, with the team lead in bold:  
BAE Systems Inc. (formerly Marconi Aerospace Systems, Inc.), CMC 
Electronics, Inc. (formerly Canadian Marconi Company) BAE Systems 
Astronics (formerly Marconi Astronics Corporation), and Nav3D Corporation;  
Rockwell Collins, Inc., Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc, The Boeing Company, 
American Airlines, Delft University of Technology, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University, Flight Dynamics, Inc., and University of Iowa;  
AvroTec, Inc., Avidyne Corporation, Lancair International, Inc., Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Raytheon Aircraft Company, Seagull Technologies, 
Inc., and FAA Civil Aeronautical Medical Institute (CAMI);  
Research Triangle Institute, Archangel Systems, Inc., Flight International, 
Inc., Seagull Technologies, Inc., Dubbs & Severino, Inc. Crew Systems, Inc., 
and FLIR Systems, Inc;  
Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., Marconi ADR, Darmstadt University of 
Technology, Allied Pilots Association, American Airlines, Alaska Airlines, 
Lufthansa German Airlines, and Marinvent Corporation;  
Avionics Engineering Center of Ohio University;  
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Rannoch Corporation;  
Seagull Technologies, Inc., LambCon, Rockwell Collins, Inc., Stanford 
University, and Raytheon Aircraft Company.   
Prominent contractors working under other contractual mechanisms included The 
Boeing Company, Boeing Phantom Works, Cambridge Research Associates, ConITS 
Team (Raytheon Company; NCI Information Systems, Inc.; Analytical Services & 
Materials, Inc.; Aerospace Computing, Inc.; & Genex Systems, LLC.), Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Logistics Management, Inc., 
Max-Viz, Inc., Research Triangle Institute, and Rockwell Collins, Inc. 
Along with a multitude of analytical studies and flight simulation experiments (see 
reference list), the Project also conducted numerous flight tests, some of which were 
under the direction of either industry or university partners.  Notable among those flight 
tests for the purposes of this paper were those conducted under direct NASA control (see 
Table 1).  Those flights included the Project Kickoff Demonstration and Test of SVS 
Technology at Asheville, NC (AVL) aboard the Air Force Research Laboratory’s 
(operated by Calspan Corporation, formerly the Veridian Corporation) Total In-Flight 
Simulator (a modified Convair 580 designated as a NC-131H) in 1999; the Dallas-Fort 
Worth, TX experiment (DFW) aboard the NASA LaRC Airborne Research Integrated 
Experiment System (ARIES) B-757-200 in 2000; the Eagle, CO (EGE) experiment 
aboard the NASA LaRC ARIES B-757 in 2001; the Newport News, VA (PHF) and 
Roanoke, VA (ROA) experiment aboard the NASA LaRC Cessna 206-H Stationaire in 
2002; the CA and NV sensor experiment aboard the NASA ARC DC-8 Airborne Science 
Platform in 2003; the Reno, NV (RNO) and Wallops, VA (WAL) experiment aboard the 
Gulfstream G-V in 2004; and the Roanoke, VA experiment aboard the NASA LaRC 
Cessna 206 in 2005. 
This paper attempts to emphasize the system aspects of SVS - the fact that an SVS 
must be a true system, rather than just terrain on a flight display, in order to enable the 
full suite of potential safety and operational benefits envisioned.  An additional emphasis 
is placed on the operational context for the utilization of SVS systems, and particularly 
on the specific intended functions of the SVS systems for individual flight applications.  
The primary thrust of the paper, however, is to document from an historical viewpoint 
many of the best practices, lessons-learned, and considerations that evolved during the 
project from the perspective of some of the NASA researchers most heavily involved in 
its execution.  It does not purport to reflect the views of either industry or university 
participants, nor even those of all NASA researchers.  In most instances, “best practices” 
is meant to be synonymous with “Recommended Practices” in the context of the 
vernacular of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended 
Practice (ARP) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) documents.  The 
NASA Integrated Synthetic Vision System Concepts to be discussed in relation to those 
best practices do not exist as other than concepts.  They illustrate what production-grade 
SV systems might, or perhaps should be in order to provide the safety of flight and 
operational efficiency equivalent to day-VMC, regardless of visibility conditions.  For 
organizational convenience, much of the ensuing discussion is parsed by two aircraft 
groupings: commercial transports and business jets (CAB), and General Aviation (GA).  
Within the SVS Project, and for the  
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Table 1.  Flight tests under direct NASA control. 
 
# Date Location Aircraft Description References 
1 Sept., 
1999 
Asheville, 
NC 
USAF Total 
Inflight 
Simulator (TIFS; 
Convair 580) 
Demonstration of flights using 
SVS primary flight display; 
compared side by side to high 
resolution color TV camera 
view. 
NASA, 2000. 
2 Oct., 
2000 
Dallas / Fort 
Worth, TX 
NASA LaRC 
ARIES B-757 
Research in night flight 
operations using SVS HUD and 
SVS PFDs (sizes A, D & X); 
RIPS runway incursion 
experiments; Hazard Sensor 
data collection and Hold Short 
Advisory Landing technology. 
Best & Rankin, 
2001; Cassell et 
al., 2001, 2002; 
Glaab et al., 2003; 
Hawes & 
DiBenedetto 
2001; Hyer, 2002; 
Jones et al., 2001; 
Thomas & 
DiBenedetto, 
2001; 
Timmerman, 
2001. 
3 Oct., 
2001 
Eagle-Vail 
Regional 
County 
Airport, CO 
NASA LaRC 
ARIES B-757 
Research in day flight 
operations using SVS HUD and 
SVS PFDs (Sizes A, D & X) 
compared to conventional 
displays; Hazard Sensor data 
collection. 
Bailey et al., 
2002a, b, & c; 
Kramer et al., 
2003, 2004; 
Prinzel et al., 
2003; Schnell et 
al., 2002a. 
4 Aug. – 
Oct., 
2002 
Newport 
News, VA; 
Roanoke, VA 
NASA LaRC 
Cessna 206-H 
Stationaire 
Research in day flight 
operations using SVS PFDs 
compared to conventional 
displays.  Explored terrain 
portrayal concepts with texture 
and DEM resolution variations. 
Glaab & Hughes, 
2003;  
5 July – 
Aug., 
2003 
CA, NV NASA ARC DC-
8 Airborne 
Science Platform 
Database integrity monitoring 
experiments and elevation data 
collection using a Light 
Detecting and Ranging 
(LiDAR) sensor 
Young et al., 
2004; Uijt de 
Haag et al., 2004. 
6 July – 
Sept., 
2004 
Reno, NV; 
Wallops, VA 
Gulfstream G-V Research in day flight and 
surface (runway incursion 
scenarios) operations using 
integrated SVS (SVS HUD and 
SVS PFDs; RIPS; DIME; 
Hazard Sensors) compared to 
conventional displays. 
Arthur et al., 
2005; Cooper & 
Young, 2005; 
Kramer et al., 
2005a; Prinzel et 
al., 2005. 
7 Aug. - 
Sept., 
2005 
Roanoke, VA NASA LaRC 
Cessna 206-H 
Stationaire 
Research in day flight 
operations using SVS PFDs 
compared to conventional 
displays.  Explored 
effectiveness of SVS displays 
to transform IMC flight into 
VMC flight 
Glaab et al., 2006. 
 
 8
purposes of this paper, a GA aircraft is any aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds 
(i.e., no type rating required) which is not involved in Federal Aviation 
Regulations(FAR) Part 121 operations (AOPA, 1997).  More specifically, the SVS 
Project grouped commercial transports and business jets together as facing similar 
research thrusts, technology challenges, and equipment-based certification issues, while 
separately targeting low end GA aircraft.  That particular GA emphasis was selected early 
in the Project development cycle, but even the 2007 Nall Report states: 
“Personal flying – visiting friends or family, traveling to a vacation home, or 
for recreation – accounted for about half of total GA flight time, but suffered 
seven out of 10 total accidents (70.7 percent) and four of five (81.2 percent) 
fatal accidents in 2005, making it significantly more hazardous than other types 
of operations.” 
The above statistics cover all GA types of aircraft.  GA accounted for 94.5 percent of all 
civil aviation accidents and 91.1 percent of all aviation fatalities (AOPA, 2007).  
The paper is organized into seven main sections, including this introductory section.  
The second section provides a background to synthetic vision and the NASA SVS 
Project.  The third section identifies the operational context for the utilization of SVS 
systems, and then proceeds to a description of the functional operations for the subsystem 
components of such systems, with an emphasis on the integration of the subsystems to 
form true systems.  The fourth section enumerates the safety and operational benefits 
enabled by the integration of SVS technologies into true systems.  The fifth section 
presents the specific intended functions of the SVS systems for individual flight 
applications (i.e., phase of flight).  The sixth section details the best practices that evolved 
during the SVS Project, and the final section contains some concluding remarks. 
2.  Background 
At its inception, the SVS Project drew heavily upon prior work by NASA, industry, 
and university researchers working within or sponsored by previous related NASA 
programs.  Examples include the Large Screen Pictorial Displays Project (Hatfield & 
Parrish, 1992; Harris & Parrish, 1992), High-Speed Research (HSR) External Visibility 
Systems (XVS) Project (NASA, 1998), and Low Visibility Landing and Surface 
Operations (LVLASO) Project (Young & Jones, 1998).  As a result of some of this prior 
work, an advanced flight guidance component, namely a Pathway or Highway in the Sky 
display was incorporated into the SVS concept (Parrish, 2003; Parrish et al., 2006).  It 
had been determined that a tunnel or pathway-in-the-sky display, when coupled with a 
synthetic view of the external environment, provides a spatially-integrated depiction of 
the intended aircraft flight path and its relation to the world in an intuitive, easily 
interpretable display of flight-critical information for the pilot.  These two principal 
display concepts, synthetic vision and pathway displays, applied to the Primary Flight 
Display (PFD) have both been under investigation within the flight display research 
community for more than three decades (Sommer & Dunhum, 1969; Adams & Lallman, 
1978; Warner, 1979).  Prior to the NASA research in Large Screen Pictorial Displays and 
High Speed Research External Visibility Systems, and more particularly within the 
NASA SVS Project, these PFD investigations usually have addressed the technologies 
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separately.  With the advent of more contemporary SVS concepts, SVS and Pathway or 
Highway in the Sky displays have become more closely coupled, as will be discussed. 
The earliest flight display work in both technologies (synthetic vision and pathway 
displays) was limited graphically to connected straight line segments by the rendering 
capabilities available then as the state of the art (i.e., stroke generators).  Because 
Pathway Displays attempted to represent the intended flight path of the airplane 
connecting geospatial waypoints, and because of the two dimensional nature of 
Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), which generated rectangular boundaries (while the 
localizer and glideslope of an ILS are angular relative to the centerline of the intended 
path, the intersecting boundaries form a rectangle about that centerline at fixed distances 
from the runway threshold), the earliest Pathway Displays were quite amenable to stroke 
presentations.  The natural inclination to include a runway representation at the end of the 
final approach segment of the Pathway Display led to its initial coupling with SV.  In 
addition to a runway representation, attempts were also made to represent first the ground 
plane, and eventually terrain.  These initial attempts were somewhat primitive, using only 
limited numbers of unfilled polygons.  As computer graphics technology has matured, 
pathway (and terrain) presentations have improved dramatically, although the basic 
concept of presenting the desired vertical and lateral path ahead of the airplane, viewed 
from the pilot’s position, in a three dimensional perspective scene has clearly been 
maintained.  Within the flight display research community, while terminology may vary 
between Pathway, Highway, or even Tunnel Displays, and some concepts may employ 
different flight guidance strategies (including the total lack of flight-director-like 
guidance) and different pathway elements, common confusion over the various 
terminologies for this type of flight display has rarely arisen. 
However, even within the flight display research community, the term Synthetic 
Vision has had different interpretations through the years, which can lead to some 
confusion.  For instance, “synthetic vision” was often a term used for what we now call 
“enhanced vision.”  In particular, the FAA flew a flight test program in 1992 (Burgess, 
1994) referred by the name of “Synthetic Vision Technology Demonstration” although 
the test specifically evaluated millimeter wave and infrared sensors for all-weather 
operations.  Computer-generated imagery – what we know now as Synthetic Vision - was 
not a part of this endeavor.  Initially, rudimentary displays of the airport environment, 
containing only a perspective runway outline and a horizon line and augmented perhaps 
with alphanumeric flight information when character generators became available, were 
termed contact analog, rather than Synthetic Vision, displays (Sommer & Dunhum, 
1969).  With the advent of raster graphics engines, filled polygons allowed for the 
presentation of more realistic, although somewhat cartoonish, airport scenes and 
surrounding terrain (see fig. 3).  These were commonly termed pictorial displays (Parrish 
et al., 1994).  The community viewpoint has finally converged to an acceptance of the 
interpretation of Synthetic Vision as a rendition of the external environment viewed from 
the pilot’s perspective which is rendered by a graphics computer accessing a geospatial 
database, or model, that contains geo-referenced locations of terrain, obstacles, and 
perhaps cultural features.  Imaging sensor information displays are now known as 
Enhanced Vision. 
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Figure 3.  Early raster graphic presentation of an airport scene on a large screen 
panoramic display. 
 
The terminology for Synthetic Vision, and its distinction from Enhanced Vision, 
evolved concurrently with the emergence of graphics rendering and texturing capabilities, 
which allowed raster graphics engines to apply textures to fill polygons thus producing 
more highly realistic scenes.  In some concepts, aerial and / or satellite photography are 
used to provide “photo-realistic” qualities.  Synthetic Vision Displays provide a real-
time, unobscured synthetic view of the world for the pilot.  The display, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, is generated by visually rendering an on-board terrain database (with additional 
airport and obstacle database information as necessary) using precise position and 
navigation (Nav) data obtained through GPS data, possibly with augmentation from 
differential correction sources such as Local Area Augmentation Systems (LAAS) or 
Wide Area Augmentation Systems (WAAS), as well as blending from on-board Inertial 
Navigation System (INS) / Inertial Reference System (IRS) information.   
The definition of Synthetic Vision does not, by itself, dictate or specify the accuracy 
or integrity of the external environment depiction to the flight crew.  However, a pre-
cursor SVS program study highlighted that without an underlying accuracy and integrity 
requirement, the SVS program goals could not be achieved.  The SVS project performed 
significant efforts to establish accuracy requirements and database requirements for SVS 
as will be shown in the following. In addition, the results from this precursor study 
performed in 1994 (Parrish et al., 2003), conclusively showed that “SVS concepts should 
not be implemented without incorporating image processing decision aiding.”  The pilot, 
flying an approach and landing using synthetic vision or synthetic vision and enhanced 
vision imagery, could not reliably or accurately identify navigation system errors, 
database errors, or runway incursions without such decision aiding. 
One critical decision aid was the development of automatic methods by which the 
accuracy and integrity of the synthetic vision display can be ensured by onboard sensors 
and systems, independent of pilot/crew action (Uijt de Haag et al., 2001b).  In addition to 
the need to assure database integrity and accuracy with respect to position, another 
decision aid was required for potential hazard identification.  Although the display 
representation to the pilot is synthetically derived, traffic, obstacles, and other flight 
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hazards not stored in the on-board databases are to be provided by appropriate on-board 
sensors and / or data link sources, and rendered on the synthetic display to augment the 
stored database with dynamic information.  Those sources include active imaging 
sensors, real-time hazard information (e.g., weather and wake vortices) sources, and 
traffic surveillance sources (such as TCAS, ASDE, ADS-B and TIS-B), as well as non-
cooperative traffic (e.g., non-functioning Mode S transponder) and unmapped obstacles 
(e.g., towers) that may be detected by, for example, a multi-mode weather (Wx) radar. 
Similarly, and as will be discussed, Synthetic Vision Displays are applicable to all 
phases of flight and not just airborne operations (the SVS Project attempted to address all 
of the phases, with the exception of the high altitude en route phase, where terrain, 
obstacle, and airport features are of lesser priority).  Still a third decision aid was 
provided with the development of the Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS).  The 
RIPS component of SVS evolved from the results of prior research (Young & Jones, 
1998; Hueschen et al., 1998; Beskenis et al., 1998; Johnson & Hyer, 1999) within the 
NASA LVLASO Program which provide the principal basis for the SVS surface 
operations display concepts.  Specifically, display formats from the Taxiway Navigation 
and Situation Awareness (T-NASA) System research (McCann, 1996; McCann et al., 
1998; Foyle et al., 1998) were evolved into a RIPS design.  Further, these surface 
operations display designs evolved to also include two algorithms for detecting possible 
runway incursions and alerting the flight crew, the Runway Incursion Advisory and 
Alerting System (RIAAS, developed for NASA by Rannoch Corporation, and now 
known as PathProx™) and the Runway Safety Monitor (RSM).  Although tested 
separately early in the SVS Project (Cassell et al., 2001, 2002; Hyer, 2002; Jones et al., 
2001; Thomas & DiBenedetto, 2001; Timmerman, 2001), RIPS later became an integral 
part of the SVS concept while the aircraft was operating on or near the airport surface. 
Synthetic Vision Displays encompass both tactical, strategic, and auxiliary display 
concepts to eliminate visibility-induced accidents.  Tactical SV concepts were generally 
designed to complement the primary flight reference (PFR) requirements for this kind of 
display and thus, left many aspects of this display untouched (i.e., alerting, autoflight 
moding, and required PFR information (altitude, airspeed, heading)).  Tactical SV 
concepts (implemented on the PFD and HUD) generally also included guidance 
information, as synthetic terrain and path guidance are intuitive information pairs.  
Concepts for tunnel or pathway in the sky guidance were researched accordingly.  
Strategic concepts (e.g., flight path management or moving map displays implemented on 
a Navigation Display, ND) are more concerned with incident prevention and avoidance to 
foster effective, proactive decision making.  SVS research was conducted to evaluate if 
synthetic terrain information could appropriately complement or improve existing and 
emerging ND concepts.  Electronic flight bag (or Auxiliary Display) SV concepts have 
been developed to allow mission-rehearsal and FMS-independent flight plan checking to, 
again, foster effective, proactive decision making. 
To develop SVS display requirements approaching a Technology Readiness Level of 
6 (system/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment), the SVS 
Project set-up a research, test and evaluation program to define requirements for display 
configurations and associated human performance criteria, and to resolve human 
performance and technology issues relating to the development of synthetic vision 
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concepts.  Analysis and pilot-in-the-loop experiments were conducted to assess the safety 
and operational benefits that these concepts might provide.  Verification and validation 
methods and tools for the necessary enabling avionics technologies and any supporting 
infrastructure were also required to address postulated certification issues. These issues 
arose when considering whether SVS could become a flight-critical system under certain 
operational conditions.  Aggressive, active participation by synthetic vision advocates 
with appropriate standards and regulatory groups was also pursued in an attempt to lower 
the certification risks and accelerate the introduction of the SVS technologies into the 
NAS fleet as required to achieve the Aviation Safety Program goal of reducing the fatal 
accident rate. 
The vast majority of the SVS Project efforts sought to achieve the potential safety 
and operational benefits of SVS along the path of equipment-based certification and 
within the existing NAS infrastructure.  As the future infrastructure evolves to an 
anticipated "performance-based" environment, the authors have few doubts that SVS 
technologies will be in the forefront as an enabler of that evolution. 
3. Synthetic Vision Systems 
Synthetic vision concepts can be operationally defined in many ways, ranging from 
simple presentations of terrain information to more sophisticated, integrated systems that 
also include airborne and surface pathway guidance information, surveillance information 
(traffic, obstacles), terrain integrity monitoring functionality, and Wx-penetrating 
imaging and hazard detection sensors.  The latter concepts take advantage of many 
enabling technologies that, together, provide more than just a display of terrain 
information but instead offer operational capabilities and enhancements from 
independent, redundant information sources with substantially improved performance 
over those with only terrain depiction alone.  The independent informational elements are 
used to both verify the accuracy of the information contained in the on-board databases 
and, also, to locate hazards (e.g., structures, obstacles, objects) that are not contained 
within the databases. 
This section separately identifies the operational context for the utilization of SVS 
systems aboard CAB and GA aircraft, and then describes the functional operations for the 
subsystem components for each system, with an emphasis on the integration of the 
subsystems to form true systems.   
3.1 System Aspects for Commercial Transports / Business Jets 
While the use of differential GPS (DGPS) and on-board databases can provide the 
primary framework for an operational SVS for commercial transports and business jets, 
many in the civil aviation community believe that independent integrity monitors for both 
surveillance (e.g., Harrah et al., 2002) and navigational (e.g., Young, 2001; Young et al., 
2002, 2003) functions will be required to meet certification and safety requirements.  
This belief stems from the anticipated certification basis (i.e., “intended function”) of an 
operational SVS.  Without independent integrity monitors, SVS will likely only be 
certified as a supplemental system, providing only terrain, procedure, and / or path 
awareness benefits that augment existing systems.  No operational “credit” for 
installation of SVS equipment (i.e., reduced approach minima or increased operational 
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approval) would be gained.  For maximal fleet deployment, an “operational credit” for 
SVS installation should be provided which allows new or additional operations because 
of its installation and use.  This “operational credit” would likely only be possible if the 
SVS includes independent integrity monitors that can verify and validate the information 
on the SVS, to the level of integrity necessary to mitigate the risk of the operation. 
Optimally, this real-time integrity monitoring functionality utilizes existing on-board 
sensor information (e.g., Wx radars, high quality radar altimeters), but with new 
computational architectures and algorithms, to provide both surveillance monitoring and 
geospatial cross-checks against SVS databases and / or positioning information without 
additional or unique sensor requirements.  Specifically, on-board integrity sensors 
(Harrison et al., 2003) can provide independent air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-
ground, and ground-to-air traffic and object surveillance, a runway incursion monitor and 
a confirmation of database integrity (the monitor becomes, in effect, a real-time 
validation of the geo-spatial models ) and registration (navigational position confirmation 
via terrain feature extraction). 
Additionally, the possibility of augmenting SVS concepts with the independent 
capabilities of enhanced vision imaging sensors can allow pilots to act as additional 
independent monitors during low visibility landing and surface operations conditions.  
This cross-checking capability can improve the overall level of safety by the 
complementary nature of EVS and SVS technologies, whereby, from Craig et al. (2002), 
“the strengths of enhanced system can compensate for the deficiencies in the synthetic 
system and that the strengths of synthetic system can compensate for the deficiencies in 
the enhanced vision system.”  EVS can complement SVS by providing a real-time 
enhanced view of the external scene to verify the position of the aircraft and to visually 
identify flight hazards or objects.  Conversely, SVS can complement EVS by providing a 
real-time synthetic view of the external scene to aid the pilot’s recognition and 
understanding of the EVS image, and showing terrain and path information when the 
EVS is obscured or unable to produce an external scene image.” 
These integrity monitoring technologies form the basis for real-time assessment of 
the dynamic flight environment and thereby supplement the synthetic world with real-
time, direct measurement of the surrounding terrain and air / ground traffic.  Integration 
of these enabling technologies into the SVS concept (a true system, rather than just 
terrain on a PFD) provides pilots with high-integrity real-time geo-referenced information 
that improves situational awareness with respect to terrain, obstacles, traffic, and flight 
path, both in the air and on the ground. 
This subsection identifies the operational context for the utilization of SVS systems 
in CAB aircraft (Section 3.1.1), introduces the overall rationale for the inclusion of a 
HUD and enhanced vision imaging sensors as an integral part of the CAB SVS concept 
(Section 3.1.2), and then proceeds to a description of the functional operations for the 
subsystem components of such a concept (Section 3.1.3), with an emphasis on the 
integration of the subsystems to form a true system. 
3.1.1 Operational Uses in IMC 
Three classes of operations (Young et al., 2002) can be considered in IMC 
operations (note that operations in VMC are of less concern as the pilot will have visual 
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references, although night-VMC and marginal VMC operations are more problematical 
and are addressed under GA operations, Section 3.2.1): (1) nominal operations; (2) off-
nominal operations; and (3) enhanced operations. 
During nominal operations in IMC, the aircraft is following a pre-defined and well-
established course or procedure, including appropriate coordination with Air Traffic 
Control (ATC).  During nominal operations, the pilot is either (1) monitoring or engaging 
autopilot modes, or (2) actively controlling the aircraft using flight-director type guidance 
derived from a navigation database or an approach and landing aid such as an ILS.  
Examples include: coupled ILS, GPS, or RNAV(GPS) approaches, and missed 
approaches that follow a defined missed approach procedure.  During nominal 
operations, SVS provides guidance to the published (and presumably correct) path using 
navigation data provided by conventional systems in the form of a tunnel in combination 
with flight-director guidance.  Supplemental to this guidance symbology will be a 
depiction of terrain to improve SA.  Even though stored terrain data may not be used to 
locate the tunnel on the display or to compute flight-director guidance, it has been 
suggested that the compelling nature of the SVS display may introduce Hazardously 
Misleading Information (HMI) during nominal operations if the terrain data has 
insufficient integrity.  For this reason, active integrity monitoring is an integral part of the 
SVS system.  Hazard detection sensors are also active to provide information concerning 
obstacles not contained within the on-board database, and to augment other traffic 
surveillance sources.  Nominal SVS surface operations are conducted in an analogous 
manner, although integrity monitoring of the airport surface database is not provided in 
real time.  However, VMC operations and corrective database feedback procedures serve 
to continuously verify each updated airport surface database version. 
Off-nominal operations in IMC would include unavoidable, inadvertent, and / or 
intentional deviations from the existing operational situations described above.  These 
deviations may be unavoidable due to lack of aircraft performance, weather conditions, or 
on-board emergencies.  Inadvertent deviations may also be due to pilot error (e.g., 
distracted by various other concerns) or induced by ATC requests (e.g., “Gulfstream 
23Alpha, clearance to land 34 Right is cancelled, sidestep to runway 34 Left; cleared to 
land 34 Left.”).  Finally, these deviations may be intentional if pilots deviate to save time 
and / or fuel, for example.  For these off-nominal operational modes, if the aircraft is 
operating near terrain in IMC and has deviated from the tunnel or flight-director, the SVS 
terrain depiction could then be used as a primary navigational aid (analogous to flying 
under VFR).  Once again, SVS provides active integrity monitoring as an integral part of 
the SVS system.  Hazard detection sensors are also active to provide information 
concerning obstacles not contained within the on-board database, and to augment other 
traffic surveillance sources.  When performing off-nominal operations such as the ones 
described, it is anticipated that the acceptable requirements for integrity are more likely to 
be less than for the nominal operations (i.e., “any Nav-aid is better than no Nav-aid”). 
Enhanced operations in IMC include new operational capabilities that become 
feasible with the high-integrity SVS-equipped aircraft.  For example, it has been 
suggested that aircraft equipped with SVS may be able to fly with reduced minimums to 
designated runways.  Other examples include: curved approaches; approaches to runways 
with little or no ground infrastructure (e.g., no ILS); and enabling functions such as 
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dynamically generated path creation and advanced guidance (including, potentially, 4-D 
pathways with required runway arrival times).  All of these new operational capabilities 
(approaching VMC-like capabilities) can conceivably be accommodated by the SVS 
system. 
3.1.2 HUD / Enhanced Vision Imaging Sensor Considerations 
Until the latter part of the SVS Project, HUD equipage was not considered as a 
necessary part of a CAB SVS Concept.  However, the Project conducted extensive 
research on that display element for two primary reasons.  First, HUDs offered a retrofit 
approach for the introduction of SVS displays into non-glass cockpits, as detailed in 
Section 3.1.2.1 below.  Secondly, HUDs offer the more easily acceptable presentation 
method, as opposed to head-down displays, for surface operations during low visibility 
conditions, as discussed in Section 3.1.2.2.  Near the end of the SVS Project, it was 
realized that the use of EVS imagery during low visibility surface operations appeared 
desirable, at least initially, to extend operational capabilities and ease certification 
concerns (in particular, concerns for surface objects and hazards not present in the airport 
database).  This viewpoint has been reinforced by the recent action by the FAA in 
granting operational credit (through lower approach minimums) to aircraft equipped with 
EVS (FAA, 2004a).  A discussion of the rationale for the inclusion of a HUD and an 
enhanced vision imaging sensor as integral parts of an SVS concept is presented in 
Section 3.1.2.3. 
3.1.2.1 Retrofit Considerations 
Significant effort was placed in the SVS Project on the "retrofit" issues associated 
with this advanced display technology (i.e., SVS) since to measurably impact safety and 
operations, a majority of the fleet has to be affected.  Transport Category airplanes 
without glass cockpit displays represent a small portion of the today’s existing fleet, 
although their presence is expected to continue well into the future.  As indicated by the 
data in Figure 4 (Both et al., 1998; Airline Monitor, 2001), the actual and projected 
world-wide fleet of jet aircraft shows that the majority of jet transports are now and will 
remain those equipped with CRTs / LCDs (i.e., "glass" cockpits).  While these data might 
at first be encouraging, retrofit is still a formidable challenge.  Although "glass" displays 
may be installed, the display drivers, graphics drivers, and drawing capability necessary 
to host a SV display system are not necessarily available (Boucek, 2001).  Thus the 
retrofit effort focused upon the compatibility of these existing cockpits and cockpit 
displays to host synthetic vision upgrades. 
Non-glass aircraft have significant display design limitations that will severely affect 
SVS implementation.  Although exact marketing statistics are not presented here, an 
obvious commercial airline market trend is the tremendous growth in the installation of 
HUDs, thanks to the operational benefits granted by an installed Head-Up Guidance 
(HGS) system (McKenna, 1999).  With this trend, a cost-effective retrofit path for SVS in 
HUD-equipped aircraft is made possible.  Analyses and research studies performed over 
the course of the SVS Project have shown the recommended SVS retrofit option for non-
glass cockpits to be the use of the SVS HUD, while continuing to utilize the existing 
electro-mechanical head-down PFD.  The HSI, however, would be replaced by an SVS 
ND (described below in Section 3.1.3.1.3). 
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Figure 4.  Percentage of world jet transport aircraft cockpit display equipage. 
 
Although HUDs have proven operational benefits, the synthetic vision HUD will not 
merely substitute for the traditional head-up displays.  Instead, the approach is to generate 
a synthetic vision image as the raster input source to a stroke-on-raster HUD.  This 
concept for a SVS-HUD is similar to EVS concepts, which typically use forward-looking 
imaging sensors with the resulting image presented on a HUD, through which the outside 
scene may be visible.  The FAA has recently certified an infrared-based EVS for use on a 
business aircraft (FAA, 2001), and even more recently granted some operational credit 
(FAA, 2004a).  In the SVS-HUD concept (see fig. 5), the terrain database scene is 
displayed in either grid form or fully textured instead of the sensor-based EVS image.  
The EVS image replaces the SVS terrain at a declutter height set somewhat above the 
traditional decision height for non-SVS equipped aircraft (see Section 3.1.3.1.2). 
For existing aircraft with glass cockpits (cockpits already equipped with raster-
capable displays), SVS retrofit strategy employs HUD equipage and existing head-down  
 
Figure 5.  The Synthetic Vision HUD Concept. 
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display (HDD) capabilities driven by new graphics processors.  Several issues should be 
considered in cases where both the HUD and PFD are used to provide SVS capabilities.  
These issues include, for example, differences in minification (the HUD has no 
minification – i.e., the minification factor is unity, although there are instances of non-
conformal, minified symbology being employed on HUDs), FOV, color, and the 
brightness control and raster washout issues associated with HUDs.  These issues are 
examined in Section 6. 
3.1.2.2 Surface Operations Considerations 
The RIPS was developed to function optimally for aircraft equipped with a HUD, 
although aircraft without a HUD can still benefit from the surface situational awareness 
information cues, and the alerts of runway conflicts and route deviations.  Without a 
HUD, the functionalities lost are the head-up surface guidance capabilities and the head-
up conflict position cues during alerts.  The remaining functionalities are presented 
effectively on the RIPS head-down moving map display of the airport surface (RIPS 
details are presented below in Section 3.1.3.2). 
One of the more interesting issues, specifically the presentation of surface guidance 
symbology, has involved both the HUD, which is used for that purpose in RIPS, and the 
ND in an exocentric viewing mode.  Research on the latter utilization was conducted 
within the NASA HSR XVS program for the High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT).  The 
proposed HSCT vehicle had no side windows and the forward visibility through the front 
windows was of little use in turns because of the extreme forward position of the crew 
station relative to the nose wheel of the vehicle.  Very successful surface operations were 
conducted aboard the Surface Operations Research and Evaluation Vehicle (SOREV; 
Kaiser, 1998), a full scale ground vehicle representative of the HSCT geometry, enabled 
by surface guidance presented head-down on an exocentric taxi coplanar map on the ND 
during taxi operations.  However, the SVS Project researchers, and particularly those 
researchers involved directly in RIPS development, felt strongly that the pilot conducting 
taxi operations should be heads–up with full attention directed to the outside 
environment, even in low visibility conditions.  Concerns for potential surface objects 
and hazards not present in the airport database led to that opinion.  The minimal research 
conducted within the SVS Project that involved surface operations in low visibility 
conditions on aircraft without HUD equipage is discussed in Section 6.1.3.1.1. 
3.1.2.3 HUD / Enhanced Vision Imaging Sensor Inclusion Rationale 
The original SVS Project rationale for HUD equipage, motivated solely by its 
advantages for low visibility surface operations, was augmented by changes in the 
regulatory environment.  Near the end of the SVS Project, the FAA changed the aircraft 
operating rules under Part 91 to provide operating credit for EVS by revising the decision 
height flight visibility requirements for conducting operations to civil airports.  Operators 
conducting straight-in instrument approach procedures may now operate below the 
published approach minimums (Decision Altitude, Minimum Descent Altitude) when 
using an approved Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) that shows the required visual 
references on the pilot’s Head-Up Display (e.g., the image shows the FAA-approved 
elements of the runway environment such as approach and runway lighting).  As a result, 
the use of EFVS in civil aircraft is now projected to increase rapidly.  While the FAA 
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prefers the terminology EFVS in order to invoke ‘flight visibility’ requirements, for this 
paper it is synonymous with the commonly used EVS terminology. 
Thus, supplementing the previously existing operating credit for HUD equipage, 
EVS sensor equipage now provides additional operational advantages in low visibility 
conditions.  And EVS sensors with at least short-range weather-penetration capabilities 
will be potentially useful during low visibility surface operations to detect surface objects 
and hazards not present in the SVS airport database.  Further discussion of EVS sensor 
imagery can be found in Section 3.1.3.4.1 and Section 6.1.5. 
Combined with the considerations of the RIPS surface guidance aspects and the 
potential advantages for low visibility surface operations, the extension of operational 
credit for HUD equipage and an EVS sensor led to the inclusion of a raster HUD with an 
EVS sensor image as an integral part of NASA’s CAB SVS concept. 
3.1.3 The Integrated SVS Concept 
The NASA Integrated SVS Concept for CAB aircraft (see fig. 6) provides a virtual 
visual environment that is not simply an aid or adjunct to human visual perception, but 
rather integrates many technologies (see Table 2) that together meet, or exceed, human 
capabilities found during visual rules flight.  The concept is described in the following 
sections as encompassing the integration of tactical and strategic Synthetic Vision 
Display Concepts (SVDCs, Section 3.1.3.1), RIPS alerting algorithms and display 
concepts (Section 3.1.3.2), real-time terrain Database Integrity Monitoring equipment and 
algorithms with precision navigation guidance (Section 3.1.3.3), and Enhanced Sensor 
Technologies (Section 3.1.3.4).   
3.1.3.1 Synthetic Vision Display Concepts.  The SVDCs embody the human-
machine interface to the SVS concept for the pilots, providing the integration of tactical 
and strategic information necessary for operations in the NAS.  These display elements 
are presented on multiple display surfaces (HUD; PFD; ND; and Synthetic Vision 
Auxiliary Display, SV-AD, or Electronic Flight Bag, EFB).  In addition to flight 
operations, these displays also present the tactical and strategic display concepts for 
surface operations, including the RIPS functionality discussed below in Section 3.1.3.2, 
and the symbology transition strategies for air-to-ground operations and ground-to-air 
operations.  Display elements include, for example: perspective terrain, flight path 
guidance, a runway location confirmation or misalignment wire-frame or outline (the 
runway confirmation outline positioning is extracted from real-time on-board sensors, 
with the outline overlaid, verifiably, upon the synthetic runway), and obstacle and traffic 
information, both in the air and on the surface.  Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
(CDTI) is presented on both the tactical flight displays (i.e., HUD and PFD) and the 
strategic ND in an integrated fashion, and Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
(TAWS) information and a vertical situation display (VSD, which presents a vertical 
profile of terrain along track) are also displayed on the ND.  All of the display concepts 
are enabled by information supplied in part by the technology elements (Runway 
Incursion Prevention System, Database Integrity Monitoring, and Enhanced Sensor 
Technologies) discussed below. 
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Figure 6.  Block diagram of Integrated SVS Concept for CAB aircraft with glass 
cockpits. 
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Table 2.  Functions and technologies involved in the Integrated SVS System 
 
Technologies  
Function Flight Operations Surface Operations 
SVS 
Displays 
Traffic 
Avoidance:  
• CDTI  
• Surface traffic 
map 
 
• TCAS 
• ADS-B 
• TIS-B 
• ATIDS 
• Air-to-air mode of 
advanced WxR 
• ATC Communications  
• ADS-B 
• Datalink (ASDE, 
CPDLC) 
• Ground-to-ground mode 
of advanced WxR 
• Ground-to-air mode of 
advanced WxR 
• ATC Communications 
• RIPS algorithm 
• HUD 
• PFD 
• ND 
• SV-AD 
Obstacle 
Avoidance 
• Air-to-ground mode of 
advanced WxR 
• EVS 
• ATC Communications 
• NOTAMs 
• Ground-to-ground mode 
of advanced WxR 
• EVS 
• ATC Communications 
• NOTAMs 
• HUD 
• PFD 
• ND 
• SV-AD 
Surveillance 
Runway 
Incursion 
Prevention 
• ADS-B 
• Air-to-ground mode of 
advanced WxR 
• ATC Communications 
• EVS 
• RIPS algorithm & alerts 
• ADS-B 
• Datalink (ASDE, 
CPDLC) 
• Ground-to-ground mode 
of advanced WxR 
• ATC Communications 
• EVS 
• RIPS algorithm & alerts 
• HUD 
• PFD 
• ND 
• SV-AD 
Position • IRU/INS/FMS 
• ADF 
• DME 
• DGPS 
• GNSS 
• WAAS 
• LAAS 
• Database Integrity 
Monitor 
• IRU/INS/FMS 
• DGPS 
• GNSS 
• WAAS 
• LAAS 
 
 
Path Guidance • FMS 
• Flight director 
• ILS 
• SVS pathway symbology 
• CPDLC 
• RIPS surface guidance 
• RIPS route deviation 
alerts 
• NOTAMs 
• HUD 
• PFD 
• ND 
•  
Navigation 
Terrain 
Avoidance: 
• CFIT 
• Land Short 
• DLRA 
• TAWS 
• SVS terrain 
• SVS pathway 
• SVS Pathway / Terrain 
Conflict Algorithm 
• FLIR 
 • HUD 
• PFD 
• ND 
• SV-AD 
Database 
Integrity 
Database 
Integrity 
Monitor 
• DLRA 
• WxR 
• Not applicable Loss of 
integrity: 
• HUD 
• PFD 
• ND 
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For organizational convenience, the display concepts are discussed in the following 
topic order: PFD, HUD, ND, Auxiliary Display, Display Integration, and SVS Tunnel / 
Terrain Conflict Detection Algorithm. 
3.1.3.1.1 PFD.  The egocentric SVS PFD has various implementations as the 
tactical display concept for SVDC, depending on whether the application is limited to 
retrofit of Size A displays or whether larger sizes can be utilized.  Size-A displays, as 
with other small display surfaces, must contend with the more severe minification issues 
associated with Field of View (FOV) of the synthetic scene (to be discussed later under 
Section 6.1.2.2.1) which affect both the closed loop handling qualities associated with the 
guidance symbologies as well as the terrain features.  For the Size-A display, airspeed, 
vertical speed, and altitude are presented externally on existing round dials (see fig. 7) as 
opposed to integrated analog/digital “tape” presentations as employed for larger size 
displays (e.g., the Size D SVS PFD of fig. 8).  In general, various studies have been 
conducted that demonstrate similar results are obtained for both presentation styles.  For 
example, results from Abbott & Steinmetz (1987), indicate that while no differences were 
noted in airspeed or altitude tracking performance, subjective pilot comments suggested 
that there was lower workload for the integrated tape formats. 
But, conceptually, an SVS PFD is more than just the addition of terrain data, 
airborne and surface pathway guidance information, and surveillance and other hazard 
information (traffic, obstacles) to a conventional PFD.  Symbology in the form of iconic 
representations of detected objects is used for hazard presentations, including traffic 
symbology that conforms with the CDTI Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
(MOPS; RTCA, 2001), but perhaps the most important symbology element incorporated 
into the tactical displays (SVS PFD and SVS HUD) is the velocity vector (see fig.2).  For 
SVS displays, the relationship between the velocity vector symbol and the terrain, and the 
velocity vector symbol and the pathway / tunnel provides the pilot with intuitive 
awareness of the current and future spatial situation.   
3.1.3.1.2 HUD.  Analyses and research studies have established the best SVS 
retrofit option for tactical SVS displays in non-glass cockpits to be the use of HUDs, 
while continuing to utilize the existing electro-mechanical head-down instrumentation 
(Glaab et al., 2003; Kramer et al., 2004b).  In the SVS application, the HUD includes 
features not traditionally employed in commercial aircraft operations.  The SVS terrain 
database scene is presented on the HUD as a grid or textured raster image with stroke 
symbology overlaid upon it.  In the SVS-HUD concept (see fig. 5), the EVS image 
replaces the SVS terrain at a declutter height set somewhat above traditional non-SVS 
equipped decision height (see Section 5.1.3 and Section 6.1.2.1.2.2 for details) and 
remains for low visibility surface operations.  Within the SVS Concept, a complement of 
EVS imaging sensors may be included to provide additional independent information.  
Further details on the use of EVS imaging sensors within the SVS Concept are presented 
in Section 3.1.3.4.1. 
3.1.3.1.3 ND.  A conventional ND provides an exocentric coplanar “god’s-eye” 
view of navigation-related information in present-day commercial transport and business 
jet aircraft.  The ND can also incorporate TAWS and VSD capabilities (see fig. 9).  Often 
surveillance information is overlaid on the navigational display (CDTI) as well.  An SVS 
ND would provide additional capabilities with the addition of terrain with TAWS caution 
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and warning overlays (FAA, 2002a) to help a pilot’s cognitive understanding of ownship 
position and track relative to traffic, terrain, and obstacle hazards (see fig. 10).  The 
terrain display is presented from an absolute altitude perspective. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Image of Size-A display for 30 º FOV with photo-textured terrain, illustrating a 
dial format. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Image of Size-D display for 30 º FOV with photo-textured terrain, illustrating a 
tape format. 
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Figure 9.  Conventional exocentric coplanar navigation display with TAWS. 
 
Figure 10.  SVS coplanar navigation display with TAWS overlays. 
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An innovative feature of an SVS ND has been to enable pilots to select between 2-D 
and 3-D exocentric views (see fig. 11).  In this case, the terms 2-D and 3-D pertain to the 
perspective, or viewpoint, of the display.  The 3-D perspective display is used to convey 
depth or “z-axis” information to the pilot (the 3-D mode does not employ stereoscopy).  
Pilots normally use the 2-D synthetic vision coplanar navigation display.  However, the 
pilot can initiate a “situation awareness” mode that changes the display frame-of-
reference from a 2-D “god’s-eye” view to a dynamic 3-D exocentric perspective view.   
 
Figure 11.  Selectable 2-D coplanar and 3-D “situation awareness” (perspective view) 
modes of SVS navigation display. 
 
In another mode of the SVS ND, an enhanced moving map (EMM) display (Foyle et 
al., 1998; McCann, 1996; McCann et al., 1998) of the airport surface as part of the RIPS 
is presented during short final approach and surface operations (RIPS details are 
presented below in Section 3.1.3.2). 
3.1.3.1.4 Auxiliary Display.  The SV-AD or EFB provides an extra display surface 
on the flight deck with multiple uses, among which are: a) to provide the RIPS EMM 
display to the PNF to allow crew coordination in the conduct of surface operations (e.g., 
runway exit selection) while the PF has a ND approach mode selected (RIPS details are 
presented below in Section 3.1.3.2); b) to provide an additional display for the PNF of 
EVS imagery such as FLIR imagery during final approach and surface operations 
(assuming continuation of the present-day civil equipage practices of single HUD rather 
than dual installations); and c) to provide display of a dynamic 3-D exocentric “mission 
rehearsal” tool that pilots can use to step through and rehearse complex or unfamiliar 
airport approaches, departures, and / or non-normal procedures prior to initial descent or 
departure during a low workload portions (e.g., cruise) of a flight (see fig. 12). 
3-D “situation awareness” mode 
(perspective view) Coplanar SVS mode 
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Figure 12.  Rehearsal tool mode using SVS ND “situation awareness” format. 
 
3.1.3.1.5 Display Integration.  Aside from the numerous occasions that arise to 
apply human factors display integration principles to conventional tactical (PFD, HUD) 
and strategic (ND) displays, the incorporation of terrain, traffic, and iconic 
representations of detected obstacles or hazards on both displays presents additional 
opportunities.  For example, among other integration features of SVDC is the 
incorporation of CDTI symbology on both displays.  One of the most effective techniques 
employs FOV lines that are drawn to enclose the forward area on the ND encompassed 
by the view presented on the SVS PFD.  It becomes an easy and intuitive task to correlate 
features such as individual traffic or a ground-based hazard such as a radio tower on each 
display (see fig. 13). 
3.1.3.1.6 SVS Tunnel / Terrain Conflict Detection Algorithm.  TAWS has 
undoubtedly addressed the problem of CFIT accidents in a positive manner and forms an 
integral part of SVDC.  However, TAWS follows the “warn-act” model and therefore 
requires the flight crew to be reactive rather than proactive.  The technology provides a 
warning when theoretically the flight crew has already lost spatial and situation 
awareness and must then perform an escape maneuver.  In addition, TAWS sometimes 
generates false alerts during operations in mountainous areas due to the method of flight 
path projection (i.e., TAWS has no integration with the planned flight path).  Since 
processors within an SVS possess sufficient information to graphically present both 
terrain and the planned flight path, an algorithm to detect tunnel / terrain conflicts well 
before the conflict point is approached has been envisioned as part of SVS (such an 
algorithm, although easily realized, was never implemented within the program) as 
another independent check and balance feature. 
3.1.3.2 Runway Incursion Prevention System.  NASA has developed a RIPS as 
an integrated subsystem of the SVS concept to improve airport safety by providing 
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supplemental surface situational awareness information and guidance cues, and alerts of 
runway conflicts and route deviations directly to the flight crew (the alerts can also be 
provided to air traffic control).  RIPS integrates airborne and ground-based technologies, 
which include advanced flight deck displays, incursion detection and alerting algorithms, 
onboard positioning systems, airport surveillance systems, and Controller-Pilot Data Link 
Communications (CPDLC), with a highly accurate airport geographic database. 
 
 
Figure 13.  SVS primary flight display and coplanar navigation display with 
neighborhood traffic and ground obstacles. 
 
The RIPS makes use of these advanced displays, data links, and DGPS to enable 
equipped aircraft to operate at airports independent of visibility while ensuring safety 
from traffic collisions.  This is done by providing pilots with supplemental situational 
awareness and guidance cues, a real-time display of airport traffic, and alerts of runway 
incursions and route deviations on both a HUD and an EMM of the airport on the ND (or 
on the SV-AD). 
The HUD is used to provide improved position awareness and guidance during final 
approach, landing, rollout, turn-off, and taxi.  Symbology presented during landing 
transitions to surface guidance at touchdown.  During landing rollout, deceleration 
Traffic 
Obstacles
Obstacles
Traffic 
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guidance to a pilot-chosen exit is provided, along with centerline and runway edge 
symbology (see fig. 14).  During taxi, centerline and taxiway edge symbols are provided 
along with centerline tracking guidance to an assigned gate location.  Non-conformal 
information depicting the taxiway centerline and aircraft gear location is also shown (see 
fig. 15), which aids particularly in turns. 
 
Figure 14.  Illustration of RIPS HUD landing/rollout deceleration guidance format (all 
HUD symbology is monochrome green). 
 
 
Figure 15.  Illustration of RIPS HUD turn guidance format using non-conformal taxi 
director symbology (all HUD symbology is monochrome green). 
 
RIPS Taxi Director Symbology 
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The EMM (see fig. 16) shows graphically a perspective track-up view of the airport 
layout, current ownship and traffic locations, and ATC instructions (including the 
approved taxi route and hold short locations).  Runway incursion alerts are also generated 
and displayed to the flight crew, while runway incursion, route deviation, and crossing 
hold alerts are presented aurally.  Upon landing and during taxi, the EMM is displayed in 
place of the ND (a pilot may also elect to display the EMM during final approach). 
 
Figure 16.  RIPS Electronic Moving Map (EMM). 
Two algorithms for monitoring traffic and generating alerts for potential runway 
incursions, PathProx™ and RSM, were developed and evaluated under the SVS Project.  
RSM (Green, 2006) uses a generic approach for detecting and generating incursion alerts 
and is not designed to detect only specific incursion scenarios.  The RSM monitors traffic 
that enters a three-dimensional virtual protection zone around the runway that is being 
used by the ownship.  Incursion detection is based on the operational state of the ownship 
and traffic, as well as other criteria (separation and closure rate), to avoid false alerts.  
Identification, position, and altitude data is used to track the traffic in the protection zone.  
Traffic data projections are calculated within RSM since, from flight test experience, 
reliable position updates are not received at consistent intervals.  RSM generates a 
Warning alert, which occurs when a runway incursion is detected and evasive action is 
required to avoid a potential collision.  Information provided with each alert includes 
identification of the incurring traffic and separation distance to potential conflict.  RSM 
was developed for NASA by Lockheed Martin. 
The PathProx™ detection algorithm (Cassell et al., 2003) works on the same general 
premise as the RSM, utilizing runway zones and tracking of traffic within that zone.  
However, PathProx™ is specifically designed to handle over 40 specific runway 
incursion scenarios.  Alerts are issued based on the states of the ownship and traffic and 
on conditions including position, speed, and track angle.  PathProx™ generates two types 
of alerts analogous to the TCAS approach.  A Caution alert (Runway Traffic) informs the 
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flight crew of a potential incursion or an incursion where the conflict does not yet require 
evasive action.  The crew can take evasive action, however, at their discretion.  
PathProx™ also generates Warning alerts (Runway Conflict) when immediate evasive 
action is required.  Information provided with each alert includes identification of the 
incurring traffic, the associated runway, and separation distance between the traffic and 
ownship.  PathProx™ was developed by Rannoch Corporation. 
The alerts are presented to the flight crew both visually on the displays and audibly.  
An audible enunciation is made in the flight deck (“Runway Traffic, Runway Traffic” for 
a RTA and “Runway Conflict, Runway Conflict” for a RCA).  The textual forms of these 
alerts are presented on the HUD, PFD and ND / EMM (see fig. 17).  On the ND and 
EMM, the traffic symbol representing the incurring vehicle is enlarged, changes color 
(yellow for RTA and red for RCA) and is highlighted by a target designator box.  The 
identification tag is also highlighted.  A target designator box also highlights the 
incurring traffic on the HUD and PFD.  In the event the incurring traffic symbol is not 
shown because of the display scale or field-of-view, a symbol is pegged on the edge of 
the display in the direction of the traffic.  The distance to the conflict is also shown on all 
the displays.  Audible route deviation and crossing hold alerts are also generated by 
RIPS.  Route deviation alerts are generated if the ownship leaves its assigned path during 
taxi.  Crossing hold alerts are generated if the ownship crosses a hold line when not 
cleared to do so by ATC. 
 
Figure 17.  RIPS runway conflict alert on SVS HUD, PFD, and EMM displays. 
3.1.3.3 Database Integrity Monitoring.  The NASA CAB Integrated SVS 
Concept provides for real-time validation of the terrain Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) 
SVS HUD 
SVS PFD SVS EMM 
 30
and obstacle databases.  During the Project this functional capability was instantiated for 
multiple experiments and referred to as Database Integrity Monitoring Equipment 
(DIME).  DIME functionality allows the SVS designer to bound the integrity of the 
relative position of the DEMs with respect to the aircraft’s estimated position and 
attitude.  DIME can make use of various ranging sensors including, for example: radar 
altimeters, forward-looking X-band Wx Radar (WxR), or omni-directional GPS Bi-Static 
Radar (GPSBR) technology.  Integrity bounds are established for any sensor by using 
detection theory tenets and assuming a direct relationship between integrity potential and 
the probability of missed detection for a given DIME architecture.  In general, DIME 
functions by comparing measurements (made by sensors) to expected values that are 
computed using estimates for position and attitude and the DEM. 
Because its measurements are primarily in the vertical dimension (i.e. from nadir), 
radar altimeter measurements are most useful in detecting vertical errors, while the 
forward-looking sensors are more sensitive to lateral or angular errors (as well as obstacle 
hazards).  A forward-looking capability also provides for increased time-to-alarm.  
Detecting problems along and in front of the flight path (see fig. 18) allows the pilot to 
maneuver the aircraft to avoid areas of uncertainty with respect to the DEM. 
3.1.3.4 Enhanced Sensor Technologies.  Enhanced Sensor Technologies for the 
NASA CAB Integrated SVS Concept include EVS imaging sensors (e.g., Forward-
Looking Infra-Red, FLIR; Millimeter Wave Radar, MMWR), which are discussed first, 
and Advanced Hazard Detection Sensors (e.g., advanced WxR), which are discussed last, 
for hazard, object, and runway confirmation or misalignment detection, as well as terrain 
feature extraction to support Database Integrity Monitoring requirements. 
 
Figure 18.  Database Integrity Monitoring Equipment. 
 
3.1.3.4.1 Enhanced Vision Systems Imaging Sensors.  It appears quite possible 
that a complement of EVS imaging sensors may be included in the initial 
implementations of SVS in commercial transports equipped with HUDs to extend 
GPS
WAAS
Radar Altitude
Wx Radar
 31
operational capabilities and ease certification concerns, particularly for low visibility 
surface operations.  EVS imaging sensors consist of active or passive sensors that are 
used to penetrate weather phenomena such as darkness, fog, haze, rain, and snow.  
Enhanced vision systems have been installed on military aircraft but have been 
infrequently found on commercial transport aircraft due to cost, complexity, and 
technical performance.  However, with the recent action by the FAA in granting 
operational credit to aircraft equipped with EFVS, installation in commercial transport 
aircraft is expected to increase.  Enhanced vision sensor imagery depends upon the 
external environment and the sensor characteristics.  For example, high-frequency radars 
(e.g., 94 GHz) and infrared sensors may exhibit degraded range performance in heavy 
precipitation and certain fog types.  On the other hand, low-frequency (e.g., 9.6 GHz) and 
mid-frequency (e.g., 35 GHz) radars have improved range, but often have poor display 
resolution.  Active radar sensors can suffer from mutual interference when multiple users 
are in close proximity.  Finally, present enhanced vision sensors do not extract color 
attributes which may potentially create misleading visual artifacts under certain 
temperature (such as daily thermal inversion) or radar reflectivity conditions.  But in the 
use of FLIR imagery, for example, for low visibility surface operations, range 
performance degradation is less of an issue, and a grey-scale presentation of an 
obstruction on a runway or taxiway is better than no presentation at all. 
The EVS image outputs are available, not only for traditional EVS image 
applications such as display as a raster image on a HUD or a SV-AD, but also for further 
image processing with both object and edge detection techniques for detection of obstacle 
conflicts and runway alignment errors.  From this processing, system advisories to the 
pilot of detected alignment errors and obstacle conflicts, as well as iconic representations 
within the outside scene of detected objects are enabled.  Such iconic presentations 
eliminate the need to train pilots in the use of sensor imagery to overcome the inherent 
visual artifacts present in weather-penetrating sensor imagery.  Sensor imagery is also 
available for potential insertion/fusion in SVS scenes. 
3.1.3.4.2 Hazard Detection Sensors.  In addition to the utilization of EVS sensor 
image processing for hazard detection (obstacles, runway misalignment), the NASA CAB 
Integrated SVS Concept also employs an advanced X-band Multi-mode WxR, not only 
for the traditional provisions of Wx and wind shear detection information, but with new 
modes for advanced hazard detection.  These new modes have both improved range and 
angular resolution to sufficiently detect and locate objects (preliminary results show that 
this technique can provide 1-3 meter range resolution and less than 1º of angular 
resolution, with 1/3º being a reasonable goal). 
In today’s commercial transport fleet, by far the most common forward-looking sensor is 
the weather radar.  Specifically, X-band pulse Doppler radars are used primarily to 
provide flight crews with a display of weather information and to provide forward-
looking wind-shear detection capability.  A secondary purpose, as described in ARINC 
(1999), is “ground-mapping to facilitate navigation by display of significant land 
contours”.  Cramer, M.R. (1996) describes use of the radar ground-mapping mode in the 
narrow Gastineau Channel for Juneau, Alaska operations “to ‘paint’ the terrain in the 
channel. This provided an exceptional aid to crew situational awareness, adding to the 
integrity of the navigation, so the weather radar was added to the minimum equipment 
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list for using these procedures”.  Although using the WxR display to aid navigation was 
historically a pilot-specific talent derived from extensive use of the device, recent work 
has shown that integration with DEMs can be used to supplement on-board navigation 
systems and to detect potential ground-based hazards (man-made objects such as towers 
or terrain of significant height) (Dieffenbach, 1995 Ammar, 1999; Morici 2001).  
Utilization of this mode of the WxR enables the integrity monitor to use feature 
extraction techniques along with a statistical assessment of similarity measures between 
the sensed and stored DEM features that are detected to surmount the shortcomings of 
forward-looking sensors alone.  Thus the advanced modes of the WxR can provide 
information enabling the database integrity monitor to provide both a confirmation of 
database integrity and a registration function (navigational position confirmation via 
terrain feature extraction).  The integrity monitor would warn the pilot whenever the SVS 
is operating in a degraded mode and that continued flight along the same trajectory may 
be hazardous. 
In an air-to-air application mode, the advanced WxR can be used to detect airborne 
traffic that have at least 1 square meter radar cross section within approximately 6NM 
and angularly within the field-of-view of the radar to supplement, in blended fashion, 
surveillance information from TCAS, ADS-B and TIS-B sources as well as to protect 
against non-cooperative (non-transmitting) traffic. 
In an air-to-ground application mode, the advanced WxR can be used to detect 
unmapped ground towers, to provide runway location to position the runway 
confirmation or misalignment wire-frame display element on the SVS PFD (see fig. 19; 
verifiably, the wire-frame overlays the synthetic runway), to detect runway obstacles, and 
to provide terrain features for the DIME functionality.  The advanced WxR has “ground 
mapping” capabilities to generate a map of the terrain in front of the aircraft to enable 
detection of mapped / unmapped ground towers and other terrain features with significant 
height (e.g., those that impinge upon flight altitudes or upon required obstacle clearance 
boundaries) and to provide terrain features for the integrity monitor.  A different form of 
Terrain Feature Extraction is used to locate the runway using a nominal ownship location 
and an airport database.  Once the radar has confirmed the location of the runway, it 
switches to verifying that the runway is clear of any large objects, including other 
aircraft, airport vehicles, or major debris. 
In a ground-to-ground application mode, the radar uses an ultra-short range 
configuration and continues to locate ground traffic / obstacles during runway / taxi 
operations.  This information is blended with other available surface surveillance 
information (e.g., ASDE, TIS-B).  And finally, in a ground-to-air mode, the radar 
searches the airspace in front of the departing ownship to detect neighboring airborne 
traffic. 
3.2 System Aspects for General Aviation Aircraft 
Unlike transport and business jet aircraft, low-end GA aircraft with installed 
electronic displays such as HUDs and Flight Management Displays (FMD) are very rare.  
Although today many useful GPS-based pilot aiding devices are available to the GA pilot 
on the commercial market, no operational credit is offered by such portable devices.  
Separate aircraft attitude information and vacuum systems are only standard in high-end 
GA aircraft.  Such severe restrictions are imposed because display space, equipment 
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weight and most especially cost constraints (the “trio of GA constraints”) combine to 
mean lesser capabilities are available.  Therefore most existing low-end GA aircraft are 
modestly to poorly equipped for IMC operations (even without consideration of aircraft 
performance limitations and lack of other auxiliary systems, such as anti-icing 
capabilities).  For these same reasons, DGPS and on-board databases alone will provide 
the primary framework for an operational SVS for most low-end GA airplanes. 
 
Figure 19.  The wire-frame display element of the SVS PFD. 
 
Limited display space implies small display surfaces, which in SVS applications 
translates into minification issues (to be discussed later under Section 6.1.2.2.1.1) which 
affect both the closed loop handling qualities associated with the guidance symbologies 
as well as the terrain features.  While these issues are generic to both aircraft groupings 
(commercial / business jet transports and GA), the severe panel limitations of GA 
airplanes exacerbate the problems.  From the GA system aspect, the importance of 
careful integration of the SVS PFD and ND to emphasize cohesive, conjunctive 
operations is essential. 
GA integration issues include SVS integration with TAWS, if the GA aircraft should 
be so equipped.  The Small Aircraft Directorates Advisory Circular 23-26 (FAA, 2005b) 
states: 
 
“The SV display must not provide any information that is in conflict with or 
incompatible with either the terrain warning or terrain awareness functions 
of the Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS).” 
and 
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“Any airplane equipment incorporating an SV system should also provide some type 
of terrain warning for pilots.” 
 
So an SVS-equipped GA aircraft may or may not have TAWS, but it will always 
have some type of terrain warning (see Section 3.2.2.1.4). 
In the transport world, where independent integrity monitors for both surveillance 
and navigational functions may be required to meet certification and safety requirements, 
low-end GA constraints limit the capabilities of even the primary sensors for those 
functions, when they exist at all.  Air Data Attitude Heading Reference System 
(ADAHRS) capabilities can only begin to approach the INS / IRS / Inertial Reference 
Units (IRU) of the transport world (although affordable GPS may change that situation), 
while Flight Management Systems (FMS) may be very limited or nonexistent.  The same 
situation prevails concerning surveillance sensors, weather radars and high quality radar 
altimeters for GA airplanes, which typically have none of those functionalities, as well as 
concerning capabilities of weather-penetrating, enhanced vision imaging sensors and 
HUDs for low visibility landing and surface operations. 
While the equipment restrictions for GA aircraft are extreme, at the same time the 
experience, qualifications and proficiency of GA pilots is much more varied than the 
somewhat homogeneous, highly trained pilot group of the transport world.  For instance, 
crew (dual pilot) versus single pilot operation is a significant factor in GA operations. 
More importantly, the pilots of commercial transports and business jets are actively 
involved in flying on a weekly, if not daily, basis.  Private pilots, particularly recreational 
pilots, fly much more irregularly.  Thus, in addition to cost constraints, limits in the 
operational sophistication of the component systems (including the pilots) are important 
safety considerations for the GA SVS. 
This subsection identifies the operational context for the utilization of SVS systems 
in GA aircraft (Section 3.2.1) and then proceeds to a description of the functional 
operations for the subsystem components of such concepts (Section 3.2.2), with an 
emphasis on the integration of the subsystems to form true systems. 
3.2.1 GA Operations (Off-Nominal VMC, Nominal IMC, Off-Nominal IMC, 
Enhanced) 
Unlike the case with commercial transports and business jets, four classifications of 
operations are considered for GA aircraft.  The extra classification is an Off-Nominal 
condition to cover both marginal- and night-VMC.  For the remaining three 
classifications, the entire emphasis is again being placed on IMC operations, as nominal 
operations in VMC are of less concern with the presence of pilot visual references in 
those conditions: (1) off-nominal VMC operations (marginal- and night-VMC); (2) 
nominal IMC operations; (3) off-nominal IMC operations; and (4) enhanced operations. 
For marginal VMC operations, the GA SVS provides a means for safe visual 
transition back to VMC for non-instrument rated pilots inadvertently encountering a low-
visibility environment, enabling low-time GA pilots to maintain spatial orientation and 
situation awareness, and thus potentially eliminating low-visibility loss of control 
(LVLOC) and CFIT accidents.  SVS terrain depiction is presented on both the attitude 
indicator and the ND in an integrated fashion and may be used as a supplement to TAWS 
 35
(if present) and the primary navigational information.  For night-VMC operations, SVS 
terrain depictions are intended to be used as supplements to TAWS, the primary 
navigational information, and the window, which is the primary terrain reference. 
In nominal IMC operations, SVS equipage attempts to replicate the functionality of 
IMC-equipped GA aircraft, although with all of the advantages of an integrated tactical 
and strategic SVS display suite (including terrain and guidance pathway features).  The 
aircraft is following a pre-defined and well-established course or procedure, including 
appropriate coordination with ATC.  During nominal operations, the pilot is either (1) 
monitoring or engaging autopilot modes, or (2) actively controlling the aircraft using 
flight-director type guidance derived from a navigation database.  Examples include: 
approaches to WAAS or ILS approach minima.  During nominal operations, SVS 
provides guidance using navigation data provided by conventional systems in the form of 
a tunnel in combination with flight-director guidance.  Supplemental to this guidance 
symbology will be a depiction of terrain on both the attitude indicator and the ND in an 
integrated fashion to improve SA.  However, because of the GA equipage constraints, 
active integrity monitoring is not envisioned as part of the Basic SVS system (see fig. 
20).  Likewise, hazard detection sensors are not available to provide information 
concerning obstacles not contained within the on-board database, and typically neither is 
information from traffic surveillance sources other than ATC.  Nominal SVS surface 
operations are conducted based merely on normal ATC communication channels and an 
ownship position taxi map display. 
Off-nominal IMC operations would include unavoidable or inadvertent deviations 
from the existing operational situations described above.  These deviations may be 
unavoidable due to dynamic ATC instructions (holding patterns, vectors to the approach), 
lack of engine performance, weather conditions, or on-board emergencies.  Inadvertent 
deviations may also be due to pilot error (e.g., distracted by various other concerns).  For 
these off-nominal operational modes, if the aircraft is operating near terrain in IMC and 
has deviated from the tunnel or flight-director, the SVS terrain depiction may be used as a 
supplement to TAWS and the primary navigational information.  Once again, SVS does 
not provide active database integrity monitoring, and there are no hazard detection 
sensors or surveillance information concerning obstacles not contained within the on-
board database. 
Enhanced operations include new operational capabilities that become feasible with 
the SVS aircraft equipped with advanced systems that provide active database integrity 
monitoring and surveillance information.  For example, it has been suggested that aircraft 
equipped with SVS may be able to fly with reduced minimums to particular runways.  
Other examples include curved approaches, approaches to runways with little or no 
ground infrastructure (e.g., no ILS or approach lighting), and perhaps lower Minimum 
Enroute Altitudes.  All of these new operational capabilities can conceivably be 
accommodated by the Enhanced SVS system (see fig. 21). 
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Figure 20.  Block diagram of Basic SVS Concept for GA aircraft. 
 
3.2.2 The Integrated GA SVS Concept 
The Basic SVS for GA aircraft does not modify current operational principals and 
procedures, either VMC or IMC, as conventionally determined by aircraft equipage and 
pilot qualification.  The second category, the Integrated GA SVS Concept, is a GA 
Enhanced SVS system with more capable SVS equipment that is envisioned to obtain 
operational credit in terms of advanced operational capabilities.  In terms of display  
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Figure 21.  Block diagram of Enhanced SVS Concept for GA aircraft. 
 
elements, however, the differences between the Basic system and the Enhanced system 
are in whether or not there is a large enough display for an integrated PFD, an accounting 
for the real time elements (i.e., traffic) not present in the on-board databases, and whether 
or not there is active database integrity monitoring.  A Basic SVS system, because of a 
small display, may not have integrated airspeed and altitude data on the attitude indicator, 
relying instead on mechanical gauges for airspeed and altitude in a manner similar to a 
CAB Size-A display (see fig. 7).  For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that a 
large enough display will exist to present an integrated PFD.  More significantly, the 
Basic SVS system provides no surveillance information and no active database integrity 
monitoring.  Only the integration of tactical and strategic SVDCs is provided.  The 
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Enhanced SVS system encompasses the integration of tactical and strategic SVDCs with 
surveillance information (available, for example, from ADS-B, TIS-B, ASDE, etc.), RIPS 
alerting algorithms and head-down display concepts, and real-time terrain DIME 
functionality.  However, because of the “trio of GA constraints”, hazard detection sensors 
are assumed to be not available to provide information concerning obstacles not 
contained within the on-board database for either system. 
For organizational convenience, the system concepts are discussed in the following 
topic order: SVS Display Concepts, Runway Incursion Prevention System, and Database 
Integrity Monitoring. 
3.2.2.1 SVS Display Concepts.  The SVDCs embody the human-machine 
interface to the SVS concept for the pilots, providing the integration of tactical and 
strategic information necessary for operations in the NAS.  These display elements are 
presented on the PFD and ND displays.  In addition to flight operations, the ND also 
presents the strategic display concept for surface operations (including, for the Enhanced 
SVS system, the RIPS functionality discussed below in Section 3.2.2.2) and employs 
symbology transition strategies for air-to-ground operations and ground-to-air operations.  
Display elements, including terrain and flight path, are presented on both the primary 
flight display and the ND in an integrated fashion (and CDTI is also presented on both 
displays for the Enhanced SVS). 
For organizational convenience, the display concepts are discussed in the following 
topic order: PFD, ND, Display Integration, and SVS Tunnel / Terrain Conflict Detection 
Algorithm. 
3.2.2.1.1 PFD.  The GA SVS PFD is an adaptation of the egocentric SVS PFD for 
CAB with the integrated analog / digital “tape” presentations for airspeed, vertical speed, 
and altitude.  The GA Basic SVS PFD (see fig. 22) incorporates only the terrain 
presentation with airborne pathway guidance information, as surveillance information 
and surface guidance are not available because of the “trio of GA constraints”.  The GA 
Enhanced SVS PFD includes the requisite sensor and / or receiver technologies to 
provide CDTI.  Neither the GA Basic nor the Enhanced SVS PFD has a surface 
operations mode, as only strategic information is provided for surface operations. Again, 
the most important symbology element incorporated into the tactical display is probably 
the velocity vector.  And since tactical displays have some strategic elements, just as 
strategic displays have some tactical elements, a careful integration of the SVS PFD and 
ND to emphasize cohesive, conjunctive operations is essential. 
3.2.2.1.2 ND.  The GA Basic SVS ND is an exocentric coplanar “gods’-eye view” 
navigation display that incorporates terrain (see fig. 23) with TAWS caution and warning 
overlays.  The Enhanced SVS ND provides available surveillance information conformal 
to the CDTI MOPS. 
3.2.2.1.3 Display Integration.  Similar opportunities to those that arose to apply 
human factors display integration principles to the CAB tactical and strategic SVS 
displays occur with GA SVS displays.  For example, FOV lines are drawn to enclose the 
forward area on the ND encompassed by the view presented on the SVS PFD (see fig. 
23).  The GA Basic SVS does not employ CDTI traffic symbology as the enabling 
sensors and / or TIS-B receivers for supplying such information elements are not present 
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(the Enhanced SVS does present surveillance information on both the PFD and the ND in 
an integrated fashion).  Upon landing and during taxi, the EMM is displayed in place of 
the ND for surface operations. 
 
Figure 22.  The GA Basic SVS PFD. 
 
 
Figure 23.  The GA Basic SVS ND on approach to ROA. 
 
3.2.2.1.4 SVS Tunnel / Terrain Conflict Detection Algorithm.  Since processors 
within an SVS possess sufficient information to graphically present both terrain and the 
planned flight path, an algorithm to detect tunnel / terrain conflicts well before the 
conflict point is approached has been also envisioned as part of SVS as another 
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independent check and balance feature.  Unlike TAWS, which follows the “warn-act” 
model and therefore requires the flight crew to be reactive, the SVS technology is 
proactive and provides a warning before the flight crew has encountered a flight path / 
terrain problem. 
3.2.2.2 Runway Incursion Prevention System.  NASA has developed a version 
of RIPS for the GA Enhanced SVS to improve airport safety by providing supplemental 
surface situational awareness information, and alerts of runway conflicts and route 
deviations directly to the pilot.  This version of RIPS, which includes a perspective track-
up view of the airport layout, current position of the ownship, current positions of other 
traffic, and ATC instructions (provided that Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication 
(CPDLC) exists), is essentially the same as that developed for commercial operations, 
with a few exceptions.  Although RIPS was developed to function optimally for aircraft 
equipped with a HUD, aircraft without a HUD (i.e., most GA aircraft) can still benefit 
from the surface situational awareness information cues, and the alerts of runway 
conflicts and route deviations.  Jones (2002) demonstrated conclusively that RIPS can be 
effective with only the EMM.  Also, since many GA aircraft operate at small, non-
towered, minimally equipped airports, traffic surveillance is achieved through ADS-B or 
TIS-B technology and, therefore, is not reliant on airport surface surveillance systems 
(although other traffic surveillance sources can be utilized, if available). 
The GA Basic SVS is not equipped to receive or display traffic information or data 
linked ATC instructions and therefore is only able to utilize the EMM as a taxi map for 
position awareness.  No RIPS alerts are possible. 
3.2.2.3 Database Integrity Monitoring.  It was recognized within the Project 
that the GA Enhanced SVS would require DIME functionality to provide database 
integrity monitoring in order to achieve the emulation of day-VMC operations in low 
visibility conditions.  However it is unlikely that a monitor based on a forward-looking 
X-band WxR would be affordable for most GA operators.  The GA Enhanced SVS is 
therefore envisioned as equipped, aside from conventional IMC navigational systems 
(DGPS, INS, IRUs), with a downward-looking radar altimeter (DLRA) as a component 
part of a DIME approach to provide database integrity monitoring for detecting vertical 
DEM errors only.  The operating range of a typical DLRA is zero to 2500 feet AGL, but 
the operational concept suggests DEM integrity is only needed at lower altitudes.  Should 
technology maturation of a GPSBR occur as a component of a Forward Looking 
Autonomous Integrity Monitor (FLAIM), both lateral and vertical monitoring would be 
possible (see Section 6.1.6.3).  The DIME functionality would warn the pilot should 
integrity be lost that the SVS is operating in a degraded mode and that continued flight 
along the same trajectory may be hazardous. 
4. SVS Benefits 
Synthetic Vision systems are intended to reduce accidents by improving a pilot’s 
situation and spatial awareness during low- visibility conditions, including night and 
IMC.  Synthetic vision technologies are most likely to help reduce the types of accidents 
which can be attributed to be visibility-induced crew error, where better pilot vision 
would have been a substantial mitigating factor (e.g., CFIT, Low Visibility Loss of 
Control, and Runway Incursion accidents).  Better pilot vision is provided by synthetic 
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vision display systems.  These technologies will serve as a substantial mitigating factor 
for aircraft accidents of other types as well. 
The potential benefits to be discussed within this section assume the integration of 
SVS technologies into a true system that provides more than just a display of terrain 
information.  In that regard, a Synthetic Vision System takes advantage of many enabling 
technologies that, together, create an operational avionics system, including the display of 
the external environment, with independent, redundant information sources to enable 
substantially improved performance and enhanced operational capabilities.  Numerous 
analytical, simulator and flight test studies comparing SVS to conventional displays have 
documented the potential of SVS displays for providing improved aviation safety, 
enhanced pilot vehicle performance, and increased NAS capacity.  Improved aviation 
safety is conjectured through demonstrated increases in situation awareness with respect 
to terrain, traffic, flight path and other external hazards.  Such conjectures have been 
validated though simulation studies where pilots were intentionally led into a CFIT 
situation or into other hazardous scenarios that were successfully avoided though the use 
of the synthetic vision system (e.g., Arthur et al., 2004a).  Intuitive display and 
presentation methods off-load the pilots from basic spatial awareness tasking (e.g., to 
avoid terrain, traffic, and obstacles) and increase their speed of situation recognition.  
These gains have been demonstrated particularly during approaches and departures at 
terrain-challenged airports (e.g., Bailey et al., 2002b) and in surface operations at 
operationally-complex air terminals (e.g., Jones et al., 2001).  Study results have 
consistently shown that SVS display concepts have provided enhanced pilot vehicle 
performance in terms of more precise hand-flown path control and significantly improved 
spatial awareness, as evidenced by reduced flight technical error (FTE) and quickened 
hazard detection and avoidance response times (e.g., Arthur et al., 2004a).  These gains in 
performance were accompanied by equivalent or, in most cases, reduced pilot workload.  
Further, it has been hypothesized that NAS capacity could increase due to the potential 
for increased visual-like operations (e.g., 3 nm in-trail separations) gate-to-gate even 
under restricted weather conditions (e.g., as low as Category IIIb minimums).  However, 
this particular hypothesis has yet to be tested. 
Most of the benefits that have been attributed to SVS are generic in their applications 
to both commercial transport / business jet and general aviation aircraft groupings, while 
a few are specific to a particular aircraft group.  However, as any assessment of benefits 
may be enhanced by an understanding of the specific issues being addressed, and for 
organizational convenience, much of the ensuing discussion is parsed by two aircraft 
groupings: Commercial Transports/Business Jets and General Aviation aircraft. 
4.1 Commercial Transports / Business Jets 
Commercial aviation is among the safest modes of transportation.  However, the 
growing demand to fly regardless of the weather has led to an accident rate that is far 
from ideal.  Aircraft accidents serve as powerful reminders of the risks involved and how 
much safer flying can and should be.  As previously discussed, SVS systems offer the 
potential to eliminate low-visibility conditions as casual factors in civil aircraft flight 
accidents.  The SVS Project targeted specific accident categories for CAB aircraft, 
including runway incursions, approach and landing accidents and incidents, and CFIT 
accidents. 
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Technology has advanced that allows for the emergence of synthetic vision systems 
that can fundamentally change how aircraft are operated in IMC.  By creating virtual 
VMC, synthetic vision has the potential to eliminate a common precursor to many 
accidents and incidents (i.e., limited visibility) and substantially improve the safety and 
operational efficiency of aviation.  However, to achieve its fullest potential, the SVS 
system must have performance, reliability, integrity, and safety functionally equivalent to 
today’s CAT IIIb systems.  For organizational convenience, the safety benefits are 
discussed first, followed by the operational benefits. 
4.1.1 Safety Benefits 
Synthetic Vision Systems are characterized by the ability to represent visual 
information and cues of the environment external to the aircraft that are intuitive and 
resemble visual flight conditions with unlimited ceiling and visibility.  As an illustration 
of the safety benefits of SVS, consider the rare event scenario results of Arthur et al. 
(2004a).  As part of a larger simulation study, each pilot flew twenty-two approach – 
departure maneuvers in IMC to the terrain challenged EGE in Colorado.  For the final 
run, flight guidance cues were altered such that the departure path for each evaluation 
pilot went into terrain.  All pilots with an SVS PFD (twelve of sixteen pilots) noticed and 
avoided the potential CFIT situation.  The four pilots who flew the anomaly with the 
conventional baseline PFD configuration, which included a TAWS and a VSD on an 
enhanced ND, had a CFIT event.  Additionally, data metrics from the entire experiment 
revealed that all of the SVS display concepts enhanced the pilots’ situational awareness, 
decreased workload and improved FTE compared to the baseline display configuration, 
during the numerous nominal and the single anomalous operations. 
In terms of safety benefits (Williams et al., 2001; Hasan et al., 2002b; Hasan et al., 
2002a; Prinzel et al., 2004e), synthetic vision may help to reduce many accident 
precursors, including:  
• Loss of vertical and lateral path awareness (spatial awareness) 
• Loss of terrain and traffic awareness  
• Loss of altitude awareness 
• Unclear escape or go-around path even after recognition of problem 
• Transition from instruments to visual flight 
• Loss of situation awareness relating to the runway environment  
• Non-compliance with ATC clearances 
• Loss of situation awareness relating to the airport surface environment 
• Loss of traffic awareness on the surface 
• Unclear path guidance on the surface 
• Unusual attitude 
• Spatial disorientation 
 
SVS is postulated to emulate day-VMC in limited visibility conditions, including 
night and poor weather.  Using SVS, the overall incident / accident rate is expected to 
approach that of day-VMC.  Some of the expected safety benefits are:  
• Reduction in CFIT accidents, including landing short of the runway accidents 
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• Reduction in runway incursion incidents and accidents 
• Improved situation awareness 
• Improvement in unusual-attitude / upset recovery 
• Improved non-normal situation management 
• Improved emergency operations (such as one-engine-out operations) 
• Improved compliance with ATC clearances 
 
These safety benefits should be particularly evident during non-normal and 
emergency situations.  In these non-normal events, mental workload and tasking / 
attentional demands placed on the pilot are high (Prinzel et al., 2005c).  SVS provides for 
improved pilot detection, identification, geometry awareness, prioritization, action 
decision and assessment, and overall situation awareness not afforded by today’s 
avionics.  These improvements allow the pilot to be proactive in avoiding hazardous 
conditions instead of reactive to alert cautions and warnings with traditional cockpit 
displays. 
4.1.2 Operational Benefits 
Despite the safety benefits provided by SVS, operational and economic benefits 
must be considered for Part 121 and 135 operations because of the costs associated with 
implementation of these systems and the very small profit margins associated with 
commercial flights.  Conventional technologies enable aircrews to conduct en route 
operations in all-visibility conditions as well as low visibility approaches and landings to 
appropriately equipped runways.  Analyses have shown that SVS could serve to increase 
NAS capacity by providing the potential for increased visual-like operations gate-to-gate 
even under extreme visibility restricted weather conditions (e.g., Category IIIb 
minimums).  For example, a NASA-sponsored cost-benefit analysis of 10 major US 
airports calculated the average cost savings to airlines for the years 2006 to 2015 to be 
$2.25 Billion (Hemm et al., 2001).  While these savings are predicated on several 
technology developments and successful implementation / certification, this analysis 
indicates the potential order of magnitude savings and operational efficiencies offered by 
these technologies. 
SVS features (e.g., surface guidance, taxi maps, tunnels / pathways / highways-in-
the-sky, velocity vectors, command guidance cues) allow pilots to rapidly and accurately 
correlate ownship position to relevant terrain, desired flight paths / plans, cultural 
features, and obstacles.  These elements enable the pilot to monitor navigation precision 
in order to comply with complex approach and departure procedures, such as Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP), Area Navigation (RNAV), Global Navigation Satellite 
System Landing System (GLS), curved, step-down, or noise abatement procedures, 
without the need for ground-based navigation aids (e.g., ILS; Very high frequency 
Omnidirectional Range navigation system, VOR; Distance Measuring Equipment, DME; 
Automatic Direction Finder, ADF; Non-Directional Beacon, NDB; LOng RAnge 
Navigation, LORAN) that are expensive to install and maintain. 
As an example of the enhanced operations provided by SVS, consider the results of 
two NASA studies that have addressed RNP operations (Kramer et al., 2004b; Arthur et 
al., 2005).  Those two studies found that SVS would enable manual RNP operations that 
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are significantly smaller for lateral RNP (5 and 2.5 times smaller, respectively) and 
within required vertical performance accuracy values than similar operations with 
conventional instruments. The outcome would be an increase in the number of RNP 
operations to runways that otherwise would not meet current Minimum Aviation System 
Performance Standards (MASPS; RTCA, 2000), resulting in a significant economic 
advantage to airlines employing SVS technology (Hemm, 2000; Hemm et al.., 2001). 
Operational benefits of synthetic vision systems (Williams et al., 2001), 
characterized as clear day flight operations, regardless of the actual outside visibility 
condition, may include:  
• Provision for more approach and departure options 
• Reduced departure and arrival minimums 
• Reduced converging and circling approach visibility minimums 
• More flexible low visibility approach operations (e.g., RNAV and RNP 
procedures) to Type I and non-ILS runways 
• Better allowance for converging and circling approaches, especially for dual and 
triple runway configurations 
• Potential transference of in-trail and lateral spacing from ATC to the aircrew 
(self-spacing and station keeping capability) regardless of visibility 
• Reduced inter-arrival separations 
• Provision for independent operations on closely-spaced parallel runways 
• Provision for precise noise abatement operations in all weather conditions 
• Better RNP adherence 
• Provision of 4D navigation capability 
• Oceanic route optimization, spacing, and ownship reporting 
• Enhanced path guidance, compliance monitoring, and alerting 
• Intuitive depiction of terminal, restricted and special use airspace 
• Intuitive depiction of traffic and weather hazards and resolutions 
• Enhanced mission planning / rehearsal capability 
• Intuitive depiction of ATC cleared flight paths and taxi clearances 
• Enhanced surface operations (e.g., rollout, turn off and hold short, taxi) 
• Reduced runway occupancy time in low visibility 
• Increased operational efficiency with faster taxi times in IMC 
• Potentially reduced training requirements due to intuitive nature of information 
presentation 
• Piloting aid support (e.g., flare guidance, runway remaining, navigation guidance) 
• Enhanced flight management 
 
In addition to supporting nominal, off-nominal, and enhanced operations, SVS will 
provide intuitive visual support to pilots in emergency situations.  In periods of loss of 
control or other non-normal scenarios during which crew attention is diverted, SVS 
provides improved situation awareness (e.g., ownship position relative to terrain and 
obstacles).  The likelihood of human errors with auxiliary systems and / or navigational 
tasks because of the high workload conditions will be reduced.  SVS assets for these 
types of scenarios could include:  
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• Intuitive cues for upset recognition / recovery, and loss of control recovery 
• Improved situation awareness (terrain, traffic, Wx) during emergency descent 
(e.g., engine out drift down, smoke / fire, depressurization) 
• Intuitive depiction of missed approach path and guidance 
• Intuitive depiction of emergency approach terrain and obstacles 
• Enhanced support and guidance for emergency procedures  
• Alternate airport and runway diversion planning 
 
4.2 General Aviation 
Within a report of the 1999 NTSB accident database (AOPA, 2000), GA accounted 
for 85 percent of all aviation accidents and 65 percent of all aviation fatalities.  The 
leading cause of GA fatal accidents is loss of the horizon for any reason.  This could be 
due to darkness, IMC, haze, or low visibility.  The majority of low end GA pilots do not 
have the vast experience of commercial jet pilots, and are therefore more easily 
disoriented in low visibility conditions with often-tragic results.  The combination of 
darkness and IMC increased the proportion of fatal to total accidents to 64.3 percent, 
making it the most deadly GA flight environment. 
Within the fatal accident category, CFIT and LVLOC accidents outnumber all other 
types.  Spatial disorientation induced by inadvertent flight into IMC continues to be a 
leading cause of the fatal accidents.  In fact, AOPA (2002) states that accidents that 
resulted from attempted VFR flight into IMC by non-IFR rated pilots were fatal 84% of 
the time.  At present, an immediate exit from IMC is the only recourse a VFR pilot has to 
avoid the perils that accompany the loss of out-the-window (OTW) visibility. 
While the FAA’s official definition for runway incursion does not include events at 
uncontrolled airports (since the Controller determines whether there is an incursion and 
then reports that occurrence to the FAA), the reported incursion rate for GA at controlled 
airports is higher than for commercial transports.  Further, the number of incursions 
where both aircraft involved are GA is the highest category (FAA, 2003). 
Synthetic Vision systems for GA aircraft are intended to reduce these accidents, all 
of which were targeted by the SVS Project, by improving a pilot’s situation and spatial 
awareness during low- visibility conditions, including night and IMC, while providing 
the benefits of day-VMC operations.  Because of the tremendous variation in GA aircraft 
capabilities and equipages, and pilot experience, proficiency, and currency, two 
categories of GA SVS systems were considered during the SVS Project.  The first 
category, the “Basic SVS” for GA aircraft, is envisioned to just replicate current 
operations, while the second category, the GA “Enhanced SVS” is envisioned to obtain 
operational credit in terms of advanced operational capabilities. 
For organizational convenience, the safety benefits are discussed first for both 
system categories, followed by the operational benefits of the enhanced system. 
4.2.1 Safety Benefits 
SVS for GA aircraft is expected to significantly reduce the occurrence of CFIT and 
LVLOC by providing virtual clear-VMC during low visibility day time (marginal) VMC, 
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at night or during IMC.  This capability can provide a means for safe visual transition 
back to VMC for non-instrument rated pilots who inadvertently encounter a low visibility 
environment, and enhanced operational safety for instrument rated pilots.  When non-
instrument rated pilots encounter a low visibility environment and must rely on the 
aircraft instruments for attitude information, they often become spatially disoriented and 
experience Low-Visibility induced Aircraft Upset (LV AU).  LV AU without recovery 
might lead to a LVLOC accident.  The presence of computer-generated terrain on the 
primary flight display should enable low-time GA pilots to maintain spatial orientation 
and situation awareness, and thus eliminate LVLOC and CFIT accidents.  In addition, the 
concept of being “IFR-rated” could also conceivably change in the presence of SVS 
displays.  Results from many NASA studies have indicated that low-time VFR pilots 
perform as well, and report similar situation awareness and workload during IMC, as 
pilots with thousands of hours and substantially greater pilot training.  It is possible that 
pilots with SVS displays could be “IFR-rated/SVS-Only”. 
As an illustration of the safety benefits of SVS, consider the rare event scenario 
results of Prinzel et al. (2003).  As part of a larger GA simulation study, each pilot flew 
35 low altitude en route and approach maneuvers in IMC to ROA.  The rare event CFIT 
scenario consisted of a situation in which, supposedly, the pilot incorrectly set the 
barometric altimeter to read 1500 feet higher than actual altitude. Such an error would 
affect both the altimeter and the other conventional display readings (i.e., the MX-20, 
which was used as a multifunction map display), but not the SVS display because that 
system was assumed to receive its altitude input from the GPS receiver.  The CFIT 
scenario resembled 11 of the previous 34 trials that began straight-and-level at 6500 ft 
MSL (4000 ft AGL) with instructions to make a left-bank turn and descend after two 
minutes to 5000 ft MSL (1000 ft AGL) over rising terrain. The scenario began in VMC 
with visibility deteriorating to IMC within one-minute elapsed time. The CFIT scenario 
started at 5000 ft MSL, but the altimeter showed 6500 ft MSL. Therefore, the instruction 
to reduce altitude by 1500 ft in effect descended the aircraft to 500 ft below a series of 
mountain peaks directly in front of the aircraft. The inadvertent entry into IMC scenario 
was designed to show that an otherwise unavoidable CFIT situation (unavoidable with 
conventional displays) could be prevented with synthetic vision technology.  None (0/13) 
of the IFR pilots and only 15% (2/14) of the VFR pilots experienced a CFIT.  One of 
these two VFR pilots had significant difficulty flying the aircraft throughout the entire 
experimental session and analyses showed performance to be well outside practical pilot 
standards; therefore, that data may be viewed suspect. The other pilot, however, did 
experience a CFIT event and, during the subsequent semi-structured interview, reported 
awareness that something was wrong but felt captured by the incorrect map display (i.e., 
MX-20) reading and failed to crosscheck the instruments. 
For surface operations in both simple and complex airport environments, SVS 
technology provides an electronic taxi map capability to assist the pilot in locating 
ownship position relative to taxiways and runways.  Such assistance can be invaluable, 
especially at night or during periods of low visibility (especially at unfamiliar airports), in 
preventing Ground Collision (GC) Runway Incursion incidents and accidents, 
particularly if accurate navigation (such as GPS WAAS) and surveillance aids (ASDE, 
TIS-B) are available.  The Basic SVS for GA aircraft is not envisioned to be equipped 
with surveillance sensors, while the GA Enhanced SVS system is envisioned with more 
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capable SVS equipment to obtain operational credit in terms of advanced operational 
capabilities. 
SVS is projected to reduce the overall accident / incident / loss rate to day-VMC 
levels.  In addition to most of the safety benefits enumerated above for CAB aircraft, the 
expected safety benefits pertinent to GA aircraft include reductions in LV AU incidents 
and LVLOC accidents. 
4.2.2 Operational Benefits 
A GA Enhanced SVS takes advantage of low-cost technologies to accurately and 
reliably emulate day-VMC operations in low visibility conditions. This statement was 
recently verified in the flight test at ROA in 2005 (Glaab et al., 2006) in which pilots 
flying in simulated IMC with SVS displays consistently produced equivalent or superior 
performance to that produced flying in VMC with conventional displays.  Such 
operational performance would open up thousands of small airports to the GA 
transportation system during marginal VMC and IMC.  This in turn would reduce air 
traffic congestion problems.  While GA aircraft do not frequently utilize high-density 
airports, synthetic vision systems will provide many of the benefits listed above for CAB 
aircraft when operating to and from congested terminal areas.  In addition, and perhaps 
more profoundly, SVS displays could enable CAT-I-equivalent approaches to hundreds 
of remote, non-equipped airports.  In addition, SVS technology might lead to the creation 
of a separate classification of instrument rated pilots with lower training and currency 
requirements than currently mandated for traditionally equipped aircraft. 
5. Applications & Intended Function by Phases of Flight 
Many of the best practices that evolved during the SVS Project are generic in their 
applications to both commercial transport / business jet and general aviation aircraft 
groupings, while others are quite specific to a particular phase of flight or task for each 
aircraft group.  In either case, however, the intended function of SVS is usually different 
for a particular phase of flight for a specific aircraft group.  For these reasons, as well as 
the fact that the SVS technologies employed for the two aircraft groupings (i.e., the 
synthetic vision system) are different, this section on SVS applications and intended 
function is sequenced first by aircraft group and then by phase of flight. 
5.1 Commercial Transports / Business Jets 
SVS is designed for applications and intended functions ranging from purely 
advisory to flight-critical.  But to eliminate visibility-induced accident precursors for all 
aircraft classes and achieve daylight VMC-like operations regardless of outside visibility 
conditions, certification for flight critical applications will be required.  Naturally there is 
a high economic risk for an airplane manufacturer or an avionics manufacturer to pursue 
such a certification process, particularly for commercial transports.  A steady progression 
in certification from advisory only to flight critical is one likely fleet implementation 
strategy.  For example, the initial TAWS system was certified as an advisory only system 
that provided alerts for vertical maneuvering (“terrain; pull-up”) alone.  The flight crew 
was expected to perform the pull up maneuver before referring to the terrain display to 
access the situation.  A more recently certified TAWS system now calls for lateral 
maneuvering in response to some terrain alerts (“avoid terrain”), rather than just vertical 
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maneuvering.  In such a situation, it is left to the flight crew to decide in which direction 
to turn.  As even more practical experience is gained with terrain databases, increased 
reliance on those databases may result, making the certification path for terrain displays 
such as SVS less challenging. 
The application of SVS technologies for the commercial transport/ business jet 
aircraft group is anticipated for all phases of flight and the discussion is parsed by those 
phases as Take-off, Departure, En route, Approach, Landing / Flare / Touchdown, Go-
Around, Rollout / Turn-off, and Surface Operations,. 
5.1.1 Take-off 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are terrain avoidance, traffic and obstacle avoidance, pathway 
guidance and situation awareness (position, traffic, obstacles, terrain, route) during the 
take-off.  Pathway boundaries are set to conform to the maximum lateral size limits used 
during the early phases of landing approach.  Those limits are a 600 foot (+/- 300 ft) 
maximum width, with corresponding deflections of ±½ dot of the lateral CDI in the 
manner of ILS course indicators (the angular deviations are computed as if ILS range was 
constant, based on the boundary limit of 300 ft).  There are no vertical boundaries for 
take-off (for a description of the departure tunnel concept, see Appendix A of Parrish et 
al., 2006), and the flight director commands speed on pitch.  Terrain, cultural features, the 
airport environment, obstacles, the runway, the flight director, the guidance pathway, and 
airborne traffic symbologies are presented appropriately on the PFD and the HUD (SVS 
terrain replaces any EVS image upon TOGA selection.).  The ND transitions from an 
exocentric perspective view (the RIPS EMM) to an exocentric overhead view (the SVS 
ND) upon runway entry, while continuously providing the airport environment, obstacles, 
the runway, the guidance pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies.  The 
SV-AD may be used as desired.  Independent monitoring of database integrity and 
registration, neighboring traffic and obstacles, and runway incursion prevention is 
provided. 
5.1.2 Departure 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic and obstacle 
avoidance and situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route) during departure.  
Pathway boundaries are set to conform to the maximum lateral size limits used during the 
early phases of landing approach (again, the pathway boundaries represent only 
suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from the intended flight path), and are 1 dot 
wide, limited to a maximum width of 600 ft (+/- 300 ft).  There are no vertical boundaries 
for departure (for a description of the departure tunnel concept, see Appendix A of 
Parrish et al., 2006), and the flight director commands speed on pitch.  Terrain, cultural 
features, obstacles, the flight director, the departure pathway, and airborne traffic 
symbologies are presented appropriately on the PFD, HUD, and the ND.  The SV-AD 
may be used as desired (e.g., to provide display of a dynamic 3-D exocentric “rehearsal” 
tool that pilots can use to step through and rehearse complex or unfamiliar airport 
approaches, departures and / or non-normal procedures).  Independent monitoring of 
database integrity and registration, and neighboring traffic and obstacles is provided. 
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5.1.3 En route 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are en route terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic 
avoidance and situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route) during en route 
operations.  Although pathway boundaries could be set to conform to the maximum size 
limits used during the early phases of landing approach, it is anticipated that most flight 
crews would not desire a pathway display during en route operations.  Pathway 
boundaries could also be set appropriately for RNP-type constraints.  Terrain, cultural 
features, the airport environment, obstacles, the flight director, the guidance pathway (if 
desired), and airborne traffic symbologies are presented appropriately on the PFD, the 
HUD and the ND (the SVS ND, an exocentric view in which the flight director is not 
displayed).  The SV-AD may be used to provide display of a dynamic 3-D exocentric 
“rehearsal” tool that pilots can use to step through and rehearse complex or unfamiliar 
airport approaches, departures, and / or non-normal procedures.  Independent monitoring 
of database integrity and registration is not active at high altitude, although neighboring 
traffic is provided. 
5.1.4 Approach 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic and obstacle 
avoidance and situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route, runway) during non-
precision and precision approaches to landing.  Pathway boundaries are set to conform to 
the navigation performance of a standard ILS.  Unlike CDIs, the pathway boundaries 
represent only suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from the intended flight path, 
and excursions beyond the boundaries are acceptable, with no requirements for unusual 
maneuvering to remain within the visual guidance representation.  The horizontal tunnel 
size was scaled to be approximately equivalent to ±½ angular dot localizer deviation 
centered around the localizer course (where 1 dot angular deviation equals 175 ft of 
lateral displacement at the runway threshold) with a 600 foot (+/- 300 ft) maximum 
width. The vertical tunnel size was scaled to be approximately equivalent to ±1 angular 
dot glideslope deviation (where 1 dot equals 0.35º angular deviation) centered along the 
glideslope path with a 350 foot (+/- 175 ft) maximum height and a 50 foot (+/- 25 ft) 
minimum height. Thus, the tunnel narrows both vertically and laterally as it approaches 
the runway threshold.  Terrain, cultural features, the airport environment, obstacles, the 
runway, the flight director, the guidance pathway, and airborne and surface traffic 
symbologies are presented appropriately on the PFD, the HUD, and the ND.  The SV-AD 
may be used to display the RIPS EMM or, if desired, an EVS image with appropriate 
symbology.  If SV-AD is in use for another purpose, either pilot may choose to select a 
transition from the SVS ND to the RIPS EMM in order to further reveal any incurring 
traffic that might appear on or near the runway.  Independent monitoring of database 
integrity and registration, runway position, neighboring traffic and obstacles, runway 
clearance of obstacles, and runway incursion prevention is provided. 
5.1.5 Landing / Flare / Touchdown 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic and obstacle 
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avoidance and situation awareness (position, traffic, runway, etc.) during landing, flare 
and touchdown.  The Pilot Flying (PF) is head-up during the landing / flare / touchdown 
phase of the approach, using the HUD, initially with an SVS image.  Terrain and pathway 
symbologies are removed from the HUD at a declutter height set somewhat above 
decision height, although the flight director, the runway confirmation outline, and 
airborne and surface traffic symbologies, as well as standard HUD flight variables 
(airspeed, radar altimeter, etc.) remain.  The EVS image replaces the SVS terrain image 
on the HUD.  The intended function of the remaining SVS technologies (providing the 
runway confirmation outline and traffic symbologies) is supplemental to the window / 
HUD, providing independent and redundant threads for monitoring of neighboring traffic 
and obstacles, assurance of a runway clear of obstacles, and runway incursion prevention. 
The Pilot Not Flying (PNF) views an egocentric SVS PFD (assuming only one HUD 
is available) with only the pathway symbology removed (at declutter height).  Terrain, 
the flight director, the runway confirmation outline, and airborne and surface traffic 
symbologies remain.  If an EVS image is desired, it may be displayed on a SV-AD with 
appropriate symbology. 
The NDs of both the PF and the PNF transition (at nose wheel touchdown and 80 
knots) from an exocentric overhead view (SVS ND) to an exocentric perspective view 
(the RIPS EMM) while continuously providing the airport environment, obstacles, the 
runway, the guidance pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies. 
5.1.6 Go-Around 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic and obstacle 
avoidance, and situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route) during the go-around.  
Pathway boundaries are set to conform to the maximum lateral size limits used during the 
early phases of landing approach (again, the pathway boundaries represent only 
suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from the intended flight path), and are 1 dot 
wide, limited to a maximum width of 600 ft (+/- 300 ft).  There are no vertical boundaries 
for go-around (a go-around pathway would use the departure tunnel concept), and the 
flight director commands speed on pitch.  Terrain, cultural features, the airport 
environment, obstacles, the runway, the flight director, the guidance pathway, and 
airborne and surface traffic symbologies are presented appropriately on the PFD and the 
HUD.  When Takeoff Go-Around (TOGA) is selected, the SVS terrain image replaces 
the EVS image on the HUD.  The ND transitions, if necessary, from an exocentric 
perspective view (the RIPS EMM) to an exocentric overhead view (the SVS ND) upon 
TOGA selection, while continuously providing the airport environment, obstacles, the 
runway, the guidance pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies.  
Independent monitoring of database integrity and registration, runway position, and 
neighboring traffic and obstacles is provided. 
5.1.7 Rollout / Turn-off 
The SVS technologies provide a system with independent and redundant threads 
whose intended functions are surface guidance, traffic and obstacle avoidance, and 
situation awareness (position, traffic, runway, turn-off exit) during rollout and turn-off.  
The PF is head-up during rollout and turn-off, using the HUD.  After main gear weight on 
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wheels (WOW), only symbologies for obstacles, the runway, and the surface guidance 
(including deceleration guidance to a pilot-chosen exit) and surface traffic remain on the 
HUD (and, if desired, an EVS image), as well as standard HUD ground variables 
(groundspeed, heading / track, etc.).  The intended function of the remaining SVS 
technologies (providing the runway outline and obstacle and surface traffic symbologies) 
is supplemental to the window / HUD, providing independent and redundant threads for 
monitoring of neighboring traffic and obstacles, and assurance of a runway clear of 
obstacles. 
The PNF views an egocentric SVS PFD with the airport scene, the surface guidance, 
and obstacle and surface traffic symbologies.  If an EVS image is desired, it may be 
displayed on the SV-AD with appropriate symbology. 
At nosewheel touchdown and 80 knots, the NDs of both the PF and the PNF display 
an exocentric perspective view (the RIPS EMM) while continuously providing the airport 
environment, obstacles, the runway, and the surface guidance (if active) and surface 
traffic symbologies. 
5.1.8 Surface Operations 
The PF is head-up during taxi operations, using the HUD.  The HUD displays the 
taxi flight director, the taxiway outlines, and ground traffic and obstacle symbologies 
(and, if desired, an EVS image).  The SVS technologies, while supplemental to the 
window / HUD, provide a system with independent and redundant threads whose 
intended functions are traffic and obstacle avoidance, surface guidance, taxi route 
compliance, runway incursion prevention, and situation awareness (position, ground 
traffic, route) during taxi operations. 
The PNF views an egocentric SVS PFD with the airport scene, the taxi flight 
director, and ground traffic and obstacle symbologies.  The ND is an exocentric 
perspective view that provides the airport environment, obstacles, the taxiways, the taxi 
route, and ground traffic symbologies.  If an EVS image is desired, it may be displayed 
on the SV-AD with appropriate symbology. 
5.2 General Aviation 
The applications for the Basic SVS for GA aircraft are to replicate current 
operations, in both VMC and IMC, as conventionally determined by aircraft equipage 
and pilot qualification.  The applications for the GA Enhanced SVS are to obtain 
operational credit in terms of advanced operational capabilities that emulate day-VMC 
operations in low visibility conditions, such as reduced arrival and departure minima and 
direct routing in IMC.  In terms of display elements, however, the differences between 
the Basic System and the Enhanced System are in whether or not there is an accounting 
for the real time elements (i.e., traffic) not present in the on-board databases, and whether 
or not there is active database integrity monitoring.  The Basic SVS system provides no 
surveillance information and no active database integrity monitoring.  Only the 
integration of tactical and strategic SVDCs is provided.  The Enhanced SVS system 
encompasses the integration of tactical and strategic SVDCs with surveillance 
information, RIPS alerting algorithms (i.e., runway conflicts and route deviations) and 
the EMM display concept, and real-time terrain DIME functionality.  However, hazard 
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detection sensors (e.g., WxR) are not available to provide information concerning 
obstacles not contained within the on-board database, even for the Enhanced SVS.  The 
application of SVS technologies is anticipated for all phases of flight (the terminology 
used is take-off rather than departure, cruise rather than en route, landing rather than 
approach, go-around, and surface operations) for GA (the section is parsed by those 
phases of flight). 
5.2.1 Take-off 
The SVS technologies for the Basic System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance and situation awareness 
(position, terrain, route) during the take-off.  Pathway boundaries are set to conform to 
the maximum lateral size limits used during the early phases of landing approach (again, 
the pathway boundaries represent only suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from 
the intended flight path).  Those limits are a 600 foot (+/- 300 ft) maximum width, with 
corresponding deflections of ±½ dot of the lateral CDI in the manner of ILS course 
indicators (the angular deviations are computed as if ILS range was constant, based on 
the boundary limit of 300 ft).  There are no vertical boundaries for take-off (for a 
description of the departure tunnel concept, see Wong et al., 2004; Appendix A of Parrish 
et al., 2006), and the flight director commands speed on pitch.  Terrain, cultural features, 
the airport environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, the flight director, and the 
guidance pathway are presented appropriately on the PFD.  The pilot selects the flight 
mode of the ND to display an exocentric overhead view (the SVS ND) of the airport 
environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, and the guidance pathway.  There are no 
provisions for independent monitoring of database integrity and registration, and 
neighboring traffic. 
The SVS technologies for the Enhanced System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, traffic avoidance, pathway guidance and 
situation awareness (position, traffic, mapped obstacles, terrain, route) during the take-
off.  Pathway boundaries are the same as those of the Basic System for GA.  Terrain, 
cultural features, the airport environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, the flight 
director, the guidance pathway, and airborne traffic symbologies are presented 
appropriately on the PFD.  The ND transitions from an exocentric perspective view (the 
RIPS EMM) to an exocentric overhead view (the SVS ND) upon runway entry, while 
continuously providing the airport environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, the 
guidance pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies.  Independent monitoring 
of database integrity, neighboring traffic and runway incursions is provided. 
5.2.2 Cruise 
The SVS technologies for the Basic System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance and situation awareness 
(position, terrain, route) during cruise.  Pathway boundaries are set to conform to the 
maximum size limits used during the early phases of landing approach.  Those limits are 
a 600 foot (+/- 300 ft) maximum width and a 350 foot (+/- 175 ft) maximum height, with 
corresponding deflections of ±½ dot of the lateral and ±1 dot vertical CDIs in the manner 
of ILS course indicators (the angular deviations are computed as if ILS range was 
constant based on the boundary limits).  Unlike CDIs, the pathway boundaries represent 
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only suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from the intended flight path, and 
excursions beyond the boundaries are acceptable, with no requirements for unusual 
maneuvering to remain within the visual guidance representation.  Terrain, cultural 
features, the airport environment and runways, mapped obstacles, the flight director, and 
the guidance pathway are presented appropriately on the PFD and the ND (the SVS ND, 
an exocentric overhead view in which the flight director is not displayed).  There are no 
provisions for independent monitoring of database integrity and registration and 
neighboring traffic. 
The SVS technologies for the Enhanced System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic avoidance and 
situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route) during cruise.  Pathway boundaries 
are the same as those of the Basic System for GA.  Terrain, cultural features, the airport 
environment and runways, mapped obstacles, the flight director, the guidance pathway, 
and airborne traffic symbologies are presented appropriately on the PFD and the ND (the 
SVS ND, an exocentric overhead view in which the flight director is not displayed).  
Independent monitoring of database integrity and neighboring traffic is provided. 
5.2.3 Landing 
The SVS technologies for the Basic System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance and situation awareness 
(position, terrain, route, runway) during the landing.  Pathway boundaries are set to 
conform to the navigation performance of a standard ILS (again, the pathway boundaries 
represent only suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from the intended flight path).  
The horizontal tunnel size was scaled to be approximately equivalent to ±½ angular dot 
localizer deviation centered around the localizer course (where 1 dot angular deviation 
equals 175 ft of lateral displacement at the runway threshold) with 600 foot (+/- 300 ft) 
maximum width. The vertical tunnel size was scaled to be approximately equivalent to ±1 
angular dot glideslope deviation (where 1 dot equals 0.35º angular deviation) centered 
along the glideslope path with a 350 foot (+/- 175 ft) maximum height and a 50 foot (+/- 
25 ft) minimum height. Thus, the tunnel narrows both vertically and laterally as it 
approaches the runway threshold.  Terrain, cultural features, the airport environment, the 
runway, mapped obstacles, the flight director, and the guidance pathway are presented 
appropriately on the PFD and the ND.  The ND does not transition automatically from the 
exocentric overhead view until the pilot selects the taxi mode of the ND to display the 
EMM after touchdown and rollout.  There are no provisions for independent monitoring 
of database integrity and registration, runway position, and neighboring traffic. 
The SVS technologies for the Enhanced System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic avoidance and 
situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route, runway) during the landing.  Pathway 
boundaries are the same as those of the Basic System for GA.  Terrain, cultural features, 
the airport environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, the flight director, the guidance 
pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies are presented appropriately on the 
PFD and the ND.  Independent monitoring of database integrity, neighboring traffic and 
runway incursion prevention is provided.  The ND transitions automatically from an 
exocentric overhead view (SVS ND) to an exocentric perspective view (the RIPS EMM) 
 54
at touchdown while continuously providing the airport environment, mapped obstacles, 
the runway, the guidance pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies. 
5.2.4 Go-Around 
The SVS technologies for the Basic System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance and situation awareness 
(position, terrain, route) during the go-around.  Pathway boundaries are set to conform to 
the maximum lateral size limits used during the early phases of landing approach (again, 
the pathway boundaries represent only suggested constraints on aircraft excursions from 
the intended flight path).  Those limits are a 600 foot (+/- 300 ft) maximum width, with 
corresponding deflections of ±½ dot of the lateral CDI in the manner of ILS course 
indicators (the angular deviations are computed as if ILS range was constant, based on 
the boundary limit of 300 ft).  There are no vertical boundaries for go-around (a go-
around pathway would use the departure tunnel concept), and the flight director 
commands speed on pitch.  Terrain, cultural features, the airport environment, the 
runway, mapped obstacles, the flight director, and the guidance pathway are presented 
appropriately on the PFD.  The ND continues to provide an exocentric overhead view 
(the SVS ND) of the airport environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, and the 
guidance pathway.  There are no provisions for independent monitoring of database 
integrity and registration, and neighboring traffic. 
The SVS technologies for the Enhanced System for GA provide a system whose 
intended functions are terrain avoidance, pathway guidance, traffic avoidance and 
situation awareness (position, traffic, terrain, route) during the go-around.  Pathway 
boundaries are the same as those of the Basic System for GA.  Terrain, cultural features, 
the airport environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, the flight director, the guidance 
pathway, and airborne and surface traffic symbologies are presented appropriately on the 
PFD.  The ND continues to provide an exocentric overhead view (SVS ND) of the airport 
environment, mapped obstacles, the runway, the guidance pathway, and airborne and 
surface traffic symbologies.  Independent monitoring of database integrity and 
neighboring traffic is provided. 
5.2.5 Surface Operations 
The intended function of the SVS technologies for the Basic System for GA is 
supplemental to the window, providing situation awareness during taxi operations on the 
Nav D, which is an exocentric perspective view (the RIPS EMM) that provides ownship 
position in the airport environment.  The pilot selects the taxi mode of the ND to display 
the EMM after touchdown and rollout.  The SVS technologies for the Enhanced System 
for GA provide situation awareness (position, ground traffic, route) on the ND (the RIPS 
EMM) supplemental to the window and an independent monitoring system whose 
intended functions are traffic avoidance, taxi route compliance, and runway incursion 
prevention during taxi operations. 
6. SVS Best Practices 
In this section, many of the best practices that evolved during the NASA Synthetic 
Vision Systems Project are documented from the perspective of some of the NASA 
researchers most heavily involved in its execution.  It does not purport to reflect the 
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views of either industry or university participants, nor necessarily even those of all 
NASA researchers.  As mentioned in the Introduction, for most instances “best practices” 
is meant to be synonymous with “Recommended Practices” in the context of the 
vernacular of the SAE ARP and ICAO documents.  However, there are a few exceptions, 
all of which are indicated as such, in which the Project selected an option or made a 
decision based on programmatic reasons rather than solely on research results.  Many of 
the symbologies used in the NASA SVS Project were never really evaluated for better 
alternatives, at least by the Project.  For example, the flight path marker symbol varied 
from straight winged to gull winged rather routinely.  Unless things obviously needed 
improvement, the Project invested its resources in other issues.  The NASA Integrated 
Synthetic Vision System Concepts to be discussed in relation to those best practices do 
not exist as other than concepts but they embody what production-grade synthetic vision 
systems might, or perhaps should, be in order to achieve the potential safety of flight and 
operational efficiency of clear daylight operations, regardless of visibility conditions.  
Many of the best practices that evolved during the SVS Project are generic in their 
applications to both commercial transport / business jet and general aviation aircraft 
groupings, while others are quite specific to a particular phase of flight or task for each 
aircraft group.  For organizational convenience, much of the ensuing discussion is parsed 
by two aircraft groupings: CAB, and GA. 
6.1 Commercial Transports / Business Jets 
Because of the more demanding operational requirements and the more stringent 
certification and operational approval processes for CAB aircraft, the CAB SVS system 
is more complex than the GA SVS systems, and therefore, the generic best practices as 
well as those specific to CAB are discussed in this section.  For organizational 
convenience, the best practices are presented by the following topic order: Database, 
Flight Operations Displays, Surface Operations Displays, Runway Incursion Prevention 
System, Enhanced Vision System Imagery, Database Integrity Monitoring, Hazard 
Detection Sensors, and the Integrated SVS Concept. 
6.1.1 Database 
Real-time rendering and database storage are two key issues facing avionics 
manufacturers to successfully implement synthetic vision; thus, the SVS design 
characteristics which affect these factors have been the subject of several studies.  
Database best practices within the SVS Project are presented first for these two topics 
(Rendering and Storage), followed by Resolution, Texture / Color / Shading, Other 
Graphics Issues, and Integrity. 
6.1.1.1 Rendering.  The NASA SVDC used in flight at EGE (Bailey et al., 
2002c) were generated by a dual 866 MHz processor personal computer (PC) with 1+ 
Gigabytes of Random Access Memory running Windows NT™ and a Wildcat™ 4210 
graphics card to provide 1280 by 1024 anti-aliased video rendering at real-time (>30 Hz) 
update rates.  This PC implementation proved that it is no longer a technical challenge to 
render these displays; unfortunately, the problem is rendering these displays using 
avionics-grade hardware.  3-D chip sets and computer architectures to support the 
graphics demands of SVS are being contemplated and built, but the industry is rapidly 
approaching the point, if it is not already there, that the pilot's cell phone has more 
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computing power and graphics capabilities than the on-board aircraft avionics.  This 
scenario cannot be an attractive aircraft marketing perspective.  Best practice within the 
SVS Project (programmatic decision) has been to assume that avionics manufacturers 
will soon meet this recognized need, and cost-shared research with industry partners was 
sponsored by the SVS project to help expedite the avionics-grade graphics-processing 
hardware availability. 
6.1.1.2 Storage.  Graphics rendering is not the only computational hurdle.  
Database storage issues have been historical concerns.  For a 1º by 1º cell of database 
containing DEM only, (approximately 60 square miles at the equator), the space required 
to store Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Level 1 data (3 arc-seconds, 
approximately 100 meter post spacing) is only 5 Megabytes; DTED Level 2 data (1 arc-
second, approximately 30 meter post spacing) requires 54 Megabytes; but DTED Level 4 
(1 arc-second, approximately 3 meter post spacing) requires 6.3 Gigabytes.  With the 
dramatic advances currently evident in digital storage capabilities, best practice within 
the SVS Project (programmatic decision) has been to assume that avionics quality storage 
devices will become readily available for SVS database applications. 
6.1.1.3 Resolution.  The DEM resolution is one factor that determines how well 
the SVS terrain depiction will match the actual terrain environment.  NASA experiments 
have shown that a terrain resolution of 30 arc-seconds “rounds off” the vertical features 
of the terrain (Hughes & Glaab, 2006), making it appear less hazardous than it may be 
and potentially reducing some safety benefit (see fig. 24).  Nonetheless, this same 
experiment showed that the 30 arc-second (approximately 1000 meter post spacing) SVS 
terrain display is still “safer” than the conventional round dial instrument panel.  From 
the FAA’s advisory circular on SVS, resolution requirements must meet the intended 
function of the terrain display.  If, for example, the terrain is intended for awareness only 
and not navigation or terrain avoidance, the resolution should be no worse than that of a 
TAWS (Appendix 1, paragraph 6.3 of FAA (2002a) recommends a resolution of 15 arc-
seconds for TAWS).  User Requirements for Terrain and Obstacle Data (RTCA, 2005) 
have been prepared which define flight phase-dependent database resolution 
requirements (e.g., a resolution of 1 arc-second in terminal areas and 3 arc-seconds in the 
en-route environment) and should help to mitigate database storage concerns while yet 
meeting the database accuracy required for precise navigation where needed (see fig. 25).  
Per RTCA DO-276, several metadata elements are required, including post-spacing (i.e., 
resolution).  Elevation reference is closely related to DEM resolution.  Elevation 
reference indicates how elevation values are assigned for the cells in the DEM.  A single 
elevation value in a 15 arc-second DEM represents an area approximately 0.25 x 0.25 nm 
(2.2 million square feet, or 54 acres).  Elevation reference describes how the single 
elevation value is chosen.  Common elevation references are average elevation, 
maximum elevation, and sometimes, the elevation of the geometric center of the area.  As 
post-spacing increases, the difference between the DEM value and the actual elevation of 
a point within a cell may differ by several hundred meters. 
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1 arc second DEM        30 arc second DEM 
 
Figure 24.  Round off effect of lower terrain resolution. 
 
 
Figure 25.  RTCA-276 terrain and obstacle database requirements overview. 
 
To date, best practice for NASA SVS applications (programmatic decision) have 
nominally used 1 and 3 arc-second DEMs for approach, landing, and take-off/departure 
operations.  For instance, the EGE flight trials used a regional DEM of 100 nm by 100 
nm with multi-resolution post-spacing varying between 1 (approximately 30 meter post-
spacing) and 3 (approximately 100 meter post-spacing) arc-seconds (approximately 
DTED Level 1 and 2, respectively).  It should be noted that the University of Iowa 
(Schnell et al., 2002c; Lemos & Schnell, 2003) found that synthetic terrain resolution has 
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a meaningful influence on performance in terms of terrain identification (static and 
dynamic images) and pathway tracking.  However, there seems to be no such apparent 
advantage of utilizing 3 arc-second (or finer) versus 6 arc-second data. 
A database, or model, of the airport environment has been used for RIPS to generate 
the HUD and EMM display functions as well as to meet the needs of the alerting 
algorithms.  Content and quality requirements for these databases are discussed in RTCA 
(2005).  To support steerage using the displays in extremely low visibility conditions, a 
survey of the airport surface may be required to generate the airport database.  In 
particular, painted centerline markings may need to be represented in the database and 
accurate to one foot in order to support low visibility operations while allowing for 
nominal positioning system error and FTE (best practice within the SVS Project). A 
discussion of the analysis of surface RNP requirements can be found in Cassell et al. 
(1997) and Cassell et al. (1999). It is important to note that as visibility increases, 
database accuracy can become less stringent as pilots will be able to depend on visual 
cues (i.e., painted centerlines) as primary steering guidance. 
6.1.1.4 Texture / Color / Shading.  Database rendering performance is also 
highly dependent upon the characteristics used in the portrayal of the DEM.  Terrain 
coloring and shading techniques are two very effective techniques in conveying terrain 
information to the pilot while making the separation between sky and ground obvious.  
NASA research demonstrated that some particular terrain portrayal coloring techniques 
are more effective than constant color terrain displays.  NASA has primarily evaluated 
two different texturing methods: elevation-based color-coding with generic texturing of 
the DEM (i.e., “generic” or "Elevation-Based Generic", EBG) and ortho-rectified 
photographic imagery overlays on the DEM (i.e., "photo-realistic").  Figure 26 illustrates 
use of the two different texturing methods (EBG and photo-realistic) on a Juno, Alaska 
database. 
 
Figure 26.  Elevation-based color-coding with generic texturing (EBG) and photo-
realistic texturing of a Juno, AK DEM. 
 
Elevation cues may be enhanced by applying particular coloring bands to depict the 
height of the terrain within a local operating area that correspond to different absolute 
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terrain elevation levels.  NASA’s experience has also shown that color bands are highly 
effective if they range from greens representing the lower elevations bands, to browns, to 
light tans, to off-white representing the highest elevation band using an area local to the 
airport of interest.  Twelve or more bands are typically used, segmented into appropriate 
elevation ranges, with each band representing perhaps at least a 100 foot change in 
elevation (real-time encoding of the DEM based on relative terrain altitude, such as used 
in some TAWS, was not used.).  Although never tested, the NASA concepts would 
dictate a transition, perhaps between operating areas of rapidly changing elevations, or 
before initiating an operation at a specific airport (such as transitioning to approach from 
en route or taxi to take-off), where the color banding assignment parameters would be 
instantaneously reset, with pilot concurrence.  Shading and texturing techniques have also 
proven effective in realistic terrain portrayal, as have shadowing techniques.  However, in 
the latter case, light source (sun angle) positioning must be carefully controlled to avoid 
the obscuration of important terrain features by shadows (e.g., see Section 6.1.2.2.2.3). 
To create the SV photo-realistic terrain database for the DFW and EGE flight trials, 
multi-resolution imagery (ranging from 1 to 32 meters/pixel) was obtained and overlaid 
on the DEM.  An important aspect of the photo-realistic database development has been 
color-balancing of the various tiles in the photo imagery.  Consideration must also be 
made to the time of the year.  For instance, aerial photography from fall or spring might 
be optimal for mountainous regions where snow will emphasize the mountain tops, yet 
not blanket the entire region.  Similarly, color touch-up of bodies of water, particularly in 
tidal areas, is important since the boundaries of the water have been found to be 
important piloting cues, but color distinction in the actual photography may not be sharp 
enough.   
No statistically-significant differences in the pilot's ability to fly the aircraft with the 
synthetic vision display concepts have been found between the generic and photo-
realistic terrain depictions.  An important consideration in this comparison is that the 
guidance/pathway information was provided and was unchanged between the concepts.  
For instance, in the EGE flight trials (see fig. 27), the last CAB flight test that compared 
the two techniques (Bailey et al., 2002; Kramer et al., 2004b), subjective ratings of terrain 
awareness, given immediately after each data run, also showed essentially no differences 
between the generic and photo-realistic texturing.  Experiments at the University of Iowa 
(Schnell et al., 2002c; Lemos & Schnell, 2003) did find differences between terrain 
depiction concepts (checkerboard, EBG, and photo-realistic texturing concepts) for a 
static image identification task (the photo-realistic concept was less effective, with 
increased response time), but all differences disappeared for the dynamic image 
identification task and for all piloting performance measures. 
However, a general subjective pilot preference for photo-realistic was been found in 
all CAB simulator experiments and flight trials.  The photo-realistic terrain texturing 
provides a subjective improvement in awareness of terrain, better awareness of cultural 
features (towns, roads, etc), and subjectively better depth perception cues. 
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Figure 27.  EGE flight activities aboard the NASA ARIES. 
 
A key component of the NASA generically-textured portrayal of the DEM has been 
the addition of cultural feature data.  Pilot opinions strongly suggest that the demarcation 
of road and water, for instance, to the generic texturing greatly enhances the situation 
awareness attributes of the SVS terrain image.  If cultural features were not an inherent 
feature, the quantitative "tie" between photo-realistic and generic-texturing may not 
necessarily be maintained.  Best practice within the SVS Project has been to include 
cultural feature data. 
Because each texturing method has strengths (e.g., generic texturing can 
dramatically enhance elevation cuing) and weaknesses (e.g., photo-realistic texturing 
requires careful color balancing across photo-tiles, when color images can be obtained), 
for its final integrated flight test NASA (Kramer et al., 2005a) developed a hybrid 
textured format, created by false-color coding monochromatic imagery (aerial 
photographs) of the flight test areas of interest (i.e., RNO and WAL) using an elevation-
based color-coded digital elevation models (see fig. 28).  The process produces a 
coloration of the aerial photographs based on altitude above field elevation, thus 
combining the best benefits of a photo-realistic database (e.g., cultural feature details) 
with those of a generic-texture database (e.g., emphasized terrain elevation). 
The elevation-based color-coding used a green color for the field elevation of the 
airport changing toward shades of brown for higher elevations.  For these databases, dark 
brown represented altitudes closer to field elevation while light browns represented 
higher elevations.  At RNO, the shading scheme consisted of 14 elevation color bands 
that began at 250 meters elevation and each band was 300 meters in size.  At Wallops, 
the shading scheme consisted of 14 elevation color bands that began at sea level (green at 
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field elevation) with each band representing 10 meters in altitude.  The aerial imagery 
was nesting such that high-resolution imagery (1 meter per pixel) was used in close 
proximity to the airfield with the majority of the imagery, away from the airport area, at 
lower resolution (4 meters per pixel). 
 
Figure 28.  The hybrid texturing method applied to the RNO database. 
 
While the hybrid texturing method has never undergone any comparative testing 
against the other techniques, the collective acceptance by experienced pilots and 
researchers seems overwhelmingly in its favor.  This blended database also obviates the 
problems associated with color-balancing photographic imagery and "seasonal" effects 
that can detract from the quality of a photo-realistic database.  It may also help to 
ameliorate some of the terrain depiction illusions encountered with monochrome 
renditions of a photo-realistic database for HUD usage (see Section 6.1.2.2.2.3).  Thus 
the final accepted best practice within the SVS Project (programmatic decision) was the 
hybrid texturing method.  However, given the inclusion of cultural feature data, the 
quantitative "tie" between photo-realistic and generic-texturing discussed earlier 
engenders acceptance by Project personnel that economic forces will ultimately 
determine the texturing method chosen by the avionics community. 
Several design characteristics have been found in the numerous studies which, taken 
collectively, provide additional design guidance and requirements for terrain depiction: 
Available HUD luminance (and resultant contrast ratios) will dictate the 
imagery content characteristics for SVS HUD applications, where shades of gray 
for raster displays such as monochrome SVS terrain are a legibility concern.  The 
issue is examined under Section 6.1.2.2.22 below. 
Although fish-net or grid patterns of terrain have been shown to add flow, 
perspective, and splay (which promote pilot perception of speed, aim-point, and 
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closure (Snow & French, 2001)), previous research also indicates that terrain 
texturing can provide these same attributes while also promoting better situation 
awareness and user acceptance. 
The augmentation of a grid pattern into generic-textured and photo-realistic 
textured databases (see fig. 29) has been briefly evaluated under the Synthetic 
Vision - General Aviation element.  The results (Glaab & Hughes, 2003; Hughes 
& Glaab, 2006) were inconclusive.  To date, the ability of the pilots' to judge 
speed, aim-point, and closure has not been noted as a deficiency in any of the SV 
display concepts, so the use of grid patterns has not been an issue.  However, the 
use of a grid pattern for a SV-HUD terrain representation alone or in addition to 
generic-textured, photo-realistic textured or hybrid-textured databases in the SV-
HUD implementations may prove necessary for legibility considerations (see 
Section 6.1.2.2.2.3). 
In the vicinity of the airport, post-processing of the DEM has been found to 
be necessary (i.e., "bull-dozing" the airport property) to mitigate visual 
abnormalities.  Without leveling the area, peculiar artifacts, such as portions of 
airport buildings and uneven runways, are prominent in the DEM.  These artifacts 
can be quite unsightly and distracting (see fig. 30).  Once “bull-dozed”, the NASA 
best practice is to insert polygon models of the runway and airport.  The models 
provide proper 3-D perspective cues to the runway and airport infrastructure.  
Also, the object models do not blur when in close proximity, as photo-texture 
often does. 
The use of red and yellow colors in the terrain shading to indicate relative 
altitude (i.e., terrain altitudes near or above ownship altitude) on the PFD was 
found to be distracting and somewhat disturbing to pilots, since red and yellow 
imply caution and warning areas.  However, the use of red and yellow colors in 
the terrain shading to indicate TAWS caution and alert specific areas has been 
found to be very desirable. 
 
Figure 29.  Fish-net grids embedded within into generic-textured and photo-realistic 
textured databases of ROA. 
3 arc second DEM   3 arc second DEM 
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Figure 30.  Views of the EGE airport property before and after “bull-dozing” and 
inserting polygon models of the runway and airport buildings. 
 
6.1.1.5 Other Graphics Issues.  Experience within the Project on other graphics 
issues has suggested several promising approaches to overcome the shortcomings of 
adapting flight simulation software for flight applications rather than using software 
designed specifically for flight. 
“Terrain popping”, which occurs as the viewer is approaching a distant object in a 
graphics scene when the object first becomes visible and the object suddenly “pops” into 
view, is the result of rounding errors.  NASA has awarded a Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) contract to Terrametrics to, along with other objectives, eliminate 
“terrain popping” by directly using a compressed version of the DEM data.  The DEM is 
converted to a terrain model (by triangulating the data) so that by using the DEM directly, 
there is no “rounding” error.  
Another promising approach to eliminating annoying rendering issues involves 
storing databases by latitude and longitude position coordinates, rather than in other 
traditional coordinate systems, to eliminate coordinate transformation problems (e.g., 
WGS84 to UTM conversions). 
Database renderers have traditionally used “flat-earth” approximations to display 
terrain because of their computational efficiency.  A flat-earth rendition, particularly for 
an SV-HUD application, will not provide a faithful terrain depiction – the flat earth 
projection will always show the SV terrain higher in apparent altitude than the real-
terrain.  This “error” is fortunately in the conservative direction.  Also, rendering 
differences being “flat-earth” and “spherical-earth” vanish the closer to the terrain the 
viewer becomes.  Nonetheless, Terrametrics (and others) are working on computationally 
efficient methods to provide “spherical-earth” renderers to avoid this approximation. 
6.1.1.6 Integrity.  The NASA Integrated SVS Concept for CAB aircraft provides 
real-time DIME functionality to bound the integrity of the Geo-spatial terrain databases 
or DEMs.  The term integrity is used frequently in the aviation community as a quality 
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metric.  Unfortunately, several segments of the community interpret integrity differently.  
There are three definitions of integrity that are relevant to SVS: system integrity, data 
integrity, and data processing integrity (Young et al., 2002).  With respect to the DEMs 
used by SVS, required data integrity will depend on the intended use of the data by the 
pilot and the architecture of the system in which the data resides.  DEM integrity is 
related to system integrity, in that system integrity can be compromised if errors exist in 
the DEM that may lead to HMI being presented to pilots, and these errors are not 
detected by pilots or the operational system. 
To ensure that data is not corrupted during processing and / or distribution, the 
guidelines have been established for data processing integrity (ICAO, 1999; RTCA, 
1998).  These guidelines define data processing integrity as the degree of assurance that 
aeronautical data and its value have not been altered since the data origination or an 
authorized amendment.  These guidelines also provide data processing procedures that 
are intended to help ensure that the resulting data is no worse than the source data. 
It is expected that the majority of terrain data that is stored on aircraft as part of an 
SVS or TAWS will not have a stated integrity with respect to the source data itself.  The 
integrity specified with these data will only refer to data processing integrity.  This is 
primarily due to the fact that the amount of validation required to establish an integrity 
value for such large data sets is viewed as cost prohibitive. 
A variety of sources from both the public and private sectors provide DEMs, and 
these DEMs are characterized by a number of parameters.  These parameters include the 
spatial extent or coverage, post-spacing or spatial resolution of elevation measurements, 
the horizontal and vertical references or datums, and the circular and linear error 
probabilities.  A Circular Error Probability (CEP) is most commonly used for the 
horizontal accuracy specification, whereas a Linear Error Probability (LEP) is used to 
specify the accuracy in the vertical dimension.  If one assumes that errors are random and 
normally distributed with zero-mean, the standard deviations in the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions can be derived from the CEP and LEP specifications. 
When utilizing DEMs as part of a flight-critical function, it is imperative to avoid the 
display of hazardous misleading terrain information (HMTI).  HMTI can be the result of 
insufficient DEM spatial resolution, inappropriate tessellation or rendering, or excessive 
post elevation errors.  The severity of the hazard will depend on the specific flight 
operation being conducted and the use of the terrain depiction by pilots during this 
operation. 
To mitigate potential risk of HMTI, active database integrity monitoring using a 
form of DIME is therefore viewed as a vital part of flight-critical SVS designs.  In the 
NASA Integrated SVS Concept, if significant inconsistencies are determined to exist, an 
integrity alert to the pilot is generated.  The best practices (recommended practices, 
lessons-learned, and considerations) that have evolved over the term of the Project with 
respect to DIME are detailed in Section 6.1.6. 
6.1.2 Flight Operations Displays 
The best practices that evolved in the area of flight operations displays are discussed 
first as related to symbology lessons for the various specific displays (Flight Operations 
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Symbology), and then as lessons concerning the specific display applications themselves 
(Flight Operations Display Considerations). 
6.1.2.1 Flight Operations Symbology.  The best practices that evolved in the 
area of flight operations symbology are discussed as lessons concerning first, Haloed 
Symbology, followed by the specific display applications themselves (HUD / PFD 
Symbology, ND Symbology, and Auxiliary Display Symbology).  Symbology issues 
such as drawing priorities (terrain is typically drawn first with symbology overlaying the 
terrain) and scaling / pegging / caging issues are not discussed unless they are unique 
issues for SVS. 
6.1.2.1.1 Haloed Symbology.  Two of the principal symbology concerns with 
including terrain on any tactical or strategic flight display (PFD, HUD, ND) have been 
excess clutter and readability / legibility of vital information.  Haloed symbology 
addresses the latter concern for head-down displays (and potentially for new digital 
HUDs as well).  Haloing is a technique used to provide a high-contrast (black) 
background so that the primary color can be more easily distinguished.  For example, the 
centerline, threshold and runway number markings are painted in white with a thin black 
border on the runway object.  This black border, known as haloing, provides color 
contrast so that the markings can be easily seen on the runway.  Symbology “thickness” 
is measured as total pixels in width.  For example, for thin display elements like the sides 
of a pathway or tunnel, with a tunnel thickness of 2 pixels and a halo thickness of 4 
pixels, 2 pixels of the tunnel overlay the halo and only one pixel (each side) of halo 
(black pixels) around the tunnel will be visible.  That is, if the halo thickness is the same 
size as the symbology, a halo will not be visible.  The software used by NASA to render 
the haloed display elements was written in OpenGL, which allows developers to specify 
line widths as floating point numbers; thus non-integer line thicknesses are possible (Woo 
et al., 1997).  Antialiasing was enabled via graphics hardware techniques.  Best practice 
within the Project has been to utilize both non-integer line thicknesses and antialiasing, 
and to halo most flight symbology elements.  For raster text symbology that directly 
overlays the terrain image (e.g., heading under the roll scale and pitch ladder text), 
antialiasing and haloing provided the most readable text.  Text within the transparent 
tapes (e.g., speed and altitude) need not be haloed as the shaded transparency or 
background opaqueness of the tapes provides sufficient contrast. 
For a stroke-on-raster HUD, symbology haloing is neither possible nor necessary.  The 
high contrast stroke symbology, drawn in the fly-back, clearly stands-out from the 
background raster.  However, new digital HUDs are all-raster; stroke cursive functions 
are not available.  In this case, symbology haloing is a necessary and vital function for 
symbology readability against the SV terrain background. 
6.1.2.1.2 HUD / PFD Symbology.  Because the symbologies appearing on HUDs 
and PFDs are quite similar, the best practices that evolved in the area of HUD / PFD 
symbologies are presented in terms of the symbology elements themselves, although 
there are significant differences in symbology considerations for these very different 
display media.  Obscuration of the view of the outside world and, conversely, the 
visibility of monochrome symbology elements under varying brightness and contrast 
conditions are major concerns with HUD displays, as are differences in raster and stroke 
symbology presentations.  Other differences include, for the HUD, unity magnification / 
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minification (conformal with the real world), the larger FOV at unity magnification, 
collimation, and location, compared to the HDDs.  When best practices for a symbology 
element differ according to the display media, both approaches are discussed. 
Best practice within the Project was to base the symbology set used during flight 
operations on symbols that were familiar to most experienced CAB pilots, including 
airspeed/altitude tapes; textual readouts of Mach number and ground speed; a waterline 
symbol; an horizon line (actually the zero pitch line) with heading scale and roll 
indicator; a pitch ladder; a wind vector; a -3° pitch reference line (variable parameter); a 
flight path marker with acceleration / deceleration caret; glideslope and localizer CDIs; a 
flight director guidance symbol; approach or departure or go-around pathway or tunnel; 
airborne and surface traffic; and a runway outline symbol.  Details concerning most of 
the symbology set can be found in Parrish (2003).  For organizational convenience, the 
best practices are presented by the following topic order: Flight Path Marker, Pathway / 
Tunnel, Flight Director Guidance, Tunnel / Terrain Conflict Detection, Obstacles, 
Traffic, Runway Outline, Pitch Ladder, and Clutter. 
6.1.2.1.2.1 Flight Path Marker.  The flight path marker or velocity vector has been 
mentioned previously as perhaps the most important symbology element incorporated 
into the tactical SVS display (e.g., see fig. 29, 31, 32) because its use is so intuitive and 
the information conveyed is so tactically significant.  The position of the velocity vector 
symbol relative to the terrain, the pathway / tunnel, and the flight guidance command 
symbol provides the pilot with the intuitive awareness of the spatial situation required to 
maneuver the aircraft with significantly less workload and at least as precisely (if not 
more so) than/as conventional symbologies, as determined in the numerous studies 
conducted within the project (Arthur et al., 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Bailey et al., 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; etc.).  The flight path marker or velocity vector represents the 
trajectory of the aircraft such that when the symbol is located above, below, right, or left 
of some other element in the display, then unless something changes, that is where the 
aircraft will pass (above, below, right, or left) relative to that element.  For example, if 
the flight path marker is consistently above a terrain ridge line, then the aircraft will clear 
that ridge line. 
Best practice within the SVS Project has been to use a quickened velocity vector (in 
both pitch and roll as in SAE (2005)) tuned to the handling characteristics of the aircraft.  
It was never found necessary to vary the quickening based on the selected FOV of the 
PFD (changes which would not, in any case, be implemented for the velocity vector of 
the fixed FOV HUD).  An acceleration / deceleration caret symbol is included as best 
practice, centered just off the left wing tip of the velocity vector, to assist in thrust 
management. A speed error bar on the velocity vector wing is also included.  The bar 
pegs and changes color (amber) to denote off-scale values.   
6.1.2.1.2.2 Pathway / Tunnel.  As mentioned previously, the inclusion of both a 
velocity vector-based flight director and a pathway or tunnel were legacy contributions 
from HSR research, and CAB researchers rarely evaluated SVS display concepts without 
the presence of both.  While the pathway-based guidance provided by the velocity vector-
based flight director allowed precise tracking response, the tunnel provided look-ahead 
(i.e., “preview”) capability to anticipate upcoming changes in the path and an expectation  
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Figure 31.  HUD tunnel used at RNO and WAL flight trials. 
 
 
Figure 32.  The HDD minimal tunnel concept used at the EGE flight trials. 
 
of impending flight director commands.  In two simulator studies (the CFIT simulator 
study of Arthur et al. (2003, 2004) and the HDD experiment of Prinzel et al. (2004c) and 
Appendix A of Kramer et al. (2005b)) that did examine the presence/absence of a tunnel 
on a HDD PFD, an average of about a 67% reduction in lateral RMS tracking compared 
to flying the same velocity vector flight director without a tunnel was found, 
accompanied by highly significant statistical reductions in workload and concomitant 
increases in situation awareness with the tunnel present.  A third simulator study (Kramer 
et al., 2005b) that examined the presence/absence of a tunnel on a HUD found similar 
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results, although the reduction in lateral RMS tracking with the tunnel present was only 
28% and was not statistically significant.  The lesser effect for the anticipatory cueing 
advantages of the HUD tunnel can perhaps be attributed to the fact that, in consideration 
of HUD clutter issues and drawing capacity limitations of the HUD stroke generator, only 
four tunnel segments were presented ahead of ownship, extending to 0.8 nm (see fig. 31), 
while the HDD version (see fig. 33) of the tunnel extends to about 3.0 nm (see fading 
feature below). 
The great majority of pathway research effort within CAB focused rather on 
minimizing the clutter associated with pathway displays.  Two tunnel concepts were 
found to be most effective, both of which are based on the NASA Langley ‘Crow’s Foot’ 
Tunnel (Parrish et al., 2006).  The minimal tunnel concept consisted of a series of 
"crow’s feet" presented in each corner of a tunnel segment (essentially a truncated box).  
The tunnel was drawn with 5 tunnel segments per nm, with a total length of 3 nm, and 
faded gradually to invisibility over the last nm (when approaching a path glideslope or 
track change, the start point of the fading feature can be extended beyond 3 nm to allow 
the upcoming change to be visible).  This minimal tunnel concept (see fig. 32) was 
suggested as perhaps preferable for HUD use, as it presents the ‘minimal’ tunnel to 
minimize clutter (Bailey et al., 2006; Prinzel et al., 2004a).  The other concept, the 
dynamic "crow’s foot", allowed the "crow’s feet" to grow as a function of path error.  
Therefore, the pilots are given feedback as to where they are in the tunnel and if they are 
close to flying out of the tunnel.  The idea of the dynamic tunnel was that if the pilot is 
flying in the center of the tunnel, there should be the smallest amount of clutter.  
However, if there exists appreciable path error, the appropriate tunnel wall would "grow" 
to help the pilot gauge where the boundaries of the tunnel are (see fig. 33).  This helps to 
overcome a frequent criticism of "low clutter" tunnels.  Should the aircraft leave the 
tunnel, the tunnel would change to a “trough” and resemble a box tunnel with the 
exception that the tunnel would 
 
Figure 33.  The dynamic tunnel concept with some error. 
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open to “invite” the pilot back into the tunnel (see fig. 34).  This dynamic tunnel concept 
was selected by the Project as best practice for HDD use.  After a detailed simulation 
study concerning SVS HUD issues (Kramer et al., 2005b) revealed that the dynamic 
tunnel concept produced lower workload and higher SA than the minimal tunnel concept 
(performance was equivalent for all other measures), the dynamic tunnel concept was 
selected by the Project as best practice for HUD use as well.  
 
 
Figure 34.  Outside the dynamic tunnel concept. 
 
Another of the best practices identified by SVS researchers concerning pathway 
displays is the automatic removal of the tunnel on final approach at a declutter altitude or 
height.  The declutter height is approach path dependent.  The visual arrival to Runway 
07 at EGE, which has an extremely short final straight segment, would dictate a much 
lower declutter height (e.g., 400 feet AGL) than the straight-in approach to EGE Runway 
25 (e.g., 800 feet AGL), for example.  The tunnel has been found to be extremely 
advantageous for maneuvering paths (e.g., turning, descending paths), but for straight 
segments, particularly when the pilot wants to see what’s in front of the aircraft, the 
tunnel benefits quickly vanish and cannot surpass their clutter contribution.  Such is the 
case on short final in an approach. 
It has also been best practice to remove the raster terrain image from the HUD at the 
declutter height to allow total focus of attention on the runway environment (if available, 
an EVS image then replaces the SVS terrain).  Should TOGA be selected during the 
approach, the raster terrain image returns to the HUD presentation and the TOGA 
pathway appears on both the HUD and PFD, along with the TOGA path guidance cue. 
A usability study (Arthur et al., 2006a) of tunnel concepts on an SVS PFD was 
conducted assessing the tunnel attributes of color and line width on HDDs (see fig. 35).  
The results showed that tunnel color was not significant; however, a green tunnel was 
slightly preferred when presented with white HUD-like symbology and a green/brown 
hybrid textured terrain database.  The line and halo line thickness of the tunnel (see fig. 
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36) was also deemed significant, as pilots preferred the tunnel thickness of 3 pixels and a 
halo thickness of 4 pixels.  The results of the usability study evince the existence of 
significant individual differences in the determination of optimal tunnel portrayal. 
 
 
Figure 35.  Four tunnel color choices; Magenta, Green, White, Black. 
 
While not conclusive, the data suggest that certain combinations of color and line 
width are not acceptable candidates specifically for Synthetic Vision displays.  Statistical 
evidence and, particularly, pilot comments imply certain characteristics are less 
favorable, such as the use of white coloring, thin line widths, and thick haloing.  Black 
coloring was typically noted to be an acceptable color because of its substantial contrast 
with the terrain background.  However, most pilots noted the unfavorable aesthetics when 
presenting a black tunnel on a synthetic terrain background.  Based on pilot comments, 
designers should consider employing magenta or green tunnel coloring with tunnel 
thickness of at least 3 pixels and black haloing.  Since the tunnel is used by the pilots as a 
second order guidance cue, the tunnel needs to be prominent without providing adverse 
clutter. 
The tunnel attributes found to be preferred in this usability test were tested using the 
NASA hybrid terrain texture concept for the PFD.  Other Synthetic Vision displays, such 
as head-up and helmet-mounted displays, and different display concepts, such as those 
employing photo-realistic, generic texturing, wire-frame, and other terrain texturing, may 
discover different results because of the highly interactive nature of tunnel presentation 
with the background terrain.  Therefore, best practice within the Project suggests that 
display designers seeking to employ pathway-in-the-sky symbology should consider 
these results as well as empirically evaluate the human factors involved in specific design 
of these formats as part of Synthetic Vision displays.  
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Figure 36.  Seven tunnel and halo thickness choices. 
 
6.1.2.1.2.3 Flight-Director Guidance.  For CAB SVS, the inclusion of precision 
guidance in the form of a pathway with a velocity vector-based flight director was a 
legacy judgment from HSR research, which had consistently demonstrated their worth.  
Subsequent investigations within the SVS Project continued to validate that judgment.  
As a typical example, the EGE flight test found on average about a 90% reduction in 
lateral Root Mean Square (RMS) tracking when flying a velocity vector flight director 
with a tunnel compared to flying only raw error (see fig. 37), accompanied by a highly 
significant statistical reduction in workload (Kramer et al., 2004b). 
Comparisons between pitch-based and velocity vector-based flight directors have 
never been a concern within the CAB SVS Project because of the ambiguities of optimal 
tuning for both handling qualities and flight technical errors associated with flight 
directors, and primarily because of the obvious advantages of the intuitive nature of a 
velocity vector in conjunction with pathway symbology.  Velocity vector-based flight 
director symbologies, both with and without tunnels and terrain, have been briefly 
evaluated under the SVS GA element of the project and details of those results are 
presented later in Section 6.2.3.1.  Essentially, presence of the tunnel affected FTE and 
workload positively, while presence of terrain affected only situation awareness ratings.  
Concerns about the compelling nature of terrain depictions on guidance displays were 
found inconsequential.  It was the guidance symbology that proved to be somewhat 
compelling, rather than the terrain.  The tunnel and guidance command symbology were 
not found to be so compelling that pilots completely lost their cross-check or ignored 
other information.  However, the tunnel and guidance were treated by all pilots as being  
Tunnel thickness: 1.0 pixels 
Halo thickness: 0 pixel 
Tunnel thickness: 1.0 pixels 
Halo thickness: 1.5 pixels 
Tunnel thickness: 2.0 pixels  Tunnel thickness: 2.0 pixels 
Halo thickness: 0 pixel           Halo thickness: 3.0 pixels 
Tunnel thickness: 2.0 pixels 
Halo thickness: 4.0 pixels 
Tunnel thickness: 3.0 pixels 
Halo thickness: 0 pixel 
Tunnel thickness: 3.0 pixels 
Halo thickness: 4.0 pixels 
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Figure 37.  EGE RMS lateral and vertical path error over the entire approach path. 
 
of extremely high integrity (similar to ILS path data) to the extent that they “trusted” this 
information until over-riding evidence of an error was found.  The symbology is no more 
compelling than current flight director and raw data displays – albeit a pilot’s scan pattern 
was focused (and improved) more so on the tunnel and guidance symbols because of the 
integrating nature of the SV symbology.  For instance, the pilots were not “required” to 
go to the ND to obtain lateral path information.  These data are now displayed directly on 
the PFD.  The ND became part of the “cross-check” in a secondary rather than essential 
fashion.  Consequently, best practice within the SVS Project has been to address the 
“high-trust” aspect of the guidance tracking task and the modification of the pilot scan: 
first, by stipulating the inclusion of the SVS Tunnel / Terrain Conflict Detection 
Algorithm alluded to earlier and discussed below in Section 6.1.2.1.2.4; and secondly, by 
promoting a good scan using visual “alerting” such as the traffic surveillance symbology 
update rate implementation, to be discussed later under the update rate section (Section 
6.1.2.2.6). 
CAB researchers also investigated three guidance cue symbologies.  The guidance 
concepts were either an integrated cue circle (“ball”) used in several HUDs, a “follow-
me” aircraft concept (“ghost”), or a “tadpole” guidance symbol (see fig. 38).  The 
integrated cue circle symbol was the tail-light portion of the ghost symbol, which is 
positioned for transport aircraft 30-seconds ahead of ownship on the centerline of the 
tunnel.  The positioning was determined by a modified form of pursuit guidance, 
documented in Merrick & Jeske (1995), to keep the aircraft trajectory tracking the tunnel.  
Yaw, pitch, and roll attitude of the ghost reflected the track and flight path angles of the 
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path at that lead position.  The tadpole provided similar information to the integrated cue 
with added track change information provided by the tail on the ball.  The tadpole 
symbology is used in some military aircraft HUDs (e.g., F-16).  No quantitative 
differences were statistically detectable, but subjective opinions favored the tadpole and 
the ghost airplane presentations over the ball, and the ghost airplane over the tadpole, 
because of the anticipatory information provided by the specific symbol. 
 
Figure 38.  Guidance symbols: Integrated cue “Ball” (left), “Tadpole” (center) and Ghost 
aircraft (two perspectives, at right). 
 
Best practice within the SVS Project has been to use any of the three guidance cue 
symbologies (ghost airplane, tadpole, or ball) as the flight director symbol, transitioning 
to the integrated cue circle (ball) at declutter height (in situations in which clutter is a 
high concern, the ball is used exclusively).  Conventional flare cue symbology as used on 
HUDs with velocity vectors appears appropriately on both the HUD and PFD.  The 
integrated cue ball is used exclusively during departure and TOGA operations. 
6.1.2.1.2.4 Tunnel / Terrain Conflict Detection.  The SVS Tunnel / Terrain Conflict 
Detection Algorithm was envisioned as part of the Integrated SVS Concept to detect 
tunnel / terrain conflicts well before the conflict point is approached as another 
independent check and balance feature.  If the programmed flight plan or immediate 
flight path has a terrain conflict, the system should provide the pilot with a visual alert 
and the conflict should be made obvious by a “Break-X” to provide clear and 
unambiguous visual evidence to the pilot that there exists a convergence of the pathway 
and the SV terrain.  In conjunction with this algorithm, another best practice heuristic 
arises.  Pathway depictions in a SVS PFD should address drawing order issues, as 
potentially HMI could result from a misapplication of drawing order priorities.  It is 
possible that in certain circumstances the pathway or tunnel may pass behind or through 
terrain, and if the pathway is drawn last (as is typically the practice), the pathway will not 
be occluded by the terrain.  The pathway should not continue through terrain or be visible 
if behind terrain.  The pathway should never continue through terrain.  For example, the 
“Break-X” would obscure the pathway “under” the terrain. 
6.1.2.1.2.5 Obstacles.  Obstacles (ground-based, man-made objects such as towers) 
are represented iconically on both the PFD / HUD and ND in the NASA Integrated SVS 
Concept.  The representation typically used has been a white rectangular barber-pole (red 
stripes) corresponding in height and location for known obstacles.  Orange stripes were 
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used for unknown obstacles to differentiate real time detections.  Best practice has been 
to halo the icon.  Information is obtained from an on-board obstacle database, from 
datalink or another update mechanism for newly mapped obstacles, and in real time from 
hazard sensors during flight or surface operations. 
6.1.2.1.2.6 Traffic.  While the strategic SVS ND is the principal display for 
surveillance information (Kramer & Norman, 2000), tactical traffic information within 
the FOV of the PFD / HUD from surveillance sources (TCAS, ADS-B, TIS-B, ASDE, or 
real time object detection algorithms) is also presented iconically on those displays (see 
fig. 39) as best practice in the NASA Integrated SVS Concept.  These icons conform to 
the CDTI MOPS (RTCA, 2001) in distinguishing between airborne and surface vehicles 
(an inverted triangle with point side down is used for surface traffic) and wire-frame 
shapes to reduce obscuration of the terrain.  The shapes and colors conform to TCAS 
conventions (blue diamonds for proximity traffic, yellow circles for 45 second caution 
alerts, red squares for 30 second warning alerts; altitude indications; ascent / descent 
arrows).  Best practices within the NASA Project include a range filter for the PFD / 
HUD traffic symbology nominally set at 7 nm to restrict displayed traffic to the 
neighborhood (particularly useful in the airport environment).  Unlike the TCAS range 
filter, the SVS Project never found it necessary to employ altitude boundaries (TCAS 
uses +/- 1200 ft), as most NASA testing occurred in the terminal area.  It was intended, 
based on HSR research (Kramer & Norman, 2000),  that traffic symbols vary in size with 
range as the traffic enters a 5 nmi boundary with the ownship, but that functionality was 
never implemented.  Alphanumeric text size remains constant size.  Careful attention is 
given to PFD integration with the ND and TCAS. 
6.1.2.1.2.7 Runway Outline.  The NASA Integrated SVS Concept includes an 
independent runway monitor display element within the PFD / HUD as a part of 
monitoring the integrity of the database / navigational position solution.  In an air-to-
ground application mode, the advanced multi-mode WxR is used to provide runway 
location in order to position the runway confirmation or misalignment wire-frame display 
element (hopefully overlaying the synthetic runway).  The runway outline offers 
assurance to the pilot in low visibility conditions that the synthetic scene is aligned 
properly and that the real runway is actually present in the outside world.  Best practice 
has been to initially fix the wire-frame outline (see fig. 19) to coincide with the synthetic 
runway position until WxR range conditions are satisfied, and to filter the position 
information provided by the WxR to prevent jitter.  Should the integrity of the WxR 
position information be in doubt, the wire-frame is removed from the display.  Best 
practice has also been to replace the runway outline at the declutter height with similar 
RIPS runway symbology (the edge cones and centerline described below), and to remove 
it completely if TOGA is selected.  During the SVS Project, an extended centerline (see 
fig. 19) was included as part of the wire-frame outline to assist in runway alignment.  
However, a usability study conducted as part of a simulator study (Bailey et al., 2006) 
under the new Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck Technologies (IIFDT) Project under 
NASA’s AvSP found it to be unnecessary clutter, particularly with the presence of tunnel 
symbology. 
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Figure 39.  An SVS PFD showing neighborhood traffic. 
 
6.1.2.1.2.8 Pitch Ladder.  The pitch ladder selected as a best practice for the NASA 
Integrated SVS Concept to satisfy obscuration concerns about the region of the aim-point 
(the flight path marker) is a split ladder with a gapped horizon line (actually the zero 
pitch line) adopted from HUD symbology implementations (see fig. 39).  The entire 
ladder, including the horizon line, is haloed.  Originally the gap in the horizon line was 
placed about the pitch reference symbol (see figs. 7 & 8), but best practice was soon 
recognized as gapped about the velocity vector position (see fig. 40). 
6.1.2.1.2.9 Clutter.  Best practice within the SVS Project has been to aggressively 
pursue all opportunities to declutter the PFD / HUD to minimize synthetic terrain and, for 
the HUD, outside obscuration while optimizing the legibility of essential information.  
Examples of the application of this philosophy are the dynamic tunnel, the declutter 
height provision for pathway removal (and terrain removal from the HUD), the 
surveillance range filter for traffic, and the numerous symbology elements that are 
haloed.  Independent HUD declutter switches for both the raster channel and stroke 
symbology are other examples. 
6.1.2.1.3 ND Symbology.  Repeated mention has been made of the NASA SVS 
efforts to emphasize the careful integration of the SVS PFD and ND.  The principle was 
adopted as a best practice philosophy.  Although those efforts certainly include use of the 
same terrain portrayal techniques, most of the efforts have been concentrated on 
symbology integration to ensure cohesive, conjunctive operations. 
The SVS ND is a direct enhancement of a conventional ND with the addition of 
terrain.  In its exocentric coplanar “gods’-eye view” navigation mode, the display 
incorporates TAWS caution and warning overlays and a VSD (see fig. 10), as well as 
CDTI to help a pilot’s cognitive understanding of map and ownship positioning and that 
of traffic, terrain, route, and obstacle hazards.  However, a usability study preceding a 
simulator experiment (Prinzel et al., 2005a) determined that most pilots preferred to 
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access a TAWS peaks mode display that employs a relative altitude presentation during 
low altitude maneuvering rather than the absolute altitude presentation employed by the 
SVS ND with TAWS overlays.  Therefore the synthetic terrain presentation would be a 
pilot-selectable page or option, allowing the pilot to declutter this information when not 
required or desired. 
 
Figure 40.  GA PFD with horizon line gapped about the velocity vector symbol. 
 
The pilot would also have a selectable “situation awareness” mode in which the ND 
changes the display frame-of-reference (see fig. 11) from a 2-D “god’s-eye view” to a 
dynamic 3-D exocentric perspective view of ownship position with respect to traffic, 
terrain, route, and obstacles (Prinzel et al., 2005a).  The VSD is no longer presented.  
Best practices within the SVS Project for both the 2-D coplanar mode and the 3-D 
“situation awareness” mode of the SVS ND follow.  For organizational convenience, the 
best practices are presented by the following topic order: PFD FOV Lines, Terrain / 
Pathway, Obstacles, and Traffic. 
6.1.2.1.3.1 PFD FOV Lines.  One of the most effective techniques for integration of 
the SVS PFD and 2-D coplanar mode of the ND employs FOV lines that are drawn to 
enclose the forward area on the ND encompassed by the view presented on the SVS PFD 
/ HUD (the PFD FOV “wedge”).  The FOV lines (see fig. 13) promote visual momentum 
between the ND and PFD so it becomes an easy task to correlate features on each display 
(e.g., they can be particularly useful during TCAS alerts or ATC callouts to locate 
individual traffic).  Best practice has been to use haloed dotted green lines to denote the 
PFD FOV wedge. 
6.1.2.1.3.2 Terrain / Pathway.  The exocentric coplanar view of the NASA SVS ND 
includes terrain, pathway, obstacles and CDTI.  The pathway is represented by a magenta 
line, and if RNP procedures are underway, the RNP boundaries are represented, only 
when off path, by a dotted aqua-colored corridor (see fig. 41).  When on path, the terrain 
profile in the VSD is the terrain along the magenta path, even if the path is a curved 
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segment.  In its “situation awareness” mode, the symbology for the route changes to a 
pathway representation (see fig. 11).  Best practice has been to provide the SVS Tunnel / 
Terrain Conflict Detection Algorithm to ensure that the tunnel never penetrates terrain or 
is visible if behind terrain without an alert warning (the “Break-X” symbology of Section 
6.1.2.1.2.4) well before the conflict point is approached. 
 
Figure 41.  The coplanar view of the SVS ND during RNP procedures. 
 
6.1.2.1.3.3 Obstacles.  As best practice, obstacles are represented iconically on the 
SVS ND in the perspective “situation awareness” mode with the same symbol as that 
used in the PFD.  In the coplanar mode, the symbol is a barber-pole truncated cone, with 
the wider base resting at the obstacle position with a track- or North-up orientation.  The 
color scheme to differentiate known obstacles from those detected by hazard sensors also 
is that used in the PFD.  Best practice has been to halo the icon.  
6.1.2.1.3.4 Traffic.  CDTI symbology for the ND in both its modes is the same as 
that used in the PFD.  Best practice has been to halo the symbols, and, as a legacy from 
HSR research (Kramer & Norman, 2000), to provide no symbology coding to indicate a 
traffic sensor source.  However, because no motion interpolation is provided (i.e., there is 
no position update smoothing, as HSR research revealed the discrete jumps in traffic 
symbology on both the PFD and ND to be helpful to the crew, rather than distracting), 
symbology update rate may provide a clue as to sensor source to the knowledgeable 
observer (e.g., ADS-B updates more quickly than TCAS).  Range filtering such as 
employed on the SV PFD/HUD is not utilized for the ND, as CDTI symbology positions 
conform to the scale selection of the ND. 
6.1.2.1.4 Auxiliary Display Symbology.  The SV-AD is generally used to present 
an existing display such as the RIPS EMM or the coplanar mode of the SVS ND, or, in a 
rehearsal tool mode, the perspective 3-D “situation awareness” view mode of the SVS 
ND (to preview alternate approach routes, emergency descent routes, unfamiliar 
departure routes, etc.).  In these cases the symbology used on the SV-AD usually 
conforms exactly to that of the display being repeated.  The Project best practices for 
these uses of the SV-AD are presented in the display considerations section below in 
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Section 6.1.2.2.5.  The symbology exception to be presented here is for an SVS 
implementation that includes a single HUD and the presence of an EVS imaging sensor.  
When the PF is using the HUD with an EVS image for flight or surface operations, the 
PNF may choose to display the EVS image on the SV-AD.  That raster image 
presentation does not include the HUD stroke symbology.  The HUD symbology set is 
replicated on the SV-AD, and an independent declutter switch is provided to allow the 
PNF to easily verify the aim-point and the guidance, and to scan for traffic and obstacles 
by removing the SV-AD symbology set to allow full presentation of the EVS image in 
the critical area in which obstacles might appear.  The use of a periphery symbology set 
for a head-down display of an EVS image, rather than the display-centered HUD-like set, 
was considered from the original work of CMC Electronics, a CRA partner (McKay et 
al., 2002), for use with FLIR and millimeter wave radar sensors (see fig. 42). However, a 
usability study conducted as part of a simulator study (Bailey et al., 2006) found pilots 
preferred the ‘declutterable’ HUD-like symbology set, and it has been adopted as best 
practice by NASA SVS. 
6.1.2.2 Flight Operations Display Considerations.  The best practices that 
evolved in the area of specific flight displays are discussed in terms of the issues that 
arose for consideration for that specific display device in flight operations (PFD, HUD, 
ND, and Auxiliary Display), concluding with lessons concerning Update Rate. 
6.1.2.2.1 PFD.  For an SVS image to be conformal, objects in the displayed image 
need to subtend the same angles they do in the real world.  Conformal SVS displays 
provide the size, shape, and location of the terrain to the pilot exactly as it would appear 
if the SVS display were a window.  The conformal FOV of a display device is based on 
the size of the display device and the distance from the display device to the pilot’s eye 
reference point (ERP).  See Figure 43 for a graphical illustration of these parameters 
along with the equations for conformal horizontal and vertical FOV.   
Because of retrofit considerations, the SVS Project initially invested a large portion 
of the CAB element resources into research centered on the effects of display surface size 
and the associated issues of minification and FOV that become primary in the 
presentation of an outside perspective scene at other than unity scaling (a conformal 
image).  FOV is a design parameter that has specific importance for SVS displays.  
Larger FOVs permit pilots to view larger areas but require the display image to become 
less conformal.  Larger FOVs, while being useful during turns or in turbulence, make 
objects appear further away (objects are minified).  Variations in FOV affect the pilot’s 
ability to judge distances.  Lower FOVs provide an image that becomes more conformal 
(objects are less minified) and enhance depth perception.  Objects that are narrow, like 
runways, become more visible with lower FOVs. 
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Figure 42.  An example of a periphery symbology set for EVS imagery presentation on 
the SV-AD, by CRA partner CMC Electronics, Inc. 
 
 
Figure 43.  Definition of a conformal display’s horizontal and vertical FOVs, along with 
the aspect ratio. 
 
SVS imagery can be generated for almost any FOV and displayed to the pilot.  The 
degree to which the SVS imagery deviates from the conformal FOV is referred to as the 
Minification Factor (MF).  The MF is defined as the FOV of the imagery being displayed 
to the pilot divided by the conformal FOV of the display device.  The MF is also the 
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inverse of the magnification factor.  Conformal FOV is also referred to as unity 
magnification/minification. 
Figures 44 and 45 present images for the SVS-PFD portion of an ARINC Size-D 
display for 30º and 60º FOVs for identical aircraft positions, approximately 1.5 nm from 
a DFW runway.  A MF of 2.1 resulted for the 30º FOV while the 60º FOV produced a  
 
Figure 44.  Image of ARINC Size-D display for 30º FOV, approximately 1.5 nm from a 
DFW runway. 
 
 
Figure 45.  Image of ARINC Size-D display for 60º FOV for identical aircraft position, 
approximately 1.5 nm from a DFW runway. 
 
MF of 4.1 for this size display.  From these two images, the effect of variations of the MF 
can be seen.  Increased MFs create the illusion that objects (like the runway) are further 
away, and, although counter-intuitively, an appearance that the altitude has decreased 
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(because of an increased downward view of previously un-displayed foreground scenery; 
see fig. 44 and 45).  Another effect of variations of the MF is that lateral and vertical 
displayed distance between the velocity vector and the runway has been reduced for 
increased MF.  These changes can lead to variations in the pilot’s ability to use the 
combination of the runway and the velocity vector as a guidance aid to manage flight 
path due to symbology clutter.  A change in MF also affects apparent handling qualities 
in pursuit guidance tasks such as following flight director commands, as control stick / 
flight path marker sensitivities change (the same unit of stick movement creates differing 
display units of movement for the flight path marker).  For organizational convenience, 
the best practices are presented by the following topic order: FOV / Minification, Size, 
and Guidance Symbology Minification. 
6.1.2.2.1.1 FOV / Minification.  In order to address the related issues of size, FOV 
and minification, the idea evolved early in the CAB effort to investigate a pilot-selectable 
FOV control.  Pilot opinion was extremely favorable for the idea, as a higher FOV was 
useful for the en route, initial approach and departure phases of flight, and a smaller FOV 
was useful for final approach and take-off.  After experience was gained in several 
studies, the best practice values for FOV evolved as 90°, 60°, and 30°, regardless of the 
display size.  A FOV of greater than 90° appeared distorted as if viewed through a fish-
eye lens, while a FOV equivalent to unity minification gave the impression of viewing a 
scene through a straw. 
The most complete examination of the related issues of display size, MF and FOV 
within the SVS Project occurred during the DFW flight test (Glaab et al., 2003).  Table 3 
summarizes a sample of the FOVs tested.  In the Table 3, unity FOV implies the FOV 
that would be provided by the display based on size of the display area combined with a 
25 inch ERP distance (unity FOV was actually unity minification factor).  At the DFW 
flight trials, which involved a runway change task at 5 nm from touchdown (see fig. 46), 
a consistent pattern was developed by the evaluation pilots for SVS FOV control during 
the horseshoe approach course.  During maneuvering from one extended runway 
centerline to another (e.g., the "transition" phase of a runway change task), larger field-
of-view settings were generally used, with a gradual reduction in the field-of-view 
selection as the pilots neared the landing runway (e.g., the "tracking" phase of a runway 
change task).  This behavior is interpreted as a function of display minification in Figure 
47, which shows the mean (and standard deviation) of the display MF used in the DFW 
runway change task (the "transition" phase) plotted as a function of the SVS HDD size.  
The pilots tended to use a less minified display for the larger display sizes (conversely, 
these results also indicate that pilots incurred larger MFs for the smaller displays to 
achieve the desired FOVs, while demonstrating the ability to maintain a degraded but 
similar level of performance), but the minification factor always approached unity as the 
pilots neared landing (i.e., the "tracking” phase) for all display sizes (see fig.48). 
6.1.2.2.1.2 Size.  At the DFW flight trials, particular attention was given to whether 
Synthetic Vision concepts could effectively be implemented on common display sizes, 
from ARINC Size A to Size D up to a conceptual Size X (10” x 8”).  Research 
throughout the SVS Project has shown that display size is not a critical issue, given that 
field-of-view (i.e., field-of-regard) control is provided to the pilot (Kramer et al., 2004b; 
Kramer et al., 2003).  As a further example, at EGE (Bailey et al., 2002), statistically- 
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Table 3.  Display size and available fields of view and Minification Factors (MFs) for 
evaluation. 
 
 
Physical display 
dimensions 
 
Unity FOV 
 
MF 
 
 
 
 
 
Size 
Width, 
in. 
Height, 
in. 
 
H, deg 
 
V, deg 
 
30° 
 
60° 
 
90° 
 
120° 
A 5.25 5 12.0 11.4 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 
D 6.4 6.4 14.6 14.6 2.1 4.1 6.2 8.2 
X 10 8 22.6 18.2 1.3 2.7 4.0 5.3 
 
 
Figure 46.  DFW change of runway task.   
 
significant benefits for the SVS HDDs were found over a baseline display suite 
consisting of an EFIS with TAWS display configuration.  The subjective rating 
comparison is shown in Figure 49 for the SVS Size A/B concept and for the SVS Size X 
concept compared to the baseline display configuration.  The data clearly show a trend 
that the evaluation pilots “Strongly Agreed” that it was easy to determine the aircraft 
position with respect to terrain with a SVS HDD concept, particularly when implemented 
using the largest display media (Size X).  The Size A photo-realistic and Size X generic 
and photo-realistic SVS display concepts provided highly statistically-significant terrain 
awareness improvement over the baseline display (Electronic Attitude Direction Indicator 
(EADI), and TAWS ND). 
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Figure 47.  MF used in DFW change of runway transition task as function of the SVS 
HDD size. 
 
 
Figure 48.  MF used in DFW landing task as function of the SVS HDD size. 
 
Although display size in CAB aircraft is not a critical issue, the MF findings 
discussed in the previous section (Section 6.1.2.2.1.1) suggest unequivocally that “bigger 
is better”.  Hence the best practice findings of the SVS Project are that pilot-selectable 
FOV control for the SVS PFD allows an effective implementation of SVS on current 
display sizes, and that an even more effective HDD size would strive to provide unity 
minification with a field-of-regard at least the same extent of current HUDs (32o H x 24o 
V). 
6.1.2.2.1.3 Guidance Symbology Minification.  As noted previously, variations of 
the MF are accompanied by changes in lateral and vertical distances between the velocity 
vector and other symbology elements.  In providing pilot-selectable FOV, therefore, SVS 
designers may need to account for these changes, which affect handling qualities in 
pursuit guidance tasks such as following flight director commands.  Best practice within 
the SVS Project has been to consider changing symbol sizes with FOV changes, 
increasing or decreasing the size of the flight path marker and flight director symbols 
appropriately to conform, for example, with the distance changes between the pitch 
ladder and heading tic mark elements or the size changes of the runway.  These 
adjustments in symbol sizes have never been utilized, however, as the existing sizes 
consistently resulted in satisfactory handling qualities without requiring either size 
changes or retuning of the gains of the flight director, but other SVS designers should be 
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aware of the potential problem, as well as the potential solution offered by adjustments in 
symbol sizes.  
 
Figure 49.  Ease in determining aircraft position with respect to terrain with SVS 
concepts compared to baseline EADI with TAWS display configuration. 
 
6.1.2.2.1.4 Variable FOV Implementation.  A pilot-selectable field-of-view control 
was found to be optimal; however, this control, as noted above, influences the pilot’s 
perception of spatial distance, depth and range cuing, and handling qualities.  In NASA 
testing, a separate, additional control was provided to the pilots for this FOV-selection 
function.  Avionics manufacturers are concerned that such perceptual issues might 
become certification show-stoppers.  NASA has found during its research that pilot 
training quickly alleviates any such issues, although a dedicated training-effects 
experiment was never conducted on these issues. 
NASA considered, but never implemented nor tested, variable, but automatic FOV 
control, whereby the FOV was pre-set based upon aircraft configuration.  For instance, 
the nominal FOV would be 60o, but if the aircraft flaps were deployed, the FOV would be 
45o, and, if gear were then deployed, the FOV would be unity.  This type of scheduling 
could provide a FOV control approaching that used during NASA flight tests with a pilot-
selectable FOV. 
Alternatively, the FOV selection in the SVS-PFD may be tied to the ND range 
selection.  Range control of the ND is “standard operating procedure” and it directly 
reflects the pilot’s area of interest.  Thus, FOV settings on the SVS-PFD could be tied to 
the range settings on the ND: higher ranges corresponding to larger SVS FOVs and lower 
ranges approaching unity FOV.  The use of embedded range rings in the SVS terrain on 
the PFD also provides visual momentum between the ND and PFD to: a) help mitigate 
Q.1: It Was Easy To Determine Aircraft Position wrt 
Terrain
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Str
on
gly
 D
isa
gre
e
Mo
de
rat
ely
 D
isa
gre
e
Sli
gh
tly
 D
isa
gre
e
Sli
gh
tly
 A
gre
e
Mo
de
rat
ely
 Ag
ree
Str
on
gly
 A
gre
e
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f O
cc
ur
en
ce
s
EADI-Baseline SV HDD - Size A
Q.1: It Was Easy To Determine Aircraft Position wrt 
Terrain
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Str
on
gly
 D
isa
gre
e
Mo
de
rat
ely
 D
isa
gre
e
Sli
gh
t ly
 D
isa
gre
e
Sli
gh
t ly
 A
gre
e
Mo
de
rat
ely
 Ag
ree
Str
on
gly
 A
gre
e
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f O
cc
ur
en
ce
s
EADI-Baseline SV HDD - Size X
Q.1: It Was Easy To Determine Aircraft Position wrt 
Terrain
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Str
on
gly
 D
isa
gre
e
Mo
de
rat
ely
 D
isa
gre
e
Sli
gh
tly
 D
isa
gre
e
Sli
gh
tly
 A
gre
e
Mo
de
rat
ely
 Ag
ree
Str
on
gly
 A
gre
e
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f O
cc
ur
en
ce
s
EADI-Baseline SV-HUD
 85
the depth/range perception with a minified display; and, b) provide additional cueing to 
the FOV selection.  These concepts are being evaluated and embedded range rings may 
become part of Honeywell’s SVS product (He et al., 2007).   
Lastly, another issue in the use of a variable FOV selection concerns upset or 
unusual attitude recovery.  The SVS-PFD must serve as a primary flight reference, and 
one of the required functions of the PFR is to provide the pilot with instantaneous and 
unmistakable cues for correct recognition of an aircraft attitude and energy condition and 
support positive and prompt recovery from any upset or unusual flight condition.  A 
variable FOV control would alter the range of pitch attitude being shown on the PFD and 
this might potentially impede attitude recognition and recovery.  It has been the 
contention that the SVS-PFD design would follow HUD experience that shows that the 
overwhelming components for successful unusual attitude recognition and recovery are 
the symbology design of the PFR.  The SVS-PFD could be designed, like a commercial 
HUD, to contain an “unusual attitude” mode, whereby the SVS-PFD or SVS-HUD 
symbology is changed automatically to facilitate unusual attitude recognition and 
recovery when the aircraft exceeds pre-set attitude parameters.  
6.1.2.2.2 HUD.  The SVS HUD concept is analogous in many respects to the EVS 
certified on the Gulfstream G-V, except that the raster image is synthetically-derived 
rather than being a direct imaging sensor output.  Unlike EVS displays, the SVS HUD 
concept uses a clear sky rather than a sensor image of the sky, so there is no obstruction 
of that area of the display.  Below the horizon, the raster image may obstruct the view of 
the outside real world (as with an EVS image), particularly if the raster brightness is not 
controlled appropriately by the pilot.  Obstruction of the outside real world scene by such 
a display is a recognized certification issue. 
The viability of the SVS HUD was initially tested and "proven" in the DFW flight 
trials (Glaab et al., 2003).  Flying night VFR operations, the colliminated HUD imagery 
provided immersive qualities which were very well-received by the evaluation pilots.  
Pilot comments noted positive situation awareness benefits without significant liabilities.  
Separate HUD controls for the stroke and raster brightness and a button on the control 
yoke for symbology and SVS raster imagery declutter were essential.  During the EGE 
flight trials (Kramer et al., 2004b), which, unlike the DFW evaluations, were conducted 
in daylight conditions, the SVS HUD concept was, again, proven to be an enhancement 
over present-day cockpit display technology for terrain awareness. 
In the EGE flight test, comparisons were made against a baseline display suite with 
no HUD consisting of a Size A EADI and a Size B ND, including TAWS capability.  As 
shown in Figure 49, a majority of evaluation pilots subjectively rated their awareness of 
the terrain as being better when flying the SVS HUD than when flying the baseline 
display suite. 
In both flight trials, the SVS HUD concept was, for all intents, a monochromatic 
green representation of the full-color, head-down display SVS concept, using an RS-343 
video format.  No effort was expended to examine graphical light source or other terrain 
shading issues tailored to the HUD. 
In contrast to the subjectively-reported success, however, the data of Figure 49 also 
show that the situation awareness enhancement was not universal.  Some negative ratings 
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(similar to those received by the baseline display suite) were given because of two 
significant deficiencies: illegible display renditions under some direct sunlight conditions 
(the raster channel of the HUD presented the velocity vector, the pathway, and the 
terrain, while the stroke channel presented the other flight symbology, including the flight 
director command) and some reported terrain depiction illusions (Bailey et al., 2002c).  
HUD luminance and contrast requirements are presented below for SVS HUD 
applications.  The problem of terrain depiction illusions and a technique for their 
potential elimination are also discussed below in Section 6.1.2.2.2.3. 
For organizational convenience, the best practices are presented by the following 
topic order: Unity Magnification, HUD Luminance, Terrain Depiction Illusions, 
Declutter, Compatibility, and SVS HUD / PFD Comparisons. 
6.1.2.2.2.1 Unity Magnification.  As a best practice, considerable effort was 
expended in both simulator and flight test environments to ensure that the separate HUD 
stroke and raster channels were aligned properly and yielded unity magnification across 
the applicable FOV of the HUD. 
6.1.2.2.2.2 HUD Luminance.  According to the SAE ARP for Transport Category 
Airplane Head-Up Display Systems (SAE, 2001)), HUD luminance must be sufficient for 
generation of "a usable display under all foreseeable ambient background conditions, 
including a sunlit cloud of 34,000 cd/m2 (10,000 ftL).  However, for HUD raster 
luminance, the vendor will specify the maximum background luminance operating 
conditions and the minimum of gray shades. 
Pilot comments from the EGE flight trials indicated that there were instances where 
the sun angle washed out the SVS HUD raster image and rendered the SVS image 
unusable.  To achieve the benefits of SVS using the HUD, the SVS raster image must be 
legible and useable in all foreseeable ambient background conditions.  An analysis of 
HUD luminance and contrast requirements was conducted in Bailey et al. (2002c).  
Assuming today's raster HUD luminance capability (i.e., <2000 ftL), uncompromised 
rendering of the synthetic vision imagery (i.e., contrast ratios > 5.66) occurs only below 
ambient brightness levels of approximately 1000 ftL (e.g., night and dark IMC).  The 
excellent pilot acceptance of the SVS HUD from the DFW flight trials was enabled by 
the night conditions of this test.  For all other lighting conditions, terrain rendering 
methods must be tailored to match currently-available HUD raster technology luminance 
levels.  No effort was expended to examine graphical light source or other terrain shading 
issues for either DFW or EGE.  Thus the full dynamic range of SVS imagery content was 
not useable and, as a Project best practice, a monochromatic rendering of terrain imagery 
needs to be evaluated and enhanced as necessary (high contrast image) to ensure 
sufficient dynamic range.  Another problem identified at EGE was the presentation of the 
guidance symbol and the pathway in the raster channel, while the stroke channel 
presented the other flight symbology, including the velocity vector / flight path marker.  
During some direct sunlight conditions, several pilots experienced momentary washout of 
the raster channel, with an interruption in tracking ability.  It became Project best practice 
to thereafter present the velocity vector and the pathway in stroke, and to use the raster 
channel for terrain and low priority symbology. 
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Another improvement, demonstrated during the GVSITE flight test, was to utilize 
neutral density filters on the forward side of the HUD combiner to improve the contrast 
of the HUD during daylight operations.  These filters were very effective at improving 
the daylight readability of the SVS-HUD.  The filters were manually positioned during 
GVSITE – this was a cumbersome process.  A method of automatically tailoring the filter 
intensity was desired, perhaps, by use of electro-chromatic shading (Rowley & Mortimer, 
2002). 
6.1.2.2.2.3 Terrain Depiction Illusions.  Some negative pilot comments during the 
EGE flight evaluations were associated with visual artifacts in viewing the terrain 
portrayal in the monochromatic HUD even when the HUD raster image was legible.  The 
pilots noted that several important features of the terrain, such as notches or rock 
outcroppings, were virtually invisible in the HUD image.  Post-flight evaluation showed 
that the raster image didn't contain sufficient dynamic range for correct pilot 
interpretation.  In addition to these luminance problems, some pilots reported an 
occasional inversion illusion with the photo-realistic synthetic terrain HUD image, in 
that, at one particular point, they would interpret a valley as a ridge, and a ridge as a 
valley.  Post-flight image evaluations and experimentation with graphic light source sun 
angles while generating the monochrome photo-realistic terrain database seemed to 
eliminate the problem.  The attitude angle of the light source was changed from the 
default value of 45º to 67º in the database image renderer (see fig. 50).  For mountainous 
terrain, 67º seemed to be a good compromise between providing some relief shading 
while allowing enough light to clearly distinguish ridges.  Again, as a Project  best 
practice, a monochromatic rendering of terrain imagery needs to be evaluated and 
enhanced as necessary (high contrast image) to ensure sufficient dynamic range. 
Rockwell-Collins, a former NASA SVS CRA partner, is employing a fish-net (a grid 
presentation of the terrain) for their synthetic vision HUD concepts (Merchant et al., 
2001a; Schnell et al., 2002a).  The fish-net or grid presentation is a high-contrast raster 
image which should be legible throughout all ambient background luminance ranges 
since it mimics stroke-written symbology.  Rockwell-Collins testing has also developed 
methods to ameliorate one of the past problems with fish-net type displays − the 
annoying and distracting bright area caused by the confluence of edge lines in valleys or 
vanishing points.  The USAF has found an Air Force pilot preference for the fish-net or 
grid format (Snow & French, 2001), especially when used in combination with an EVS 
image (Rate et al., 1994). 
Direct comparisons between a fish-net and synthetic terrain HUD format were not 
conducted within the SVS Project, but future NASA efforts under the new IIFDT Project 
may be directed at evaluating a fish-net terrain overlay embedded within synthetic vision 
terrain renditions.  This approach is analogous to a fish-net synthetic terrain image 
combined with EVS.  The theory is that the high contrast fish-net depiction will be 
noticeable and readable during all ambient lighting conditions, yet in lower ambient 
lighting conditions, the synthetic vision terrain depiction will be viewable to provide a 
high fidelity, unambiguous scene for terrain and obstacle awareness.  Experimental data 
and other research (e.g., Foyle et al., 1992) to support the definition of minimum 
acceptable luminance capabilities and scene content characteristics for SVS HUD 
concepts may occur in the coming years under the IIFDT Project. 
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Figure 50.  Effect of changing the attitude angle of the light source from 45º to 67º in the 
database image renderer. 
 
6.1.2.2.2.4 Declutter.  Because of the concern for obscuring any potential viewing 
of the real world by the SVS synthetic scene being presented in the raster channel of the 
SVS HUD, it was  best practice to provide a declutter switch on the yoke to toggle the 
raster channel on / off.  During the course of the Project, it also became best practice to 
provide another similar switch for the stroke symbology channel. 
6.1.2.2.2.5 Compatibility.  In keeping with the best practice philosophy of 
aggressive pursuit of display integration opportunities, SVS HUD and HDD symbologies 
were made as compatible as possible within Project constraints of time and funding.  
However, these are very different display media.  Major concerns with HUD displays are 
fixed field of regard; a monochrome image, which eliminates color coding usage for 
cautions and warnings, for example, and provides an easily cluttered environment; and 
the potential for display obscuration of the real world out-the-window view. 
6.1.2.2.2.6 SVS HUD / PFD Comparisons.  Many of the Project experiments, both 
simulator and flight, produced data that allowed direct comparison of SVS HUD and 
HDD concepts in flight operations.  Almost universally in the comparisons of objective 
data, the HUD and HDD performance were equivalent statistically, if not operationally.  
In the case of subjective data comparisons, the few metrics that were statistically 
separable favored the HUD concept, with one notable exception, which occurred at EGE.  
At EGE, the Situation Awareness- Subjective Workload Dominance (SA-SWORD) 
rating was found to be significantly higher with the Size X HDD than with the HUD (see 
fig. 51).  However, the EGE flight test was conducted in daylight conditions with 
simulated low visibility conditions and the HUD luminance and terrain depiction issues 
encountered there have been previously discussed.  The lower SA-SWORD ratings are 
probably attributable to those issues.  While few subjective metrics were statistically 
separable, when asked directly for a preferred display configuration, the SVS HUD 
concept was overwhelmingly selected. Head up position for out-the-window viewing and 
unity magnification were always cited as the major rationales for that selection. 
45º            67º 
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Figure 51.  SA-SWORD results from EGE flight test comparing statistically 
discriminable SVS display concepts against baseline EADI with TAWS display 
configuration. 
 
6.1.2.2.3 ND.  The vast majority of the best practices for flight operations on the 
ND that evolved during the SVS Project dealt with symbology issues and display and 
system integration issues (most of which involved symbologies and have been discussed 
under that topic).  Those remaining are presented below by the following topic order: 
SVS ND, Coplanar 2-D / Perspective 3-D, and PFD Integration. 
6.1.2.2.3.1 SVS ND.  The modern ND for CAB aircraft is the one conventional 
display that has actually evolved the most in terms of not being merely an electronic 
rendition of a former mechanical instrument.  Many useful facets such as complex flight 
path representation (including RNP), track prediction noodle, selectable range scales, 
Track / North Up selection, VSD, TAWS, TCAS, CDTI, etc., have been incorporated, 
enabled by modern day computational and graphic processor capabilities.  As a best 
practice, the SVS ND retains the advanced facets of the conventional ND and enhances 
this modern display with the addition of terrain (including cultural features) and enhanced 
integration attributes for both systems (e.g., surveillance and hazard detection systems) 
and other displays (e.g., PFD FOV).  The SVS ND presents terrain and route information 
from an absolute altitude perspective.  TAWS caution and warning alerts are incorporated 
quite successfully as color overlays (solid yellow or red areas of concern) with 
transparency to allow the synthetic terrain to remain visible (Prinzel et al., 2005a).  
However, very limited attempts to provide a relative altitude presentation with yellow or 
red speckling (similar to the peaks mode of Honeywell’s Enhanced Ground Proximity 
Warning System) were unsuccessful, as pilots found their workload increased in trying to 
discriminate the yellow and red peaks mode depictions from the similar colored synthetic 
terrain.  To address this problem, SVS researchers provided a terrain declutter function, 
although additional research might provide a better solution.   
6.1.2.2.3.2 Coplanar 2-D / Perspective 3-D.  The SVS ND also provides a pilot-
selectable “situation awareness” mode that smoothly transitions from the 2-D coplanar 
exocentric view to dynamic 3-D perspective exocentric views (Prinzel et al., 2005a).  The 
objective of the mode (which is similar to a mode of the certified Vision I product from 
Universal Avionics) is to provide pilots with improved spatial awareness (terrain, 
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pathway, traffic, obstacles).  The pilot-selectable dynamic “situation awareness” mode of 
the SVS ND is illustrated in Figure 52.  When the pilot initiates this mode, the view 
smoothly transitions from the 2-D SVS coplanar view to a (a) 20º right offset view at 
10,000 feet (which is maintained for 5 seconds) and then pans to a (b) 20º left offset view 
at 10,000 feet (which is maintained for 5 seconds) and then smoothly transitions back 
again to 2-D SVS coplanar view.  These 3-D views “time out” after the 10 seconds back 
to the 2-D overhead view to preclude the possibility that a pilot might leave the 
navigation display in the 3-D mode and attempt to use it for primary navigation. 
 
Figure 52.  The dynamic “situation awareness” mode of the SVS ND. 
 
6.1.2.2.3.3 PFD Integration.  As best practices of the SVS Project, the SVS ND 
utilizes the same terrain depiction techniques and the same symbology icons (traffic, 
obstacles) as the SVS PFD.  Spatial integration is provided by the PFD FOV wedge (or 
PFD FOV lines) that appears on the ND.  The wedge changes shape appropriately with 
PFD FOV selections and ND range selections. 
6.1.2.2.4 Auxiliary Display.  NASA actually has had limited experience with the 
SV-AD (Arthur et al., 2005; Kramer et al., 2005a; Jones, 2005; Jones & Prinzel, 2006), 
and the best practices that have evolved are mostly conceptual ideas that have not been 
thoroughly evaluated.  Nonetheless, those practices are recorded here as ideas that, at 
least, appear to work reasonably well by the following topic order: RIPS Operations, 
EVS Applications, Rehearsal / Briefing Tool, and Electronic Flight Bag. 
Standard 2-D mode of SVS ND. 
First View     Second View 
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6.1.2.2.4.1 RIPS Operations.  During approach operations, there is often a desire for 
the crew to be able to view both the RIPS EMM and the SVS ND simultaneously.  If the 
SV-AD is in use for another purpose (e.g., for display of an EVS image), only one 
display format is available and that format appears on the ND.  As part of the RIPS 
landing preparations, the PNF usually selects a desired runway exit location through 
access to the RIPS EMM, an action also facilitated by the presence of the SV-AD.  Exit 
location selection may also be accessed through the HUD display if the SV-AD is 
unavailable. 
6.1.2.2.4.2 EVS Applications.  As indicated in the SV-AD symbology section 
(Section 6.1.2.1.4) above, when the PF is using the HUD with an EVS image for flight or 
surface operations, the PNF may choose to display the EVS image on the SV-AD with a 
replicated HUD symbology set (the certified Gulfstream EVS has a similar feature). 
6.1.2.2.4.3 Rehearsal / Briefing Tool.  The SV-AD also is envisioned for use during 
low workload phases of flight in the perspective 3-D “situation awareness” view mode 
(Arthur et al., 2006b) to brief and rehearse an approach, missed approach, etc., or as a 
tool for validating flight paths (e.g., before FMS execution of a modified path), rehearsal 
of complex procedures (e.g., engine-out, complex missed approach, depressurization 
routes in high terrain), and graphic flight crew briefing of unfamiliar airport 
environments (see fig. 12). 
6.1.2.2.4.4 Electronic Flight Bag.  The SV-AD could also be used as a display 
device for electronic flight bag applications such as checklists, Wx displays, airport 
surface maps, flight manual or document viewing, etc. 
6.1.2.2.5 Update Rate.  The issue of update rate for flight displays arose with the 
advent of digital computer simulation of aircraft back in the late 1960s, when analog 
simulation computers (continuous rather than discrete) began to be replaced by digital 
simulation.  Subsequently a large body of knowledge on the subject has been developed.  
The issue has returned somewhat to prominence with SVS displays because of the need 
to render dynamic scenes consisting of numerous graphic polygons.  Of course, 
Computer Generated Image (CGI) developers within the aircraft simulation community 
have dealt with the same issue for many years, with more and more success.  Fortunately, 
the update rate required for the relative benign maneuvering capabilities of CAB and GA 
aircraft is only in the neighborhood of 20-30 Hz for inner-loop tactical displays like the 
PFD.  A strategic display like the ND can update at a lower rate. 
Update rates vary for different sources of information that are supplied to a flight 
display.  For example, in CDTI applications TCAS information is updated about once 
every 4.8 seconds, while ADS-B data is updated once a second.  As long as the sudden 
changes don’t affect handling characteristics of the airplane and aren’t objectionable to 
the pilot, this conglomeration of variable rates has proved acceptable.  The primary 
features of a PFD, for example, need to update fast enough to provide a smooth depiction 
of motion for all reasonable flight maneuvers appropriate for the type of airplane.  
However, some jerkiness can be helpful.  Rather than smoothing (e.g., by iterative 
prediction methods) traffic surveillance information on the SVS PFD, best practice within 
the NASA Project has been to allow symbology updates to occur at the received rates.  
Positional jumps in traffic symbology draw additional attention to the traffic symbols 
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during the pilot’s scanning of the PFD, overcoming some of the potential attentional 
focus issues devoted to the pathway and guidance symbology, for example. 
6.1.3 Surface Operations Displays 
The NASA Integrated SVS Concept for CAB aircraft incorporates the RIPS to 
enhance operations at airports independent of visibility while improving safety.  RIPS 
provides pilots with situational awareness and guidance cues, a real-time display of 
airport traffic, and alerts of runway incursions and route deviations on both a HUD and 
an EMM of the airport on the ND (and / or on the SV-AD).  The best practices that 
evolved during the development and evaluation of RIPS are presented in two sections of 
this paper.  This section (6.1.3) describes surface operations symbology and specific 
display (HUD, PFD, ND, SV-AD) considerations.  In most instances, the best practices of 
the SVS Project are the symbology set itself and how it is used within the various 
displays.  The second section (6.1.4), which describes the system issues of RIPS and the 
incursion detection algorithms, follows. 
6.1.3.1 Surface Operations Symbology.  The best practices that evolved in the 
area of surface operations symbology are discussed as lessons learned concerning the 
specific display applications themselves (HUD / PFD, ND, and Auxiliary Display). 
6.1.3.1.1 HUD / PFD Symbology.  The SVS Project conducted very few research 
studies that involved surface operations in low visibility conditions on any aircraft 
without HUD equipage (the exceptions were Jones (2002); Jones & Prinzel (2006); and 
Arthur et al. (2006b)), as the best practice philosophy within the Project has been to 
include a HUD as a vital part of the CAB Integrated SVS Concept.  And the Project 
envisions that, in addition to a HUD, EVS sensors with at least short-range weather-
penetration capabilities will be necessary to extend operational capabilities and ease 
certification concerns.  Consequently there has been little investment of resources in the 
investigation of potential HDD PFD symbologies for surface operations without a HUD.  
However, in such a case, researchers within the Project did expect to use the same 
symbology set for the PFD that is utilized on the SVS HUD, overlaid on a synthetic scene 
of the surface environment to emulate a minified HUD view of the real world or an EVS 
image.  In its final integrated flight test (Jones, 2005; Kramer et al., 2005a), NASA 
conducted limited evaluations of such a configuration.  Unlike the HUD application, 
where SVS terrain is removed at declutter height in preparation for surface operations, 
concerns for obscuration of hazards by terrain presentation on the PFD were not an issue.  
Full color was also utilized on the HDD PFD. 
The SVS HUD symbology for surface operations is an integral part of the RIPS 
(Jones, 2002).  Display formats from the T-NASA System (McCann, 1996; McCann et 
al., 1998; Foyle et al., 1998) were adapted to be compatible with the RIPS operating 
principles (Johnson & Hyer, 1999; Hyer & Otero, 2007).  Discussion of the best practice 
symbology set for the HUD / PFD is presented in time sequence from landing / rollout, 
and taxi, to departure.  The best practices concerning the traffic and obstacle symbologies 
employed, along with the incursion and route deviation prevention features of RIPS, 
which are active during all surface operation sequences, are discussed last (Sections 
4.1.3.1.1.4 and 4.1.3.1.1.5, respectively). 
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6.1.3.1.1.1 Landing / Rollout.  On approach, a “ROTO” box containing textual 
rollout / turn-off variables (airport designator, runway designator, desired exit 
designation, desired exit speed, remaining runway length) appears at runway capture 
(aligned with runway and below 1200 ft AGL).  The PNF selects a desired runway exit, 
which appears as two rows of edge markings (cones) at the appropriate place on the RIPS 
runway outline, which itself also becomes viewable at declutter height (the RIPS runway 
outline replaces the runway confirmation wire-frame) on the HUD.  The runway outline 
is composed of traffic cone symbols (hollow triangles) lining the runway edges (see fig. 
53), which become individually visible as range decreases. 
 
 
Figure 53.  Illustration of RIPS HUD symbology set for landing (all HUD symbology is 
monochrome green). 
 
At WOW, the flight operations symbology set is replaced by the surface operations 
symbology set.  The number of symbology elements on the SVS HUD / PFD is very 
limited, and yet they provide powerful and effective elements of the RIPS.  The set is 
dominated visually by the runway centerline, which is actually made up of individual 
rectangles resembling centerline lights appearing every 50 feet along the runway, and the 
individual cones marking the runway edges at 50 foot intervals (runway remaining signs 
also appear at appropriate points along the runway edges).  The same symbology 
elements are used for subsequent taxiway presentations. 
Deceleration guidance during rollout to the pilot selected exit is provided at WOW 
by a ground speed control thermometer symbol with predictor, along with a predicted 
speed-obtained position ‘football’ symbol (Johnson & Hyer ,1999; Hyer & Otero, 2007), 
to assist in the deceleration to the proper exit speed (see fig. 54).  Should the exit position 
be missed, the ‘football’ symbol becomes a predicted zero speed-obtained position 
symbol.  Ground speed is provided as a textual part of the thermometer element.  In 
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addition to this deceleration guidance symbology, the RIPS surface symbology set 
provides position management symbology in the form of a trend vector or noodle to assist 
in centerline tracking and turn control (much like the noodle on a flight operations ND).  
This two line segment predictor denotes positions to be obtained at steady-state current 
ground speed in 30 and 60 seconds and is drawn to appear ahead of the aircraft. 
 
Figure 54.  Illustration of RIPS HUD symbology set for rollout (all HUD symbology is 
monochrome green). 
 
6.1.3.1.1.2 Taxi.  Upon exiting the arrival runway, the thermometer display element 
is removed along with the tracking noodle, and, in addition to a textual presentation of 
ground speed, current taxiway designation, and the next taxiway desired, a RIPS taxi 
director appears (see fig. 55).  The taxi director contains a non-conformal minification of 
the aircraft main gear represented within a box, while the sides of the box itself are non-
conformal minifications of the taxiway edge positions (at the same MF as the gear).  The 
taxi director is located at the apparent ownship position within the HUD FOV, and also 
provides a centerline tracking guidance command symbol (a hollow diamond), along with 
a turn noodle extending from a solid ownship diamond symbol on an axle midway 
between the gear symbols (vertical tic marks).  The taxi director guidance symbology is 
quite successful in providing accurate centerline tracking, not only on straight taxiway 
segments, but also in turns, where the limited FOV of the HUD makes control much 
more difficult (Jones, 2002).  To assist in route guidance to the assigned gate, the HUD 
symbology set also includes highway-like turn signs at upcoming intersections. 
6.1.3.1.1.3 Departure.  Shortly after entering the departure runway (when ownship 
heading is within 5º of the runway heading), the RIPS taxi director symbology and 
textual elements are replaced by flight operations take-off symbology (airspeed/altitude 
tapes; textual readouts of mach number and ground speed; a waterline symbol with 
acceleration / deceleration caret; an horizon line with heading scale and roll indicator; a 
flight director guidance symbol; a pitch reference line; a lateral track reference line; a 
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departure pathway; terrain; and airborne and surface traffic) which operates in 
conjunction with the RIPS edge cones and position predictor noodle (as in the rollout 
symbology set) for take-off (see fig. 56).  The flight path marker with acceleration / 
deceleration caret, pitch ladder, wind vector, and localizer CDI symbology elements are 
not present until after rotation, when the pitch and track reference lines are removed, 
along with the waterline acceleration / deceleration caret. 
 
Figure 55.  RIPS HUD taxi operations format, including non-conformal taxi director 
symbology. 
 
 
 
Figure 56.  Illustration of RIPS HUD symbology set for take-off (all HUD symbology is 
monochrome green). 
6.1.3.1.1.4 RIPS Traffic / Obstacles.  Tactical symbology for ground traffic and 
obstacles are merely hollow squares drawn at the appropriate locations within the HUD 
FOV.  The symbol is referred to as the target designator box during incursion cautions or 
warnings, as it locates the offending traffic (the target designator box is caged on the 
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appropriate border when the offending traffic is outside of the HUD FOV).  Piloted 
evaluations found the target designator box to be a very effective method of highlighting 
the incurring traffic on the HUD (Jones, 2002). 
6.1.3.1.1.5 Alerts.  RIPS provides textual alerts on the HUD for incursion cautions 
or warnings.  The distance to the incursion conflict is also shown.  While some pilots 
were either unaware of the display of the distance to incursion variable or didn’t use it, 
best practice has been to include the variable on all display surfaces for those pilots who 
did find it useful (Jones, 2002).  Textual alerts are also provided for any attempted entry 
of closed runway (see fig. 57) or taxiways (notification of the closures is based on 
NOTAMs), and for any runway or taxiway hazards detected by onboard sensors.  Route 
deviations and crossing hold alerts are audible only. 
 
PFD  View    HUD View 
       
 
Figure 57.  Runway closed symbology. 
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6.1.3.1.2 ND Symbology.  The strategic display for RIPS surface operations 
(Jones, 2002) is the EMM (see fig. 16).  Upon landing, the ND transitions automatically 
at nosewheel touchdown and 80 knots to the EMM for taxi operations in place of the SVS 
ND.  The EMM is removed for take-off upon entry of the departure runway.  The EMM 
shows a perspective track-up view of the airport layout, current ownship and traffic 
locations, ATC instructions (including the approved taxi route and hold short locations), 
and RIPS alerts.  A pilot-selectable top down overview of the airport layout is also 
available (see fig. 58).  While both viewing modes have proven effective, most evaluation 
pilots have preferred the perspective view, particularly when operating on the surface.  
Other traffic is indicated by dark blue chevrons when on the ground (to contrast with the 
shades of brown used on the airport layout) and cyan chevrons when airborne.  During 
incursion cautions or warnings, the symbol for the offending traffic is enlarged, changes 
color (yellow for RTA and red for RCA) and is highlighted by a target designator box.  
The identification tag is also highlighted.  In the event the incurring traffic symbol is not 
shown because of the display scale or field-of-view, a symbol is pegged on the edge of 
the display in the direction of the traffic.  The distance to the conflict is also shown.  
Piloted evaluations found the target designator box to be a very effective method of 
highlighting the incurring traffic on the EMM (Jones, 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 58.  RIPS overhead view of airport surface. 
 
Several zoom/scale levels are available to the pilot.  ATC instructions are portrayed 
graphically and textually.  Text messages are shown on a pop-up window that the pilot 
can remove if desired (ATC datalink messages and NOTAMs).  Graphic depictions of 
ATC instructions include the approved route and hold-short locations.  Route deviation 
and crossing hold alerts are also generated by RIPS and displayed to the pilot audibly.  
Route deviation alerts are generated if ownship leaves its assigned path during taxi.  
Crossing hold alerts are generated if ownship crosses a hold line when not cleared to do 
so by ATC. 
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6.1.3.1.3 Auxiliary Display Symbology.  The usage envisioned by the Project for 
the SV-AD during surface operations involves an SVS implementation that includes a 
single HUD and the presence of an EVS imaging sensor.  When the PF is using the HUD 
with an EVS image for surface operations, the PNF may choose to display the EVS 
image on the SV-AD.  That raster image presentation includes a replicate of the RIPS 
HUD symbology, with independent declutter control.   
6.1.3.2 Surface Operations Display Considerations.  The best practices that 
evolved in the area of specific flight displays are discussed in terms of the issues that 
arose for consideration for that display device (PFD, HUD, ND, and Auxiliary Display,) 
in surface operations. 
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6.1.3.2.1 PFD.  The SVS Project gave very little attention to a CAB Integrated 
SVS Concept that did not include a HUD, which was considered particularly vital to 
receive any operational credit for SVS equipage in terms of enhanced surface operations 
during low visibility conditions.  Having the PF predominantly head-up during taxi 
operations with symbology and an EVS image at unity magnification seems 
overwhelmingly reasonable, particularly until real-time surface hazard detection 
technologies have matured to a high level of integrity.  Consequently, few resources were 
devoted to a panel-mounted SVS PFD for surface operations other than to emulate the 
HUD formats in color with a terrain background.  However, in spite of this view, it was 
recognized within the Project that the HUD has weaknesses for surface operations 
applications compared to a panel-mounted SVS PFD with pilot-selectable FOV and a 
high integrity surface hazard detection system.  These weaknesses include a fixed field of 
regard that makes turning difficult, particularly for aircraft with cockpits located ahead of 
the nose gear (oversteer); a monochrome image, which eliminates color coding usage for 
cautions and warnings, for example, and provides an easily cluttered environment; 
limited visibility that is dependent on atmospheric conditions; and the potential for 
display obscuration of the real world out-the-window view. 
6.1.3.2.2 HUD.  The display specific considerations for the HUD for surface 
operations duplicate most of those for flight operations.  Particular emphasis for surface 
operations is again placed on the best practice philosophy of aggressive pursuit of display 
integration opportunities for the SVS HUD and the ND symbologies.  The limited and 
fixed field-of-regard of the HUD makes that integration essential. 
6.1.3.2.3 ND.  The vast majority of the best practices for surface operations on the 
ND that evolved during the SVS Project have dealt with symbology issues and display 
and system integration issues (most of which involved symbologies and have been 
discussed under that topic).  Worthy of further mention, however, are the uses of both 
exocentric coplanar and perspective (EMM) viewpoints for the ND in flight / surface 
transitions.  Best practice within the Project for the PF was to use the overhead coplanar 
viewpoint during approach and take-off operations and the perspective view (EMM) 
during taxi.  The SV-AD was available to provide the alternative view via pilot selection. 
6.1.3.2.4 Auxiliary Display.  As best practice during taxi operations, the CAB 
Integrated SVS Concept envisions the SV-AD for display of an EVS image with 
replicated HUD symbology set as indicated above in the SV-AD symbology section 
(Section 6.1.2.2.5). 
6.1.4 Runway Incursion Prevention System 
The best practices that evolved in the area of RIPS are discussed as related to the 
RIPS system itself and to its alerting algorithms, as lessons concerning the specific 
display applications themselves have already been presented. 
6.1.4.1 System Principles.  RIPS is predicated on four main principles (see fig. 
59): (1) “Knowing where you are”, which involves information that is supplied to the 
flight crew by means of highly accurate ownship positioning on the EMM presentation of 
the airport database.  Best practice within the SVS Project has been to use a LAAS to 
obtain differential GPS corrections. The LAAS position data was then blended with INS 
data and used for ownship position determination with accuracies of less than 2 m.  (2) 
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“Knowing where others are”, which involves information that is supplied to the flight 
crew by means of accurate traffic positioning on the EMM presentation of the airport 
database.  Best practice within the SVS Project has been to obtain traffic position data 
from all available sources (ADS-B, TIS-B, ASDE, ATIDS, taxiway sensor technology, 
etc.) and to fuse this information to provide seamless coverage of the airport surface. The 
fused traffic data could include baggage carts, construction equipment, etc.  (3) 
“Knowing where to go”, which involves information that is supplied to the flight crew by 
ATC.  Best practice within the SVS Project has been to obtain the routing instructions via 
data link (e.g., CPDLC), although manual entry by the crew is also possible (in all NASA 
research studies, CPDLC was either used or simulated for transmission of routing 
instructions).  (4) “Knowing when a mistake occurs”, which involves information that is 
supplied to the flight crew by the detection algorithms that detect potential runway 
conflicts and route deviations.  Best practice within the SVS Project has been to alert both 
the flight crew and ATC so that both parties have the same information. 
 
Figure 59.  RIPS system overview. 
 
6.1.4.2 Alerting Algorithms.  The newly developed RIPS aircraft based detection 
algorithms have been shown to provide more timely alerting for the flight crew, and with 
greater situation awareness, than transmitting current-generation Airport Movement Area 
Safety System (AMASS) surface generated alerts to the aircraft (Jones, 2001).  RIPS-
based alerting (see fig. 17 for alert presentations on the SVS HUD, PFD, and EMM) also 
resulted in greater safety margins and more reliable incursion prevention than reliance on 
crew monitoring alone.  In specific scenarios tested, for example, on approaches, alerting 
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provided greater safety margins over a surface map alone in low visibility, and on 
departure, RTOs were conducted sooner with alerting, particularly in low visibility 
(Jones, 2002).  However, determining when to alert pilots to a potential incursion 
situation is very critical.  Chances of unnecessary maneuvers (go-arounds or rejected 
take-offs, RTOs) increase if alerts are provided too early. Conversely, chances of 
collisions increase if alerts are provided too late.  Best practice within the Project has 
been to test that incursion alerting is provided in a timely manner, allowing sufficient 
time to react to potential conflicts, for all of the scenarios for which the algorithm has 
been designed.  Specifically, for commercial operations, best practice has been to alert 
when 1nm from the threshold on approach scenarios and as soon as possible during 
departure (as soon as departure state can be determined, which typically is when the 
TOGA button, if available, is pressed). 
Section 3.1.3.2 describes PathProx™ as generating two types of alerts (RTA, RCA) 
analogous to the TCAS approach.  In an extensive simulator study (Jones, 2002), 
seventy-five percent of the evaluation pilots thought that it would be beneficial to have a 
two-stage alerting system like PathProx™ where the first alert (RTA) received was 
cautionary in nature and corrective action was not required (a strong desire for temporal 
separation between the two alerts was also expressed). This alert allows crew members to 
become aware of potential conflicts early and gives more time to evaluate the situation 
and strategize solutions.  However, RSM (which generates only warning alerts) has 
consistently proven extremely effective in simulator and flight evaluations (Jones et al., 
2001, 2002, 2005, 2006).  Two-stage alerting has therefore not been adopted as an SVS 
Project best practice for CAB applications. 
Audible enunciation of incursion alerts, in addition to textual and symbology cuing 
methodologies on all available display surfaces, has been adopted as an SVS Project best 
practice.  Early research results (Jones, 2002) suggested that RIPS without audible 
alerting would still be effective in detecting potential runway incursions.  This finding 
was perhaps a testament to the effectiveness of the textual and symbology cuing alert 
strategies and an objection to still another audible alert in the cockpit.  In Jones (2005) 
the audible enunciation was found to be the most powerful indication of the incursion 
alert. 
6.1.5 EVS Imagery 
NASA researchers within the SVS Project have had somewhat limited experience 
with the presentation of EVS images to CAB flight crews (Tiana et al., 2000; Nguyen et 
al., 2002; Hines et al., 2005), having adopted the approach of leaving EVS investigations 
mostly to CRA partners like BAE (MMWR), CMC Electronics (MMWR, FLIR), and 
Rockwell Collins (FLIR).  The NASA best practice philosophy had initially been to use 
the information extracted from such weather-penetrating sensor images, rather than the 
images themselves, in order to avoid the associated visual artifacts and expensive training 
/ currency issues involved (Parrish et al., 2003; Harrah et al., 2002).  A well-presented 
synthetic scene with hazard icons (symbologies based on automated decision aiding 
functions for object detection and database alignment / navigation error detection) avoids 
many of the human perception issues that intrude in EVS applications, while offering 
improved performance and pilot workload (Parrish et al., 2003; McKay et al., 2002).  
However, the Project has made some investment in the development of applications of 
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the NASA Retinex Image Processing technology (Hines et al., 2004, 2005, 2006; Jobson 
et al., 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006; Rahman et al., 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006) to EVS 
images.  Retinex utilizes advanced image enhancement techniques to increase the 
brightness, scene contrast, detail and overall sharpness of images, and to improve image 
fusion algorithms.  Also, the Project envisions that, in addition to a HUD, EVS sensors 
with at least short-range weather-penetration capabilities will be necessary.  This 
viewpoint has been reinforced by the recent action by the FAA in granting operational 
credit (through lower approach minimums) to aircraft equipped with EFVS. 
The EVS images have been considered for presentation either in combination with 
the SVS scene or independently, and the findings for each approach, as well as the 
integrated SVS / EVS approach selected as best practice for the CAB Integrated SVS 
Concept, are presented below. 
6.1.5.1 EVS Image Insertion or Fusion with SVS.  NASA researchers within 
the SVS Project have considered the potential use of EVS imagery as an image inset 
within a larger FOV synthetic scene (Parrish et al., 2003) on a PFD (HDD or HUD), as 
well as image fusion possibilities.  Neither consideration was endorsed by the Project, but 
neither were they entirely dismissed.  In either case, the combined image would be 
presented on the PFD (HUD or HDD) of both the PF and PNF, with the original EVS 
image perhaps presented independently with replicated HUD symbology on the SV-AD. 
6.1.5.2 Independent EVS Imagery Displays.  The final flight test activities of 
the SVS Project included evaluations of independent EVS images, although all flight 
activities took place in VMC.  IMC was simulated by obscuring the evaluation pilot’s 
forward visibility, but the EVS sensor images were unaffected.  The RNO and WAL 
flight activities aboard the Gulfstream G-V in the summer of 2004 (see fig. 60) allowed 
comparisons of a HUD SVS, a HDD-only SVS and a HUD FLIR EVS concept (Arthur et 
al., 2005; Kramer et al., 2005a), while the WAL flight activities aboard the NASA 
ARIES 757-200 in the fall of 2005 (Jobson et al., 2006) explored HUD MMWR 
independently and / or fused with FLIR.  In the later flight test, which was conducted in 
VMC only, the FLIR image was always far superior in VMC to the MMWR image, and 
so fusion only served to degrade the FLIR image.  Consequently, no effective evaluation 
of fusion was possible. 
The Gulfstream flight test did provide effective comparisons of independent uses of 
SVS and FLIR images.  SVS, by being weather-independent and providing fuller field-
of-regard with pilot-selectable FOV, holds many advantages over forward looking sensor 
systems for terrain, path, and obstacle awareness in many flight phases (particularly 
during the approach).  The approach data from RNO and WAL suggested a clear 
preference for the SVS concepts (even the no HUD, HDD SVS PFD concept) compared 
to the FLIR EVS concept.  FLIR had its own unique set of problems (e.g., clouds and 
precipitation obscuring terrain or distorting the impression of the surrounding terrain, 
missed runway incursions during simulated IMC). 
On the other hand, SVS as a stand alone system is entirely dependent on appropriate 
on-board sensors and / or data link sources for traffic, obstacles, and other flight hazards 
not represented in the on-board databases to augment the stored database with flight-
critical real-time information.  However, a high integrity hazard / object detection system 
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is not yet available (a “perfect” SVS), and EVS is an imaging sensor which provides a 
direct view of the vehicle external environment; consequently, EVS is completely 
independent of the derived aircraft navigation solution and is independent of a database. 
Very little stands between the EVS image shown to the pilot and the real-world; thus, an 
EVS pilot gets an extremely high degree of confidence in the system. Under conditions of 
smoke, haze, and night, a FLIR/EVS provides orders-of-magnitude improvement over the 
pilot’s natural vision, greatly enhancing the pilot’s situation awareness and reducing the 
pilot’s workload. 
 
Figure 60.  RNO and WAL flight activities aboard the Gulfstream G-V. 
 
While SVS was considered the system of choice by the pilots at the RNO and WAL 
flight test, several pilots suggested this superiority is maintained (without reservation) on 
the approach until the “final approach fix” or a “stabilized on approach” point.  Beyond 
this point on the approach, the need for EVS becomes more prevalent in the absence of a 
“perfect” SVS.  Several pilots noted this reservation (the absence of a “perfect” SVS) and 
pointed out that an independent FLIR image provided them confidence in the SVS 
imagery and that this was an additional integrity sensor as a complement to SVS 
technology.  
6.1.5.3 Integrated SVS / EVS.  As a result of this experience, the Project 
conceived of an integrated SVS / EVS functionality to create “the best of both worlds” 
within the CAB Integrated SVS Concept, which is now considered best practice.  For 
flight operations, the HUD presentation of synthetic terrain is used until declutter height 
is reached on landing approach.  At this point, the HUD raster image transitions from a 
pure SVS image through blended SVS / EVS to pure EVS image (blending is a linear 
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modulation with altitude occurring over 100 feet from 100% SVS / 0% EVS ending at 
0% SVS / 100% EVS).  The EVS image remains available to the PF on the HUD upon 
exiting the arrival runway for taxi operations and it is removed just before gate arrival.  
Similarly, the EVS image on the HUD is available to the PF during departure taxi 
operations and is removed upon entry of the departure runway.  The pure EVS image 
may be selected by either pilot for presentation on the SV-AD at any time.  Bailey et al. 
(2006), a simulator study conducted under the new IIFDT Project, documents the initial 
evaluation of the integrated SVS / EVS functionality during landing approaches. 
6.1.6 Database Integrity Monitoring 
As comprehensive validation of a geo-spatial terrain database is impractical, these 
databases typically have no quantifiable level of integrity.  This lack of a quantifiable 
integrity level is one of the constraints that has limited certification and operational 
approval of TAWS / SVS to “advisory-only” systems for civil aviation.  The SVS Project 
has pursued active database integrity monitoring using a form of DIME to bound 
database integrity to address this lack of certifiable database integrity level.  The monitor 
uses radar altimeters and the advanced modes of the WxR to provide information that 
enables the monitor to provide both a confirmation of database integrity and a registration 
function (navigational position confirmation via terrain feature extraction).  The monitor 
would warn the pilot whenever the SVS is operating in a degraded mode and that 
continued flight along the same trajectory may be hazardous.  The best practices 
(recommended practices, lessons-learned, and considerations) that have evolved over the 
term of the Project with respect to DIME are presented below, beginning with the DIME 
Functional Construct.  The second section presents the details of the approach using the 
WxR, while the third section documents experience within the Project on a promising 
lower cost approach using a GPSBR receiver.  The final section discusses loss-of-
integrity alerting. 
6.1.6.1 DIME Functional Construct.  Historically, various monitoring methods 
have been used to provide navigation system integrity.  In order to avoid a web of 
ground-based integrity monitors, it is recommended that a form of autonomous integrity 
monitoring be applied analogous to the Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitor (RAIM) 
approach used by GPS.  The RAIM concept is based on a consistency check among 
multiple measurements that are assumed to be independent and uncorrelated (AIAA, 
1996).)  In the case of the proposed method, in-flight sensor measurements of geo-spatial 
locations or features are compared with expected values that are derived from the DEMs 
and estimates of aircraft position and attitude. 
Three sensor types were investigated: downward-looking sensors, forward-looking 
sensors, and omni-directional sensors.  Specifically, the DLRA approach was found to be 
most useful in detecting vertical DEM errors, but had limited observability with respect 
to other error classes (Young et al., 2003).  Because radar altimeters make measurements 
nominally from nadir, horizontal DEM errors are difficult to detect unless there is 
significant terrain undulation under the flight path.  Further, unless the detected error is a 
bias or ramp-type error that persists over a spatial region within the DEM, the detection 
may not be operationally useful as the aircraft has already flown over the region where 
the error was observed by the altimeter-based function.  Both of these shortcomings led 
to the need to consider forward-looking sensors.  However, for cases where a forward-
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looking sensor may not be available, or is cost-prohibitive, consider that the DLRA does 
provide an improved level of integrity on its own.  In addition, DLRA measurements can 
be logged and used post-flight as part of model validation and update/maintenance 
procedures. 
The FLAIM approach (Young et al., 2002) adapted the concepts tested with the 
radar altimeter.  FLAIM was tested during the Project using an X-band Weather Radar 
(WxR) but conceptually can be applied using any ranging sensor (e.g. Laser/LiDAR).  
The third approach that was tested considered an omni-directional passive sensing 
concept.  This approach was tested using GPS technology configured to function as a Bi-
static Radar measuring specular reflections of satellite-based transmissions (Esterhuizen 
et al., 2005; Ganoe & Young, 2005; Junered et al., 2006; Masters et al., 2001, 2005; 
Sturtevant et al., 2003; Vinande et al., 2005). 
It is important to recognize that the flight crew can, and will, act as another 
independent integrity monitor of geographic feature data quality.  For example, in clear-
weather conditions, pilots may be able to observe gross errors in the databases by 
comparing SVS depictions with what they see out the window.  In a similar manner, EVS 
sensors can allow pilots to monitor integrity within the field-of-view limits of the sensor.  
However, the performance of a human monitor will be driven by weather conditions, 
workload, pilot experience, and other factors such as the quality of available sensor 
information.  As it is difficult to quantify this type of human performance, it is not 
recommended as a sole means of integrity assurance for stored geographic feature data, 
particularly when visibility is limited.  On the other hand, the FLAIM approach can 
provide additional information to the crew so that they can assess the quality of the stored 
data on-the-fly.  For example, instead of generating terrain alerts (see Section 6.1.6.4), 
smoothed mismatches could be displayed as a figure-of-merit. Based on this, the crew 
could decide how much they should trust the SVS while flying over specific geographic 
regions in specific visibility conditions. 
6.1.6.2 FLAIM Using WxR.  A secondary purpose of commercial WxR systems 
is ground-mapping of significant land contours, a mode which can be integrated with 
DEMs to supplement on-board navigation systems and to detect potential ground-based 
hazards.  Based on research during the SVS Project, it is recommended that this ground-
mapping mode of the WxR be employed, along with the DLRA, to provide improved 
integrity.  This use can help to overcome some of the shortcomings of the DLRA monitor 
function.  Because the WxR includes a scanning aperture, information from scans over 
spatial regions is available. Even a single radial measurement consists of several range 
measurements (one at each range bin location).  As a result, feature extraction and 
feature-based disparity-checking can be performed.  In other words, disparities between 
features that are sensed and features that are extracted from the stored DEM can be 
compared in a statistical manner similar to the one described for the DLRA approach 
(Gray, 1999).  Operationally, as with the DLRA, if significant inconsistencies are 
detected, a loss-of-integrity alert is generated. 
Unlike the radar altimeter, the WxR terrain measurements cannot be mapped to the 
terrain database entries directly.  Two parallel threads must translate available 
information into a common reference domain.  Figure 61 illustrates the algorithm 
employed to enable a one-to-one feature-based comparison (Young et al., 2004). 
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For organizational convenience, the comparison methods are presented by the 
following topic order: Radial-Based Feature Detection and Classification and Image-
Based Feature Detection and Classification. 
 
Figure 61.  The SHADE algorithm. 
 
6.1.6.2.1 Radial-Based Feature Detection And Classification.  Because of the 
prevalence and stability of terrain shadowing as observed by airborne radars, WxR-based 
FLAIM was tested using shadow edge locations as the features of interest.  As shown in 
Figure 61, each parallel thread consists of a function that extracts terrain-related shadow 
features from the independent sources and translates them into a common reference 
domain.  Shadow edges are often the most significant feature discernable in WxR 
measurements and occur when reflectivity values transition to/from 0 dB indicating no 
detectable reflectivity (see fig. 62).  WxR shadowing occurs most frequently in areas of 
moderate to severe terrain undulations when the aircraft is at a relatively low altitude or 
the antenna depression angle (i.e., tilt) is large.  Figure 63 depicts a segment of a sample 
WxR radial measurement and the edge features that would be detected and classified as 
either front or back edges of a shadowed region (Young et al., 2004).  The gradient at 
each edge can also be computed and used as a weighting factor to down-sample features 
prior to disparity checking. 
To improve confidence in shadow detection, a feature is only classified as a shadow 
feature if both a front and back edge is detected, or if a shadow extends to the range 
setting of the radar.  Other considerations related to shadow feature detection and 
classification include (Young et al., 2004): 
a) Whenever multiple shadows are seen along a radial, longer shadows should have 
priority when computing the disparity test statistic.  Longer shadows are more 
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likely to be seen by both threads and when detected, are more likely to represent 
the same spatial region.  In addition, longer shadows reduce the potential for 
spatial correlation between the front and back shadow edges.  Lastly, for longer  
 
Figure 62.  Weather radar shadow diagram. 
 
 
Figure 63.  Segment of sample radial measurement and shadow edge features from 
weather radar data. 
 
shadows, the variability of disparity will be smaller, thereby leading to a smaller 
minimum detectable bias.  These observations also hold for shadow width (i.e., 
using wider shadows will lead to better performance).  The negative effect of 
constraining shadow size will be reducing availability.  Larger shadows may not 
occur in some operational environments and therefore the disparity checking 
function would not produce results (i.e., higher integrity).  
b) Due to angular resolution, closer shadows should have priority when computing 
the disparity test statistic.  Specifically, shadow edges seen by the radar at long 
range will be less accurate than edges seen at close range.  This is due to the fact 
that the spatial volume represented by a single range bin will grow with range.  As 
with the shadow size constraint, the negative effect of constraining range will be 
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reduced availability in some operational environments.  Short-range shadows may 
not always been seen. 
c) If the aircraft is equipped with a radar altimeter, it may be beneficial to use this 
sensor to trigger operation.  The operational concept suggests DEM integrity is 
only needed at lower altitudes.  Typical operating range for commercial radar 
altimeters is zero to 2500 feet AGL.  In addition, the AGL height of the radar 
could be used to determine range constraints for the disparity checking function 
(i.e., to determine the starting range bin for shadow searches). 
d) At low altitude, radar-reported range bin values that are below the noise floor are 
not always attributable to terrain shadowing.  The most common examples are 
bodies of water such as lakes.  Small water-body features should not corrupt 
performance.  However, in regions of large water bodies, a feature database 
containing water body boundaries may be required. 
 
One behavior that is common when using small shadow sizes is a detection by one 
thread and not by the other.  Disparity checking in this case will result in a large 
difference that may lead to a false alert.  To mitigate this behavior, repeated scans can be 
accumulated to see if the feature persists in one thread and not the other.  If it does, this 
indicates an actual error that should be detected.  Using multiple scans to track features in 
this way will improve integrity but must be traded against the increase in time-to-alarm 
that results from waiting for additional scan measurements.  The other benefit of using 
small shadows is that as shadow size gets smaller, the likelihood of observing shadows 
will increase.  This increases the availability of the integrity monitor. 
Feature detection and classification in the DEM-derived thread is similar to that of 
the WxR thread; however, the challenge for this thread is to generate synthesized radial 
measurements.  The algorithm uses aircraft position from GPS, aircraft attitude from an 
IRU, antenna pointing direction from the WxR, a beam model, and a DEM to generate 
the synthesized measurements.  This algorithm is described in detail in Young et al. 
(2005).  Figure 64 illustrates sample results from both Shadow Detection and Extraction 
(SHADE) threads from data obtained during the NASA DC-8 flight test (Young et al., 
2004). 
6.1.6.2.2 Image-Based Feature Detection and Classification.  The radial 
measurements produced by the two threads of SHADE can be accumulated into images 
over the course of the radar scans.  An alternate disparity checking function was 
developed that uses these images and traditional machine vision and pattern recognition 
techniques (Cooper & Young, 2005).  This capability allows for two levels of integrity 
checking.  An inner loop of this function compares the radial features as described 
previously, while, simultaneously, an outer loop function extracts and tracks features seen 
within the scan-based images accumulated over repeated scans.  This approach exploits 
the fact that, for reasonably fast update rates, extracted features are traceable across 
image sequences and consistent with the aircraft’s position as derived from onboard 
navigation systems.  Using this approach, inner loop integrity monitoring can occur at the 
SHADE frame rate (i.e., the radar measurement rate), while longer term registration can 
be confirmed in a parallel task executing at a relatively slower frame rate for the outer 
loop (i.e., over several scans).  By providing continuous inner loop integrity monitoring, 
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the parallel task can be scheduled according to the slower scan rate of the WxR radar, or 
at a rate that provides acceptable outer loop comparison. 
6.1.6.3 FLAIM Using GPSBR.  Most of the research effort concerning the 
FLAIM approach using GPSBR has been concentrated on the development of the  
(a)    (b) 
 
Figure 64.  SHADE results for three sample scans from DC-8 testing (a) WxR-derived 
thread, (b) DEM-derived thread. 
 
GPSBR receiver (Ganoe & Young, 2005), as the same FLAIM that was developed under 
other parts of the SVS Project could be adapted readily given a satisfactory GPSBR 
altitude estimate.  The GPSBR is able to track and measure signals directly from multiple 
GPS satellites, as well as the multiple signals that are reflected from the surface of the 
Earth (see fig. 65).  These measurements are than used to generate an altitude estimate 
that can be used by the FLAIM to provide a bounded level of integrity for the terrain 
DEM (both lateral and vertical monitoring) so that safe operational constraints can be 
specified.  The SVS Project was not able to mature this concept fully, although it is 
considered a promising approach in need of more research to determine its limitations 
and capabilities. 
6.1.6.4 Database Loss-Of-Integrity Alerts.  Conceptually, the DIME acts as an 
intermediary between the terrain model and the SVS display(s).  This “watch-dog” type 
function checks (or validates) the model against an independent sources of information 
(i.e., the downward- and / or forward-looking sensors).  When a statistically significant 
difference is detected, the pilot is informed that the integrity of the displayed information 
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is in question.  When differences are within expected bounds, the pilot can be assured 
that the display is operating at its specified performance level with a probability 
consistent with the level of integrity required for the current operation.  Establishing 
appropriate detection thresholds is based on expected behavior of the information sources 
and requirements for missed detection rates and false alarm rates. This process is 
described in Young (2005) and Gray (1999). 
 
 
Figure 65.  The GPS Bi-static Radar (GPSBR) receiver utilizes GPS signals reflected 
from terrain. 
 
Early considerations of database integrity alert strategies for SVS terrain included 
removal of the terrain from the display(s) following a lack of integrity detection.  This 
removal strategy for SVS terrain was also contemplated following a TAWS alert to 
prevent the flight crew from maneuvering with respect to possibly unreliable terrain 
information.  However, based on results of Project experiments, it is recommended that  
the crew be notified of the degraded integrity condition and given discretion to decide 
how, or whether, to continue use of the terrain display.  This approach is consistent with 
the procedure now used with TAWS alerts that call for lateral maneuvering. 
6.1.7 Hazard Detection Sensors 
As discussed in Section 6.1.5.3, the final NASA CAB Integrated SVS Concept 
utilizes an EVS image on the HUD on final approach after the declutter height and for 
taxi operations.  The best practice philosophy of the SVS Project had initially been to use 
the information extracted from hazard detection sensors (weather-penetrating sensors) 
and sensor images, rather than the images themselves (Harrah et al., 2002).  Thus the 
Project conducted research on sensor technologies which include EVS sensors (e.g., 
FLIR) and Advanced Hazard Detection Sensors (e.g., multi-mode WxR) for hazard and 
object detection, as well as terrain feature extraction from the WxR to support database 
integrity monitoring requirements.  The best practices that evolved in these areas are 
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provided below in the following topic order: EVS Sensor Detected Hazards and Multi-
mode Weather Radar Detected Hazards. 
6.1.7.1 EVS Sensor Detected Hazards.  The SVS Project, operating in a 
resource constrained environment, adopted as a best practice philosophy (programmatic 
decision) a dependence on both prior research conducted under the HSR Program (Tang 
et al., 1994, 1996; Yang et al., 2000) and more recent state-of-the-art advances in image 
processing to meet Project needs in the area of further image processing with both object 
and edge detection techniques for detection of obstacle conflicts and runway alignment 
errors.  Only limited research (Gandhi et al., 2000; Kasturi et al., 2000, 2002; Yang et al., 
2002) was performed and no field evaluations were ever conducted on image object 
detection directly within the Project. 
6.1.7.2 Multi-mode Weather Radar Detected Hazards.  In addition to 
provisions for the utilization of EVS sensor image processing for hazard detection 
(obstacles, runway misalignment), the NASA CAB Integrated SVS Concept also employs 
an advanced X-band Multi-mode WxR, not only for the traditional provisions of Wx and 
wind shear detection information, but with new modes for advanced hazard detection.  
These new modes have both improved range and angular resolution to sufficiently detect 
and locate objects (preliminary results show that these techniques can provide 1-3 meter 
range resolution and less than 1º of angular resolution, with 1/3º being a reasonable goal).  
The best practices that evolved in these areas are provided below. 
6.1.7.2.1 Air-To-Air Sensor-Detected Objects.  In an air-to-air application mode, 
the advanced WxR is used to detect airborne traffic within approximately 6NM and 
angularly within the field-of-view of the radar to supplement in blended fashion 
surveillance information from TCAS, ADS-B and TIS-B sources, as well as to protect 
against non-cooperative (non-transmitting) traffic.  This capability was developed under 
the NASA HSR Program and further enhanced under the SVS Project.  The best practice 
enhancements developed under the SVS Project were to continue to estimate target 
velocity based on the Doppler radar measurement of velocity augmented by a range-rate 
velocity approximation, and to require a target ‘hit’ on at least three sequential radar 
scans to firmly establish a track (“persistence”) before attempting a blend with other 
surveillance sources or otherwise identifying an independent, non-cooperative object.  
While the airborne traffic detection mode of the advanced WxR was tested extensively in 
the HSR Program, it was never included as a surveillance source in the 2004 integrated 
SVS flight tests at RNO and WAL. 
6.1.7.2.2 Air-To-Ground Sensor-Detected Objects and Terrain Features.  In an air-
to-ground application mode, the advanced WxR is used to detect mapped and, more 
importantly, unmapped ground towers, to provide runway location to position the runway 
confirmation or misalignment wire-frame display element, to detect runway obstacles, 
and to provide terrain features for the integrity monitor.  Best practices concerning 
feature detection for the integrity monitor have previously been presented, while those 
concerning obstacle and runway detection are presented below: 
a) The advanced WxR has “ground mapping” capabilities to generate a map of the 
terrain in front of the aircraft to enable discrimination of mapped / unmapped 
ground towers and other terrain features with significant height (those that impinge 
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upon flight altitudes).  The best practice that evolved within the Project was to 
define an ‘object detection wedge’ that extended ± 30° about the track and up to 3 
nm in front of the aircraft (effective only at flight altitudes below 2,500 feet AGL).  
The wedge was ± 500 feet deep, starting at ownship altitude and extending 500 feet 
toward the ground and 500 feet above the aircraft.  Thus objects that were more 
than 500 feet below or 500 feet above flight altitude were not discriminated. Use of 
this ‘object detection wedge’ allowed necessary and sufficient control of the false 
alarm rate, while still providing a high probability of successful discrimination. 
b) A different form of Terrain Feature Extraction is used to locate the runway using a 
nominal ownship location and an airport database.  With provision of this 
information, the WxR scans the relevant areas to detect the metal support structure 
for the approach lights at each end of the runway (if an approach light system is not 
installed at the runway ends, inexpensive radar reflectors were located near the four 
runway corners).  The best practices that evolved within the Project for this feature 
were to begin the processing at 5 nm from the runway threshold, and to continue to 
update and refine the positions until about 0.25 nm from the threshold.  At this 
point the process employed a coasting algorithm using ownship GPS/INS/Altitude 
information to track the radar-extracted corner positions and a low pass filter to 
remove distracting jitter from the wire-frame element.  Two scans were required to 
confirm the runway position (both ends) once the processing began.  It also became 
best practice to set the runway position to “unknown” if the radar altimeter 
exceeded 100 feet after having dropped below 50 feet OR if range to runway end 
exceeded 1 nm after having been less than 0.25 nm OR if the difference between 
ownship and runway heading exceeded 30º. 
c) Once the radar has confirmed the location of the runway, it switches to verifying 
that the runway is clear of any large objects, including other aircraft, airport 
vehicles, or major debris.  The best practice that evolved within the Project for this 
feature was to define a radar cross-sectional area of at least 1 square meter to allow 
necessary and sufficient control of the false alarm rate, while still providing a high 
probability of successful detection.  Although successful implementation of the 
WxR runway confirmation feature was not achieved in the 2004 integrated flight 
tests at RNO and WAL, stand-alone tests of the WxR functionality were successful. 
6.1.7.2.3 Ground-To-Ground Sensor-Detected Objects.  In a ground-to-ground 
application mode, the radar has provisions for an ultra-short range configuration and 
would continue to locate ground traffic / obstacles during runway / taxi operations.  This 
information would be blended with other available surface surveillance information (e.g., 
ASDE, TIS-B) and supplied to the RIPS.  However, this mode was never exercised due to 
funding and time constraints within the Project. 
6.1.7.2.4 Ground-To-Air Sensor-Detected Objects.  And finally, in a ground-to-air 
mode, the radar searches the airspace in front of the departing ownship to detect 
neighboring airborne traffic.  This mode is almost identical to the air-to-air application 
mode; in fact, the detection task is simpler because of the reduced ownship motions and 
the lack of ground clutter.  However, this mode was never formally exercised due to 
funding and time constraints within the Project and the high level of confidence in its 
successful performance. 
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6.1.8 The Integrated SVS Concept 
The RNO and WAL flight activities aboard the Gulfstream G-V in the summer of 
2004 (Arthur et al., 2005 ; Kramer et al., 2005a; Jones, 2005) marked the first time 
NASA’s SVS technologies have been integrated as a complete system for both flight and 
surface operations, incorporating synthetic terrain primary flight and navigation displays, 
enhanced vision sensors, advanced multi-mode weather radar object detection, synthetic 
vision database integrity monitoring, refined dynamic tunnel and guidance concepts, 
surface map displays, and the Runway Incursion Prevention System. The results 
effectively showed the efficacy of the NASA CAB Integrated SVS Concept to 
significantly enhance pilot situation awareness (without increasing mental workload) for 
runway traffic and terrain, and substantially better pilot acceptability and trust due to 
integrated integrity monitors and enhanced vision sensors. 
6.2 General Aviation 
Because of the “trio of GA constraints” (display space, equipment weight and cost), 
the operational requirements, and certification and operational approval processes for GA 
are quite different in most instances than for CAB.  Therefore the best practices for GA 
aircraft that are specifically different from CAB and from the generic best practices 
applicable to both are discussed in this section.  Recently, the FAA has released FAA AC 
23-26 (FAA, 2005b) that deals specifically with SVS displays.  While AC 23-26 was 
generated with substantial contributions from NASA SVS researchers, the best practices 
from the SVS Project are presented in greater detail herein. For organizational 
convenience, the best practices are presented by the following topic order: Display 
Considerations, Database Depiction, Flight Operations Considerations, Surface 
Operations Considerations, Runway Incursion Prevention System, and Database Integrity 
Monitoring. 
6.2.1 Display Considerations 
The limited display space available in GA aircraft implies small display surfaces, 
which in SVS applications translates into minification issues which affect both the closed 
looped handling qualities associated with the guidance symbologies as well as the terrain 
features employed on SVS displays.  The focus within the GA element of the SVS 
Project has, therefore, been to attempt to determine the most effective presentation 
techniques for terrain depictions and for guidance symbologies.  Thus extensive efforts in 
terrain portrayal evaluations (see Section 6.2.2) and head-down symbology development 
(see Section 6.2.3) have been conducted throughout the element’s activities.  The success 
of these efforts was dramatically illustrated in the flight test at Roanoke, Virginia (ROA) 
in 2005 (see fig. 66) in which pilots flying in simulated IMC with SVS displays 
consistently produced equivalent or superior performance in FTE, workload ratings and 
SA ratings to that produced flying in VMC with conventional displays (Glaab et al., 
2006). 
6.2.2 Database Depiction 
The best practices that evolved in the area of database depiction or terrain portrayal 
are discussed as lessons learned specific to texturing and fish-net usages in GA display 
applications. 
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6.2.2.1 Texturing.  One area of mild contention between CAB and GA 
evaluations of terrain database depiction techniques arose concerning elevation-based 
color-coding with generic texturing of the DEM (i.e., EBG) and ortho-rectified 
photographic imagery overlays on the DEM.  No statistically-significant differences in 
the pilot's ability to fly an aircraft with the synthetic vision display concepts have ever  
 
Figure 66.  NASA LaRC’s Cessna 206-H Stationaire. 
 
been found in any NASA simulator experiment or flight test between the generic and 
photo-realistic terrain depictions.  It should again be noted that a key component of the 
NASA generically-textured DEM has been the inclusion of cultural feature data, which 
greatly enhances the situation awareness attributes of the SVS terrain image.  If cultural 
features were not an inherent feature, the quantitative "tie" between photo-realistic and 
generic-texturing may not necessarily be maintained.  Likewise, a general subjective pilot 
preference for photo-realistic was found in every study, with one exception (Glaab & 
Hughes, 2003).  During the first GA flight test at ROA, generic terrain information was 
found easier to interpret than the more detailed photo-realistic depiction by many of the 
pilots.  Important terrain features, such as the location of valleys and mountains, may be 
more difficult for the pilot to discern due to the masking effect of trees and other 
elements included in the photo-realistic texturing.  Specific pilot comments at ROA 
reflected a desire to know when they were approaching a ground-based hazard without a 
need to know whether it was rocks, dirt, or trees.  One supposition, which has never been 
tested, has been advanced concerning workload contributions to terrain depiction 
preferences.  The relatively lower workload demands on a CAB flight crew during 
nominal approach compared to that of a single GA pilot may alleviate potentially 
distracting photo-realistic details.  Those details may also be more easily discerned and 
thus prove less distracting with the lower MFs associated with the larger display surfaces 
in CAB cockpits. 
Despite the mild contention, best practice within the Project is to use the hybrid 
texturing method (a programmatic decision), even though it has never undergone any 
comparative testing against the other techniques.  The collectively enthusiastic 
acceptance by experienced pilots and researchers seems overwhelmingly in its favor.  
Particular emphasis by these enthusiasts has been placed on the dramatically enhanced 
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elevation cuing provided by the elevation-based color-coding technique, eliminating 
color shadowing issues (see terrain depiction illusions, Section 6.1.2.2.2.3) sometimes 
encountered with photo-realistic texturing. 
6.2.2.2 Fish-net.  The SVS GA element conducted numerous simulator 
experiments and flight tests (Takallu et al., 2002, 2004, 2006; Hughes & Takallu, 2002; 
Hughes & Glaab, 2003, 2006; Glaab & Hughes, 2003; Bartolone et al., 2004; Wong et 
al., 2004) that compared a conventional baseline round dial display concept (see fig. 67), 
a rudimentary SVS (constant color ground with a fish-net, CCFN, draped over the DEM) 
display concept (see fig. 68), and textured SVS (generic and photo-realistic, both with 
and without fish-nets) display concepts (see fig. 69 - 72).  When statistically significant 
results were obtained for either qualitative and / or quantitative measures, as most 
frequently happened, the order of results always favored the SVS concepts (of any flavor) 
over the baseline round dials (BRD), and the more sophisticated SVS concepts over the 
CCFN.  No differences were found between the textured SVS display concepts with and 
without fish-net, although pilot preferences favored omitting the fish-net. 
6.2.3 Flight Operations Considerations 
The best practices that evolved in the area of GA flight operations symbology are 
discussed as lessons learned concerning display-specific issues (PFD and ND). 
6.2.3.1 PFD Symbology.  The best practices that evolved in the area of GA PFD 
symbologies are presented in terms of the symbology elements themselves. 
6.2.3.1.1 Flight Path Marker.  With less inertia, GA aircraft are more susceptible 
to high frequency atmospheric disturbances than CAB aircraft, and with less precise 
instrumentation, flight path angle determination is more problematic.  However, best 
practice within the SVS Project for both CAB and GA aircraft has been to use a 
quickened velocity vector (in pitch as in SAE (2005)) tuned to the handling  
 
 
Figure 67.  GA conventional baseline round dial (BRD) display concept. 
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Figure 68.  GA constant color ground with a fish-net (CCFN) display concept. 
 
 
Figure 69.  GA elevation based generic (EBG) SVS display concept. 
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Figure 70.  GA elevation based generic with a fish-net (EBGFN) SVS display concept. 
 
Figure 71.  GA photo-realistic SVS display concept. 
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Figure 72.  GA photo-realistic with a fish-net SVS display concept. 
 
characteristics of the aircraft.  Conversely, best practice within the SVS Project for GA 
aircraft has been the use of a low pass filter to partially offset the more responsive nature 
of the quickened GA velocity vector. 
6.2.3.1.2 Flight Director Guidance.  Under the GA element of the SVS Project, 
research was conducted to determine the most effective guidance symbology to use in 
implementing SVS displays within the display size constraints of the GA cockpit.  One 
simulator study (Wong et al., 2004) eliminated a pitch / roll dual-cue (needles) flight 
director (see fig. 73) from further consideration in favor of a pathway with a velocity 
vector-based flight director, which provided FTE (see fig. 74), workload and SA 
performance improvements (a prior simulator study, Takallu et al. (2006), had similar 
results).  A subsequent flight test evaluation (Glaab et al., 2006) produced comparable 
results when comparing a pitch / roll single-cue flight director (see fig. 75) to the pathway 
with a velocity vector-based flight director both with and without terrain.  Velocity 
vector-based pathway guidance again provided FTE, workload and SA performance 
improvements.  The addition of terrain to the pathway-based guidance affected only the 
SA ratings, with FTE and workload being unchanged.  Ultimately, best practice within 
the Project has been to use velocity vector-based pathway guidance. 
6.2.3.1.3 Tunnel Types.  Research was also conducted to determine the most 
effective pathway symbology to use in implementing SVS displays within the display 
size constraints of the GA cockpit.  Two simulator studies ((Bartolone et al. (2004) and 
Takallu et al. (2006)) were conducted (using different  
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Figure 73.  GA pitch / roll dual cue (needles) flight director display concept. 
 
 
Figure 74.  GA RMS lateral and vertical tracking error results. 
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Figure 75.  GA pitch / roll single cue flight director display concept. 
 
maneuvers and geographic sites) that compared tunnel concepts adopted from various 
research organizations and industry applications.  The selected concepts were an 
Unconnected Box Tunnel (see fig. 76), a Connected Box Tunnel with Sliding Box 
Guidance Cue (see fig. 77) and Crow’s Foot Tunnel with Ghost Aircraft (see fig. 78).  
Both studies found FTE, workload, readability (clutter), and SA performance advantages 
with the Crow’s Foot Tunnel with Ghost Aircraft presentation.  Thus, best practice within 
the Project has been to use the Crow’s Foot Tunnel with ghost airplane symbol for 
pathway presentation. 
 
Figure 76.  GA Unconnected Box Tunnel display concept. 
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Figure 77.  GA Connected Box Tunnel with Sliding Box Guidance Cue display concept. 
 
 
Figure 78.  GA Crow’s Foot Tunnel with Ghost Aircraft display concept. 
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6.2.3.1.4 Field-of-View.  One objective of the flight test effort reported in Glaab 
& Hughes (2003) was to establish recommended FOV use for SVS GA applications. One 
factor affecting FOV use was the need to keep the velocity vector on the display. 
Significant crab angles were observed for both en route and approach maneuvers 
primarily due to the airspeeds employed (i.e. 100 and 90 knots). Cross wind conditions 
encountered were considered mild. In addition, turbulence effects, combined with the 
natural flight dynamics of the aircraft, produced substantial motion of velocity vector 
position. Occasionally, pilots were able to employ lower FOVs (30°), to enhance their 
view of the runway during the latter stages of the final approach. However, due to the 
dynamics of the aircraft, combined with the operating speeds, resulting measured FOVs 
typically ranged near 60°.  In post-block questionnaires, all pilots selected 60° FOV as 
the most preferred for the approach maneuver.  Therefore, the best practice for SVS GA 
applications has become fixing the FOV at 60° as a reasonable value, since that FOV 
would provide the most utility because of the substantial movements of the velocity 
vector typical in GA flight operations. Removal of pilot-selectable FOV control should 
not impose substantial restrictions on the utility of these displays due to characteristics 
inherent to GA aircraft.  This recommendation is counter to Glaab et al. (2003) and 
Kramer et al. (2004b), studies which involved testing with large transport aircraft and 
helped establish pilot-selectable FOV as the best practice of CAB.  However, lower 
FOVs, such as 30°, could still be useful for calm operating conditions for GA aircraft, 
and should be considered to provide increased utility during latter stages of final 
approach. 
6.2.3.2 ND Symbology.  Best practice within the GA element of the SVS Project 
has been to replace the typical GA ND with TAWS implemented on an Mx-20 (see fig. 
79) for the earlier studies of the element (Hughes & Takallu, 2002; Glaab & Hughes, 
2003) with a GA version (see fig. 80) adapted from the CAB SVS ND with TAWS 
caution and warning overlays.  While no comparative testing between the two ND 
concepts was conducted by the GA element, the enthusiastic acceptance of the SVS ND 
by experienced GA pilots and researchers has been overwhelmingly in its favor. 
6.2.4 Surface Operations Considerations 
The best practices that evolved in the area of surface operations symbology as GA-
specific issues are practically non-existent, as, aside from providing a taxi map for 
ownship position awareness, the Basic SVS system is not intended for low visibility 
surface operations.  The Enhanced SVS system does include surveillance information and 
RIPS incursion detection algorithms and display concepts, and as such is better equipped 
for low visibility surface operations.  However, only one simulation study within the 
Project addressed GA surface operations, and the best practices that evolved in that effort 
are discussed below under RIPS. 
6.2.5 Runway Incursion Prevention System 
The two algorithms developed under the RIPS efforts, PathProx™ (Cassel et al., 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003)and RSM (Green, 2002, 2006), were originally designed to 
address runway incursion incidents involving only commercial aircraft (as shown in fig. 
81, such incidents occurred in 2003 at a rate of about one every 2.6 days).  However, the  
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Figure 79.  GA ND with TAWS implemented on an Mx-20 (on approach to ROA). 
 
 
Figure 80.  GA version on approach to RNO adapted from the CAB ND with 
neighborhood traffic and TAWS overlays (not shown). 
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Figure 81.  Runway Incursion Rates from FAA Runway Safety Report, August, 2004. 
 
number of GA / GA type incursions is much higher (reported incidents occurred in 2003 
at a rate of about one every 1.7 days), especially considering that incidents at 
uncontrolled airports are not reported, since there is no ATC at uncontrolled airports and, 
by definition, a controller determines whether there is an incursion and then reports to 
FAA.  In the final stages of the SVS Project, extension of both algorithms to alert during 
GA / GA type incursions was successful. Further extension to alert during Commercial / 
GA type incursions, another serious concern (see fig. 82), may be pursued under another 
NASA Project (IIFDT). 
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Figure 82.  Runway Incursion by Severity Category from FAA Runway Safety Report, 
July, 2003. 
One study (Jones, 2006) was conducted within the SVS Project to evaluate the 
extension of the two algorithms to address GA / GA type incursions, and the best practice 
findings of the usability experiment of that study are presented below under the following 
topics: EMM View, Traffic Display, Two-stage Alerting, and Audible Alerts. 
6.2.5.1 EMM View.  Both a coplanar view ND (see fig. 59) and the perspective 
EMM (see fig. 16) have been evaluated for surface operations.  While both viewing 
modes have proven effective, most transport evaluation pilots have preferred the 
perspective view, particularly when operating on the surface (Jones, 2002).  In the GA 
study, the perspective map was rated slightly more effective (see fig. 83).  Best practice 
within the Project for both GA and CAB applications was to use the overhead coplanar 
viewpoint during approach and take-off operations and the perspective view during taxi. 
 
Figure 83.  GA RIPS overhead view of airport surface. 
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6.2.5.2 Traffic Display.  In the GA study, a surface map with ownship (without 
other traffic) was rated as being significantly inferior to a surface map with traffic and / 
or incursion alerting for perceived safety value added.  Most evaluation pilots (14 of 16) 
considered traffic presentation necessary to prevent runway incursions.  However, 
according to analysis of the objective measures, the addition of traffic was marginally 
beneficial when presented on a moving map display and was only effective when alerting 
was provided.  A possible cause may be that pilots had to transition to out-the-window 
and were not focused on the head-down display. 
6.2.5.3 Two-stage Alerting.  Eleven of 16 evaluation pilots liked the idea of 
having a caution alert in conjunction with a warning to provide more evaluation and 
reaction time (i.e., a greater comfort level).  For the scenarios evaluated, the pilots 
generally felt that providing caution and warning alerts on approach was most effective, 
while a warning alert alone was sufficient when on the airport surface (during departure 
and taxi).  Also, results from the RIPS GA study indicated that more of the subjects 
preferred two-stage alerting for single pilot operations.  The consensus was that two-stage 
alerting was desired on approach but single-stage was desired during take-off and taxi 
(where there is less time to evaluate the situation and more immediate actions may be 
necessary). 
6.2.5.4 Audible Alerts.  In the GA study, a greater safety margin resulted when 
audible alerts were provided.  With such alerting, the pilot is provided a cue to direct 
focus and attention to the head-down display to locate the incurring traffic.  In fact, pilots 
rated having audible alerts with no surface map and having such alerts with a map with 
ownship but no traffic almost the same for runway incursion prevention on almost all 
dependent variables measured.  For the experimental scenarios tested, the moving map 
display revealed its utility only when traffic AND alerting were available.  Overall, a 
surface map with ownship and traffic along with audible alerts was considered an optimal 
incursion prevention system, while an audible alert alone was considered a minimally 
effective system.  It should be noted that more descriptive terms for the alerts, such as 
“Warning, traffic departing 25”, or “Caution, traffic approaching 34R” were used in the 
study.  Most of the subjects felt the terms were very effective; however, a few of the 
pilots thought the terms should be even more descriptive.  More research needs to be 
conducted to determine the best terms to use, and to examine the use of more descriptive 
terminology in CAB applications. 
6.2.6 Database Integrity Monitoring 
The GA Enhanced SVS is equipped with a DIME approach to database integrity 
monitoring.  DIME can make use of various ranging sensors, such as DLRA or, if 
available, a mature omni-directional GPS Bi-Static Radar (GPSBR) receiver.  The best 
practices within the Project that have evolved for the monitoring methodology were 
presented in Section 6.1.6. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), under its Aviation 
Safety Program (AvSP), chartered the Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) Project to develop 
and support the implementation of a synthetic vision system(s) that would greatly 
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improve aviation safety and efficiency of operations for commercial transport, business 
jet, and general aviation aircraft.  The Project has developed display system concepts to 
improve pilot terrain/situation awareness by providing a perspective synthetic view of the 
outside world through an on-board database driven by precise aircraft positioning 
information updating via Global Positioning System-based data.  This work was aimed at 
eliminating visibility-induced errors and low visibility conditions as a causal factor to 
civil aircraft accidents, as well as replicating the operational benefits of clear day flight 
operations regardless of the actual outside visibility condition.  Limited visibility is the 
single most critical factor affecting both the safety and capacity of worldwide aviation 
operations.  Synthetic vision technology will allow this visibility problem to be solved 
with a visibility solution, making every flight the equivalent of a clear daylight operation. 
A Synthetic Vision System takes advantage of many enabling technologies that, 
together, provide more than just a display of terrain information, but instead represent 
operational display systems with independent, redundant information sources and 
substantially improved performance over those displays with only terrain depiction alone.  
The independent informational elements form the basis for monitoring the dynamic flight 
environment and thereby supplement the synthetic world with real-time, direct 
measurement of the surrounding terrain, air / ground traffic and structures / obstacles / 
objects that are not within the databases.  Integration of these enabling technologies into 
the SVS concept (a true system, rather than just terrain on a PFD) provides pilots with 
high-integrity real-time geo-referenced information that improves situational awareness 
with respect to terrain, obstacles, traffic, and flight path, both in the air and on the 
ground. 
Numerous research and development activities have been conducted to evaluate, 
investigate, and assess the technology which can lead to operational and certified SVS.  
From these works and through the cooperative efforts of industry, academia and the 
FAA, certified SVS display concepts could be operational in the very near future, 
providing quantifiable operational and safety benefits.  This work was possible only 
through the collective efforts of many, many individuals.  The authors gratefully 
acknowledge the contributions of all those involved in Government, Industry, and 
Academia. 
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